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13 Results
State | Citation | Description/Statute Name | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Montana | 49 Mont. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 18, 2002 WL 1009805 | Montana-Attorney General opinion | What authority do county or municipal courts have to set fines or fees? |
The Montana Constitution and Montana law authorize amunicipal court judge to release a defendant on a time-pay
bail bond, defined as a bond in an amount set by the judge
to be + See morepaid in installments.
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If the court finds some form of bail necessary, however, Mont. Code Ann. § 46-9-301, provides more specific factors for a court to consider. These factors include, among other matters + See morenot related to the safety of the victim and the community, that the amount shall be not oppressive, and that the amount shall be
considerate of the financial ability of the accused. Id., §§ 46-9-301(4) and (6). The time-pay bail bonds system comports with these requirements.The Montana Constitution and Montana law authorize a municipal court judge to release a defendant on a time-pay bail bond, defined as a bond in an amount set by the judge to be paid in installments.
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Ability to pay |
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Montana | 41 Mont. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 59 | Montana-Attorney General opinion | Other applicable opinions | Cash bail for minor offenses may be increased to include applicable surcharges |
In order to collect the additional $10 charge required by section 46-18-236, MCA, a court may exercise its power under section 46-9-302, MCA, and increase the bail schedule for minor + See moreoffenses in a like amount.
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Enforcement |
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Oregon | OP-6203 (1988) | Oregon-Attorney General opinion | What authority do county or municipal courts have to set fines or fees? | Fines and fees must fall within the limits imposed in the state legislature's max-min scheme | It is axiomatic that state officers may administer public funds only in the manner authorized or directed by the Oregon Constitution or controlling statutes. | Fines and fees |
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Oregon | OP-6203 (1988) | Oregon-Attorney General opinion | What authority does the state supreme court have to impose binding state-wide rules on the imposition or collection of fees and fines? | The Chief Justice in particular has wide latitude in determining these rules |
The Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court is the administrative head of the Judicial Department. ORS 1.002(1). ‘The Chief Justice shall exercise administrative authority and supervision over the courts + See moreof this state consistent with applicable provisions of law * * *.’ Id. Pursuant to that authority, the Chief Justice may, inter alia, ‘issue orders appropriate to that exercise.’ ORS 1.002(1)(a). Accordingly, these statutes grant to the Chief Justice the power to require judges and clerks to comply with statutes that govern the imposition, collection, and disposition of fines and penalty assessments. See also ORS 1.025 (governing duties with regard to matters relating to the administration of justice).
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Fines and fees |
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South Carolina | S.C.A.G. Oct. 8, 2012 (informal opinion) | Civil contempt |
Are the same procedural protections that are required in criminal proceedings required in civil collection/contempt proceedings arising from criminal justice debt when those proceedings may result in incarceration? What if + See morethe proceedings may only result in additional fines or non-incarceration penalties?
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No - the rationale for punishment based on contempt proceedings rather than criminal proceedings is different |
The principal purpose of criminal contempt is punishment. In civil contempt, however, the contemnors "carry the keys of prison in their own pockets" as the contempt serves to secure "compliance + See morewith judicial decrees." 287 S.E.2d at 919. The Court concluded that "[t]he conditional nature of the imprisonment, based entirely upon appellant's refusal to pay respondent's expenses, justified the civil contempt proceeding without a jury trial.
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Enforcement |
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South Carolina | S.C.A.G. July 15, 1996 (informal opinion) | Setting fees | Does allowing different municipalities to set their own indigency standards or fines/fees violate the equal protection afforded by the state’s constitution? | Not answered as to indigency - however, municipalities cannot set their own fees not in accordance with State statutes |
it is the opinion of this Office that all fee schedules used in the various counties based upon ordinances and special statutes are unconstitutional and that the only fee schedule + See moreavailable for the services enumerated is to be found under South Carolina Code Section 27-53 (1976) [replaced by Act No. 164 of 1979]
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Fines and fees |
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South Carolina | Robert L. McCrudy, S.C.A.G. Dec. 14, 1999 (informal opinion) | Collection by private vendor | Which fines and/or fees may be collected by a private vendor? | Collection of criminal fines and fees are the job of the magistrate |
With respect to the physical collection and handling ofpublic monies such as fines, restitution, etc. such should be done exclusively by the court and its officers rather than by the + See morecompany, in the absence of legislative authorization therefore.
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Enforcement |
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South Carolina | 1987 S.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 255 (1987) | Bearden | Should ability to pay be considered when imposing fines or fees or only when collecting fines or fees? | Not answered - however, cannot implement a surcharge if defendant fails to pay fee |
In the circumstances where an indigent fails to comply with the schedule of payments established by the court and the court determines that the indigent has wilfully refused to pay + See moreor failed to make bona fide efforts to pay, the court is authorized to imprison the defendant for contempt. As provided in Section 17–25–350, where part of the fine has been paid, the imprisonment cannot exceed the remaining pro rata portion of the sentence. I am unaware of any basis for a court to impose a fine in addition to the sentence originally imposed.
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Ability to pay |
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South Carolina | 1978 S.C. Op. Att'y Gen. 140 (1978) | South Carolina-Attorney General opinion | What authority do county or municipal courts have to set fines or fees? | By implication, they may set fees at least as far as reimbursement for public defense |
Since the Defense of Indigents Act, supra, does not prohibit the municipal court from ordering reimbursement as a condition of suspended sentences and since such orders are not generally unconstitutional + See moreor improper, it is the opinion of this Office that certain municipal courts may order as a condition of a suspended sentence, a convicted indigent defendant to reimburse the Judicial Department for the costs of his representation by a public defender, pursuant to Section 17–3–40 of the Code of Laws.
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Washington | Wash. Att'y Gen. Op. 1993 NO. 11 (1993) | Ability to pay - considered at imposition and collection of fines and fees | Should ability to pay be considered when imposing fines or fees or only when collecting fines or fees? | They must be considered both when imposing and collecting fines and fees |
[A] county considering an ordinance authorizing a court to impose a multiple booking fee as part of a criminal sentence should heed constitutional considerations relating to the offender's ability to + See morepay the fee. Some statutes providing for the repayment of costs incurred on behalf of a criminal defendant, also known as recoupment statutes, have been challenged as unconstitutional. The courts generally have upheld these statutes, provided that they contain certain safeguards. As set forth in Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 40 L.Ed.2d 642, 94 S.Ct. 2116 (1974), and summarized in State v. Earls, 51 Wn.App. 192, 19596, 752 P.2d 402 (1988), the safeguards are:(1) The requirement of repayment must not be mandatory;(2) Repayment may be imposed only upon convicted defendants;(3) Repayment may only be ordered if the defendant is or will be able to pay;(4) The financial resources of the defendant must be taken into consideration;(5) A repayment obligation may not be imposed if it appears there is no likelihood the defendant's indigency will end;(6) The convicted person must be permitted to petition the court for remission of the payment of costs or any unpaid portion thereof;(7) The convicted person cannot be held in contempt for failure to repay if the default was not attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the court order or a failure to make a good faith effort to make repayment.
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Washington | Wash. Att'y Gen. Op. 1993 NO. 11 (1993) | Authority to set fines/fees | What authority do county or municipal courts have to set fines or fees? | Counties are given extensive freedoms to set fines and fees for municipal violations, but cannot do so in fields in which the state preempts |
Counties have broad authority under article 11, section 11 of the state constitution to act in furtherance of their police power. That section provides: Any county, city, town or township + See moremay make and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws. The State Supreme Court has described this provision as follows: This is a direct delegation of the police power as ample within its limits as that possessed by the legislature itself. It requires no legislative sanction for its exercise so long as the subject-matter is local, and the regulation reasonable and consistent with the general laws. Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wn.2d 106, 109, 356 P.2d 292 (1960); see also Brown v. Yakima, 116 Wn.2d 556, 559, 807 P.2d 353 (1991).Under this provision, counties may enact ordinances regarding all those measures which bear a reasonable and substantial relation to promotion of the general welfare of the people. State v. Seattle, 94 Wn.2d 162, 165, 615 P.2d 461 (1980). County ordinances prescribing local offenses and punishments for them would constitute police power measures of the county under article 11, section 11 of the Washington Constitution. Such county ordinances may not, however, conflict with state laws. The courts have interpreted this to mean that counties may not legislate in a particular area when the state has preempted the field, or when the county legislation and state legislation on the same subject cannot be harmonized. Brown, 116 Wn.2d at 559.
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Washington | See answer for 8 above | Washington-Attorney General opinion | What authority does the state supreme court have to impose binding state-wide rules on the imposition or collection of fees and fines? | See answer for 8 above | See answer for 8 above | |
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Washington | Not answered | Washington-Attorney General opinion | Under what circumstances does a conflict of interest in the imposition or enforcement of court debt violate state law? | Not answered | Not answered |