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|State||Citation||Description/Statute Name||Question||Brief answer||Language from the opinion||When does the case apply?|
|Michigan||Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. (1998) Opinion No. 6995||Michigan-Attorney General opinion||Other applicable opinions||
A prosecutor is not authorized by law to require a criminal defendant to pay costs as a condition for reducing or dismissing criminal charges pending against the defendant. A court+ See more
may, however, when sentencing a convicted defendant, impose such costs as are permitted by statute, including those permissible costs agreed to between the prosecutor and the defendant as part of a plea bargain.
Criminal prosecutions are governed by the Michigan Code of Criminal Procedure (Code), 1927 PA 175, MCL 760.1 et seq; MSA 28.841 et seq. The Code, at Chapter XI, MCL 771.1+ See more
et seq; MSA 28.1131 et seq, authorizes the imposition of costs in criminal cases. If a defendant has been found guilty, and if it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant is an appropriate candidate, the court may place the defendant on probation. Section 1. As a condition of probation, the court may require the defendant to pay costs. Section 3(2)(c). Such costs, however, are limited to expenses specifically incurred in prosecuting the defendant, in providing legal assistance to the defendant, and in providing probation supervision of the defendant. Section 3(4).
|Fines and fees|
|Michigan||Mich. Op. Att'y Gen. (2008) Opinion No. 7217||Michigan-Attorney General opinion||The use of funds from criminal fines and assessments are restricted by provisions of the Michigan State Constitution.||
However, the Legislature should be aware of the limitations imposed by Const 1963, art 8, § 9, which requires that fines assessed for any breach of the penal laws be+ See more
used to support libraries. If excess revenue in the Crime Victim's Rights Fund is used for purposes other than to enforce and pay for the crime victim rights enumerated in art 1, § 24, the use could face scrutiny to determine if the assessments conflict with art 8, § 9 or other constitutional provisions. . . . Therefore, to the extent that the Legislature intends to authorize uses of the Fund to pay for the constitutionally enumerated crime victim's rights, it must consider whether each proposed use is within the language of art 1, § 24, given the principles of constitutional construction that guide the Court.
|Fines and fees|
|North Carolina||N.C.A.G. Mar. 21, 1996||RE: Advisory Opinion; Exceptions to Statutory Exemptions for Execution of Judgment on Criminal Restitution Orders||Other applicable opinions||North Carolina is not barred from structuring a program to collect costs; however, the state's initiatives, must be narrowly drawn so as to avoid chilling the indigent's right to counsel||
North Carolina [is not] barred from structuring a program to collect the amount it is owed from a financially-able defendant through reasonable and fairly administered procedures. The state's initiatives in+ See more
this area naturally must be narrowly drawn to avoid either chilling the indigent's exercise of the right to counsel, or creating discriminating terms of repayment based solely on the defendant's poverty. Beyond these threshold requirements, however, the State has wide latitude to shape its attorneys fees recoupment or restitution program along the lines it deems most appropriate for achieving lawful state objectives. Id. at 123-124. (emphasis added.)
|North Carolina||N.C.A.G. June 10, 1980||Criminal Law and Procedure; Sentences; Probation; Restitution; Bankruptcy Proceedings||Person who received illegal gains as a part of criminal activity may not discharge legal financial obligations in bankruptcy||
It would thus be against our statute and public policy to permit a defendant who has received illegal gains and who was ordered to make restitution as a condition of+ See more
his sentence to vacate such conditions by a discharge in bankruptcy." People v. Mosesson, 356 N.Y.S. 2d 483, 484-85, (1974). See also: People on Inf. of Anerbach v. Topping Bros., 359 N.Y.S. 2d 985 (1974).
|Oregon||OP-6203 (1988)||Oregon-Attorney General opinion||What authority do county or municipal courts have to set fines or fees?||Fines and fees must fall within the limits imposed in the state legislature's max-min scheme||It is axiomatic that state officers may administer public funds only in the manner authorized or directed by the Oregon Constitution or controlling statutes.||Fines and fees|
|Oregon||OP-6203 (1988)||Oregon-Attorney General opinion||What authority does the state supreme court have to impose binding state-wide rules on the imposition or collection of fees and fines?||The Chief Justice in particular has wide latitude in determining these rules||
The Chief Justice of the Oregon Supreme Court is the administrative head of the Judicial Department. ORS 1.002(1). ‘The Chief Justice shall exercise administrative authority and supervision over the courts+ See more
of this state consistent with applicable provisions of law * * *.’ Id. Pursuant to that authority, the Chief Justice may, inter alia, ‘issue orders appropriate to that exercise.’ ORS 1.002(1)(a). Accordingly, these statutes grant to the Chief Justice the power to require judges and clerks to comply with statutes that govern the imposition, collection, and disposition of fines and penalty assessments. See also ORS 1.025 (governing duties with regard to matters relating to the administration of justice).
|Fines and fees|
|Washington||Wash. Att'y Gen. Op. 1993 NO. 11 (1993)||Ability to pay - considered at imposition and collection of fines and fees||Should ability to pay be considered when imposing fines or fees or only when collecting fines or fees?||They must be considered both when imposing and collecting fines and fees||
[A] county considering an ordinance authorizing a court to impose a multiple booking fee as part of a criminal sentence should heed constitutional considerations relating to the offender's ability to+ See more
pay the fee. Some statutes providing for the repayment of costs incurred on behalf of a criminal defendant, also known as recoupment statutes, have been challenged as unconstitutional. The courts generally have upheld these statutes, provided that they contain certain safeguards. As set forth in Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 40 L.Ed.2d 642, 94 S.Ct. 2116 (1974), and summarized in State v. Earls, 51 Wn.App. 192, 19596, 752 P.2d 402 (1988), the safeguards are:(1) The requirement of repayment must not be mandatory;(2) Repayment may be imposed only upon convicted defendants;(3) Repayment may only be ordered if the defendant is or will be able to pay;(4) The financial resources of the defendant must be taken into consideration;(5) A repayment obligation may not be imposed if it appears there is no likelihood the defendant's indigency will end;(6) The convicted person must be permitted to petition the court for remission of the payment of costs or any unpaid portion thereof;(7) The convicted person cannot be held in contempt for failure to repay if the default was not attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the court order or a failure to make a good faith effort to make repayment.
|Washington||Wash. Att'y Gen. Op. 1993 NO. 11 (1993)||Authority to set fines/fees||What authority do county or municipal courts have to set fines or fees?||Counties are given extensive freedoms to set fines and fees for municipal violations, but cannot do so in fields in which the state preempts||
Counties have broad authority under article 11, section 11 of the state constitution to act in furtherance of their police power. That section provides: Any county, city, town or township+ See more
may make and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws. The State Supreme Court has described this provision as follows: This is a direct delegation of the police power as ample within its limits as that possessed by the legislature itself. It requires no legislative sanction for its exercise so long as the subject-matter is local, and the regulation reasonable and consistent with the general laws. Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wn.2d 106, 109, 356 P.2d 292 (1960); see also Brown v. Yakima, 116 Wn.2d 556, 559, 807 P.2d 353 (1991).Under this provision, counties may enact ordinances regarding all those measures which bear a reasonable and substantial relation to promotion of the general welfare of the people. State v. Seattle, 94 Wn.2d 162, 165, 615 P.2d 461 (1980). County ordinances prescribing local offenses and punishments for them would constitute police power measures of the county under article 11, section 11 of the Washington Constitution. Such county ordinances may not, however, conflict with state laws. The courts have interpreted this to mean that counties may not legislate in a particular area when the state has preempted the field, or when the county legislation and state legislation on the same subject cannot be harmonized. Brown, 116 Wn.2d at 559.
|Washington||See answer for 8 above||Washington-Attorney General opinion||What authority does the state supreme court have to impose binding state-wide rules on the imposition or collection of fees and fines?||See answer for 8 above||See answer for 8 above|
|Washington||Not answered||Washington-Attorney General opinion||Under what circumstances does a conflict of interest in the imposition or enforcement of court debt violate state law?||Not answered||Not answered|