with judicial decrees." 287 S.E.2d at 919. The Court concluded that "[t]he conditional nature of the imprisonment, based entirely upon appellant's refusal to pay respondent's expenses, justified the civil contempt proceeding without a jury trial.

available for the services enumerated is to be found under South Carolina Code Section 27-53 (1976) [replaced by Act No. 164 of 1979]

company, in the absence of legislative authorization therefore.

or failed to make bona fide efforts to pay, the court is authorized to imprison the defendant for contempt. As provided in Section 17–25–350, where part of the fine has been paid, the imprisonment cannot exceed the remaining pro rata portion of the sentence. I am unaware of any basis for a court to impose a fine in addition to the sentence originally imposed.

combination of factors. In arriving at these diverse results, courts have recognized the following distinctions: felonies or misdemeanors; the presence or absence of home rule; the presence or absence of express municipal authority; and the presence or absence of clear and express language indicating state preemption. For the reasons hereafter stated, we conclude that municipalities may enact their own penalties for the crime of DWUI. Although some may believe the result anomalous, we find merit in the argument that had the legislature intended to impose mandatory jail sentences on our cities and towns, it would have done so by simple, clear, and express language. Municipalities have express powers to govern themselves and to regulate local affairs. Municipalities have been granted express power to regulate the use of streets by the legislature. Clear and express limitation of the power to regulate the use of streets does not appear in the statutes; nor has the legislature clearly and expressly indicated its desire to gain exclusive jurisdiction over DWUI in W.S. 31-5-233 (1977) or in Senate Enrolled Act No. 32. The provision of a lesser penalty in a municipal ordinance does [*12] not create conflict with a state law on the same subject, provided the crimes are of a similar class. Therefore, municipalities may regulate DWUI by passing ordinances with lesser penalties than provided by Senate Enrolled Act No. 32.

ever been physically incarcerated in the county jail and regardless of the source of the injury. The county commissioners must reimburse him for these costs. A person's indigency has no bearing upon the initial determination of responsibility. If the person is not indigent the sheriff or county may proceed against him in a suit for reimbursement. [*12] If the person is in fact indigent, the sheriff or county has no recourse for recovery against either the county hospital or the state welfare system.

a comprehensive scheme of parole restitution: the board shall provide for restitution on parole, may modify restitution imposed by the sentencing court, modify restitution imposed by the board or waive it entirely. Under § 7-13-413, W.S. 1977, the board is given the power to adopt rules and regulations governing the performance of duties of parole officers and the administration of the act. Thus it is reasonable that the probation and parole board could take on the responsibility of collecting and disbursing restitution if so ordered by the court.