et seq; MSA 28.1131 et seq, authorizes the imposition of costs in criminal cases. If a defendant has been found guilty, and if it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant is an appropriate candidate, the court may place the defendant on probation. Section 1. As a condition of probation, the court may require the defendant to pay costs. Section 3(2)(c). Such costs, however, are limited to expenses specifically incurred in prosecuting the defendant, in providing legal assistance to the defendant, and in providing probation supervision of the defendant. Section 3(4).

used to support libraries. If excess revenue in the Crime Victim's Rights Fund is used for purposes other than to enforce and pay for the crime victim rights enumerated in art 1, § 24, the use could face scrutiny to determine if the assessments conflict with art 8, § 9 or other constitutional provisions. . . . Therefore, to the extent that the Legislature intends to authorize uses of the Fund to pay for the constitutionally enumerated crime victim's rights, it must consider whether each proposed use is within the language of art 1, § 24, given the principles of constitutional construction that guide the Court.

combination of factors. In arriving at these diverse results, courts have recognized the following distinctions: felonies or misdemeanors; the presence or absence of home rule; the presence or absence of express municipal authority; and the presence or absence of clear and express language indicating state preemption. For the reasons hereafter stated, we conclude that municipalities may enact their own penalties for the crime of DWUI. Although some may believe the result anomalous, we find merit in the argument that had the legislature intended to impose mandatory jail sentences on our cities and towns, it would have done so by simple, clear, and express language. Municipalities have express powers to govern themselves and to regulate local affairs. Municipalities have been granted express power to regulate the use of streets by the legislature. Clear and express limitation of the power to regulate the use of streets does not appear in the statutes; nor has the legislature clearly and expressly indicated its desire to gain exclusive jurisdiction over DWUI in W.S. 31-5-233 (1977) or in Senate Enrolled Act No. 32. The provision of a lesser penalty in a municipal ordinance does [*12] not create conflict with a state law on the same subject, provided the crimes are of a similar class. Therefore, municipalities may regulate DWUI by passing ordinances with lesser penalties than provided by Senate Enrolled Act No. 32.

ever been physically incarcerated in the county jail and regardless of the source of the injury. The county commissioners must reimburse him for these costs. A person's indigency has no bearing upon the initial determination of responsibility. If the person is not indigent the sheriff or county may proceed against him in a suit for reimbursement. [*12] If the person is in fact indigent, the sheriff or county has no recourse for recovery against either the county hospital or the state welfare system.

unless otherwise ordered by the court." The Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that when the word 'shall' is employed, it is usually legally accepted as mandatory, Mau v. Stoner, 14 Wyo., 183, 83 P. 218, 219 (1905). In construing statutes, "Unless the context otherwise indicates, the use of the word 'shall' (except in its future tense) indicates a mandatory intent". 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 25.04 [*2] p. 301 (4th Ed. Sands); Ginnavan v. Silverstone, 246 Md. 500, 229 A.2d 124, 127." Mayland v. State, Wyo., 568 P.2d 897, 899 (1977). Clearly, the legislature, by the word 'shall', intended the clerk of court to collect and disburse restitution payments. Upon an order of restitution by the sentencing court, it becomes mandatory for the office of the clerk to administer the restitution. "The clerk of each of the courts shall exercise the powers conferred and perform the duties enjoined upon him by statute and by the common law; and in the performance of his duties he shall be under the direction of his court." Section 5-7-101, W.S. 1977. Although the statute does not specifically provide for disbursement, where the legislature provided for the clerk to collect restitution it can be inferred that the legislature also intended the clerk to disburse restitution. Section 14-6-229(f)(i), W.S. 1977, allows a juvenile court to order a child to make restitution for any damage or loss caused by his wrongful act. Title 14 of the Wyoming Statutes does not specifically state a procedure for collecting and disbursing restitution payments from juveniles. However, Wyoming courts have [*3] held that statutes dealing with related subjects or having the same general purpose must be read in pari material in order to ascertain intelligent meaning and achieve uniformity. Kuntz v. Kinne, Wyo., 395 P.2d 286 (1964); Stringer v. Board of County Commissioners of Big Horn County, Who., 347 P.2d 197 (1960). Therefore, Section 14-6-229(f)(i), W.S. 1977, and Section 7-13-312, W.S. 1977, must be read in pari materia as to methods of collecting and disbursing restitution payments from both juvenile and criminal defendants.

a comprehensive scheme of parole restitution: the board shall provide for restitution on parole, may modify restitution imposed by the sentencing court, modify restitution imposed by the board or waive it entirely. Under § 7-13-413, W.S. 1977, the board is given the power to adopt rules and regulations governing the performance of duties of parole officers and the administration of the act. Thus it is reasonable that the probation and parole board could take on the responsibility of collecting and disbursing restitution if so ordered by the court.

pursuant to §§ 7-13-307, through 7-13-315, W.S. 1977, goes directly to the Wyoming Crime Victims Compensation Commission after the Commission awards compensation to the victim. Such restitution is deposited in the Commission's account and used to set off against a judgment in favor of the state in a civil action. Section 1-40-112(c)(i), W.S. 1977, (1986 Cum. Supp.). [*7] The Commission reduces the amount of the compensation due the victim by the amount of restitution paid. Section 1-40-122(c)(ii). If restitution has been ordered, but not paid, the victim may be compensated by the Commission and shall reimburse the Commission when and if the defendant pays. Section 1-40-112, W.S. 1977 (1986 Cum. Supp.) was amended by the 1987 general session of the 49th Wyoming Legislature. A new subsection (g), effective May 22, 1987, states any payment of benefits to, or on behalf of a victim or other claimant under the Crime Victims Compensation Act creates a debt due the state by any person found by a criminal court to have committed a criminal act. Payment of the debt shall be a condition of probation, Laws 1987, ch. 119, § 1-40-112(g). In making payment of the debt a condition of probation or parole, the court or board of parole sets the schedule or amount of payments. The Commission has the authority to authorize compensation payments directly to the victim or to a third party. Section 1-40-108(d)(iii), W.S. 1977, (1986 Cum. Supp.). Similarly, the court could order direct payments to victims under the Restitution to Crime Victims Act, Sections 7-13-307 through 7-13-315, W.S. 1977. The victim's remedies for non-payment would be reporting the failure to the prosecuting attorney, the court or the probation and parole officer if applicable.

before a master is a critical stage of such a proceeding. Accordingly, both the right to counsel and the obligation of the Public Defender to provide representation for indigents apply.If incarceration is not sought as a remedy in a contempt proceeding, the constitutional right to counsel is not implicated.6 Nor is the Public Defender obligated to provide representation.

is our opinion that the eligibility criteria established by the Public Defenders Office must be adopted under the rulemaking procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act in order to be legally effective.

into the reason why the defendant has failed to pay the fine. If the failure to pay is attributable to indigency the court must also consider alternate methods of punishment. If the court ultimately decides that an additional period of incarceration is necessary to serve the interests of deterrence and punishment, the aggregate period of incarceration cannot exceed the maximum sentence for the underlying offense."

for court-designated individuals conducting each type of fee-for-service ADR"

courts of this State, which shall have the force of law until rescinded, changed or modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law. The power of courts other than the Court of Appeals to make rules of practice and procedure, or administrative rules, shall be subject to the rules and regulations adopted by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law." "Subject to the approval of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, the county administrative judge of each circuit court shall develop and adopt maximum hourly rate fee schedules for court-designated individuals conducting each type of fee-for-service ADR"

alternative procedure in working with indigents.

not limited to, past due feesand fines.”

fine or other penalty imposed is suspended, in whole or in part, such suspension shall not affect the state assessment under this section. No state assessment imposed under the provisions of this section may be suspended or reduced by the court. Based on the above quoted statute, the state assessment court costs are collected by the clerk of the court regardless of whether the judge imposes them or not. There are several statutorily imposed fees or costs which are to be collected regardless of whether the judge imposes them or not, e.g. Mississippi Code Annotated Section 19-7-31 allows the boards of supervisors to impose a court cost for the support of a public county law library in their respective counties. This court cost is automatically assessed regardless of whether the judge imposes it or not. Also, upon conviction for writing a bad check, Section 97-19-67(4) directs the court to impose a fee in the amount of up to 85% of the face value of a bad check in addition to any other fine, fee, cost or penalty imposed by the judge. Section 37-26-9(4) imposes a supplemental court education and training cost in all criminal cases where a fine of $10 or more is imposed by the judge. The general rule is that if the cost is statutorily imposed, there is no need for the judge to impose the cost. However, from time to time, a court cost may be incurred in which there is no statutory imposition. In such a case it is within the judge's discretion to impose such a court cost on the defendant.