combination of factors. In arriving at these diverse results, courts have recognized the following distinctions: felonies or misdemeanors; the presence or absence of home rule; the presence or absence of express municipal authority; and the presence or absence of clear and express language indicating state preemption. For the reasons hereafter stated, we conclude that municipalities may enact their own penalties for the crime of DWUI. Although some may believe the result anomalous, we find merit in the argument that had the legislature intended to impose mandatory jail sentences on our cities and towns, it would have done so by simple, clear, and express language. Municipalities have express powers to govern themselves and to regulate local affairs. Municipalities have been granted express power to regulate the use of streets by the legislature. Clear and express limitation of the power to regulate the use of streets does not appear in the statutes; nor has the legislature clearly and expressly indicated its desire to gain exclusive jurisdiction over DWUI in W.S. 31-5-233 (1977) or in Senate Enrolled Act No. 32. The provision of a lesser penalty in a municipal ordinance does [*12] not create conflict with a state law on the same subject, provided the crimes are of a similar class. Therefore, municipalities may regulate DWUI by passing ordinances with lesser penalties than provided by Senate Enrolled Act No. 32.

ever been physically incarcerated in the county jail and regardless of the source of the injury. The county commissioners must reimburse him for these costs. A person's indigency has no bearing upon the initial determination of responsibility. If the person is not indigent the sheriff or county may proceed against him in a suit for reimbursement. [*12] If the person is in fact indigent, the sheriff or county has no recourse for recovery against either the county hospital or the state welfare system.

unless otherwise ordered by the court." The Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that when the word 'shall' is employed, it is usually legally accepted as mandatory, Mau v. Stoner, 14 Wyo., 183, 83 P. 218, 219 (1905). In construing statutes, "Unless the context otherwise indicates, the use of the word 'shall' (except in its future tense) indicates a mandatory intent". 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 25.04 [*2] p. 301 (4th Ed. Sands); Ginnavan v. Silverstone, 246 Md. 500, 229 A.2d 124, 127." Mayland v. State, Wyo., 568 P.2d 897, 899 (1977). Clearly, the legislature, by the word 'shall', intended the clerk of court to collect and disburse restitution payments. Upon an order of restitution by the sentencing court, it becomes mandatory for the office of the clerk to administer the restitution. "The clerk of each of the courts shall exercise the powers conferred and perform the duties enjoined upon him by statute and by the common law; and in the performance of his duties he shall be under the direction of his court." Section 5-7-101, W.S. 1977. Although the statute does not specifically provide for disbursement, where the legislature provided for the clerk to collect restitution it can be inferred that the legislature also intended the clerk to disburse restitution. Section 14-6-229(f)(i), W.S. 1977, allows a juvenile court to order a child to make restitution for any damage or loss caused by his wrongful act. Title 14 of the Wyoming Statutes does not specifically state a procedure for collecting and disbursing restitution payments from juveniles. However, Wyoming courts have [*3] held that statutes dealing with related subjects or having the same general purpose must be read in pari material in order to ascertain intelligent meaning and achieve uniformity. Kuntz v. Kinne, Wyo., 395 P.2d 286 (1964); Stringer v. Board of County Commissioners of Big Horn County, Who., 347 P.2d 197 (1960). Therefore, Section 14-6-229(f)(i), W.S. 1977, and Section 7-13-312, W.S. 1977, must be read in pari materia as to methods of collecting and disbursing restitution payments from both juvenile and criminal defendants.

a comprehensive scheme of parole restitution: the board shall provide for restitution on parole, may modify restitution imposed by the sentencing court, modify restitution imposed by the board or waive it entirely. Under § 7-13-413, W.S. 1977, the board is given the power to adopt rules and regulations governing the performance of duties of parole officers and the administration of the act. Thus it is reasonable that the probation and parole board could take on the responsibility of collecting and disbursing restitution if so ordered by the court.

pursuant to §§ 7-13-307, through 7-13-315, W.S. 1977, goes directly to the Wyoming Crime Victims Compensation Commission after the Commission awards compensation to the victim. Such restitution is deposited in the Commission's account and used to set off against a judgment in favor of the state in a civil action. Section 1-40-112(c)(i), W.S. 1977, (1986 Cum. Supp.). [*7] The Commission reduces the amount of the compensation due the victim by the amount of restitution paid. Section 1-40-122(c)(ii). If restitution has been ordered, but not paid, the victim may be compensated by the Commission and shall reimburse the Commission when and if the defendant pays. Section 1-40-112, W.S. 1977 (1986 Cum. Supp.) was amended by the 1987 general session of the 49th Wyoming Legislature. A new subsection (g), effective May 22, 1987, states any payment of benefits to, or on behalf of a victim or other claimant under the Crime Victims Compensation Act creates a debt due the state by any person found by a criminal court to have committed a criminal act. Payment of the debt shall be a condition of probation, Laws 1987, ch. 119, § 1-40-112(g). In making payment of the debt a condition of probation or parole, the court or board of parole sets the schedule or amount of payments. The Commission has the authority to authorize compensation payments directly to the victim or to a third party. Section 1-40-108(d)(iii), W.S. 1977, (1986 Cum. Supp.). Similarly, the court could order direct payments to victims under the Restitution to Crime Victims Act, Sections 7-13-307 through 7-13-315, W.S. 1977. The victim's remedies for non-payment would be reporting the failure to the prosecuting attorney, the court or the probation and parole officer if applicable.

this area naturally must be narrowly drawn to avoid either chilling the indigent's exercise of the right to counsel, or creating discriminating terms of repayment based solely on the defendant's poverty. Beyond these threshold requirements, however, the State has wide latitude to shape its attorneys fees recoupment or restitution program along the lines it deems most appropriate for achieving lawful state objectives. Id. at 123-124. (emphasis added.)

his sentence to vacate such conditions by a discharge in bankruptcy." People v. Mosesson, 356 N.Y.S. 2d 483, 484-85, (1974). See also: People on Inf. of Anerbach v. Topping Bros., 359 N.Y.S. 2d 985 (1974).

Justices of the Peace may establish a mail-in fine center, ... in which case the summons may be made returnable to the applicable mail-in fine center.? 21 Del. C. Section 709(a) The statute does not authorize a municipality to establish a mail-in fine center for payment of fines for motor vehicle offenses which occur within the town. Nor can a town avail itself of the voluntary assessment procedure unless it has an Alderman's or Mayor's Court that is ?duly established.? 21 Del. C. Section 703(d). Stated differently, there must be an actual court, to which payments for motor vehicle offenses can be remitted ?to dispose of the charge without the necessity of personally appearing in the court to which the summons is returnable.? Id. Section 709(a). In conclusion, the Town of Elsmere is not an entity designated by statute to receive criminal history information from DELJIS. It may only operate a voluntary assessment system through a duly established Alderman's or Mayor's Court. In the absence of such a court, it may not charge, impose or collect ?court costs? or any similar fee from persons charged with motor vehicle violations within its boundaries.

exclusive jurisdiction over the care, charge, custody, control, management, administration and supervision of: (14) Collecting as a condition of supervision, a fee based on the Accountability Level of the offender. An offender sentenced to an Accountability Level I sanction shall be charged a $10 monthly fee; an offender sentenced to an Accountability Level II sanction shall be charged a $20 monthly fee; and an offender sentenced to an Accountability Level III sanction shall be charged a $25 monthly fee. The Director of Community Services shall develop policies and procedures with regard to determining an offender's ability to pay the monthly fee. Such policies and procedures shall be applied on a consistent basis to all offenders, and shall be subject to approval by the Commissioner of Correction. In the event the Department determines an offender is unable to pay the monthly fee due to lack of employment or other significant extenuating circumstances, such as an offender's responsibility to remit payment for victim compensation, restitution or child support, said inability shall not constitute a violation of supervision. The offender shall remain liable to pay the fee at such time as the Department determines he or she is able to do so. (Emphasis Supplied) For the reasons outlined below, we conclude that the Department is permitted to assess a supervision fee on offenders sentenced prior to the effective date of 11 Del.C. Sec. 6504(14).

that ‘[t]he personnel of the [county] system shall continue to be appointed and employed under the same procedure as used prior to February 8, 1956, and the system shall be financed under the same method as it was financed prior to February 8, 1956.’ Based on this provision, it is my opinion that any remaining county probation systems could not be converted into a system operated by a private corporation without legislative authority; therefore, the Community Corrections Corporation's proposal could not be accepted by any county still operating a county probation system.

interest in his contract. I agree with your conclusion. To the extent that the sheriff would be responsible to supervise the performance of one contracting to feed county prisoners, this conflict of interest, standing alone, would make the sheriff ineligible to enter into such a contract. An analogous situation was addressed in Op. Att'y Gen. U83-8 (copy attached), and it was concluded that a county commission chairman could not contract to supply groceries to his county. Use of a sealed bid procedure to award the contract was found not to avoid the conflict of interest because the chairman would still be required to supervise performance under the contract. After Op. Att'y Gen. U83-8 was issued, the General Assembly acted to authorize certain transactions between political subdivisions and their officers and employees, including sales of personal property made pursuant to sealed competitive bids. O.C.G.A. § 16-10-6(a)(2)(B) (Ga. Laws 1983, pp. 1326, 1339). The new Code section does not affect your question because in my view the feeding of prisoners does not constitute the sale of personal property to the county.

surcharge. The sheriff, by virtue of his office, is jailer of the county. O.C.G.A. § 42–4–1(a). As such, he has a legal duty to take into custody those convicted of crimes and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. O.C.G.A. § 42–4–12. The refusal to do so is a felony offense. Id. Further, a writ of mandamus may issue to compel performance of this duty. Griffin v. Chatham County, 244 Ga. 628, 629 (1979). For the foregoing reasons, it is my unofficial opinion that a sheriff must accept into custody those individuals convicted of criminal offenses who have been sentenced to a term of incarceration, and that the sheriff may not require payment of a surcharge as a condition precedent to service of the sentence.

a public defender is, under the statute, limited ‘[t]o the extent that [the defendant] . . . is able to provide for the employment of an attorney, the other necessary services and facilities of representation, and court costs . . .’ Thus, the court would not be authorized to order reimbursement beyond the indigent defendant's ability to pay for the services rendered by the public defender. However, this does not exclude partial reimbursements where the defendant is capable of paying some portion of the expenses of representation, as where, for example, the defendant is neither destitute nor a pauper. O.C.G.A. § 17-12-10(a)…. …In summary, it is my unofficial opinion that under O.C.G.A. § 17-12-10(c) a superior court may tax additional amounts onto any fine or restitution where a criminal defendant was represented by a full or part-time public defender, but the court may only order such payments or reimbursements to the extent of the individual defendant's financial capability to pay.

the legal action. The mental retardation comprehensive evaluating teams are statutorily required to be provided by the State Department of Human Resources. O.C.G.A. § 37-4-40. In the criminal context, psychiatric examinations of defendants are properly a charge upon the county treasury, whether required to benefit the defendant, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), or as an aid to the court during trial or prior to sentencing, O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-130.1, 17-7-131; Lingo v. State, supra. Op. Att'y Gen. U85-29 29. In regard to the latter, the Georgia Supreme Court has said that “the psychiatrist appointed by the court for a sanity examination of the defendant may not be regarded as a prosecution witness, but is instead a witness for the court.” Massey v. State, 226 Ga. 703, 704 (1970). Nor is his testimony subject to exclusion by virtue of the defendant's psychiatrist-patient privilege. Pierce v. State, 243 Ga. 454 (1979).

purpose government unit. For example, the municipality is authorized by a wide range of statutes to engage in a variety of functions, including providing police protection and protecting the public health, safety, welfare and Morals. See; Minn. Stat. chs. 410 to 472 (1980). Review of the various local government units reveals that a town is the unit most similar to a municipality. To some extent, towns also possess traditional police powers and authority to provide law enforcement services. Minn. Stat. §§ 365.15; 367.03, subd. 3 (1980). Indeed, numerous towns are given the powers and authority of a statutory city. Minn. Stat. § 368.011 (1980). We therefore conclude that while the county is entitled to one-half of all such fines or penalties, the municipality or town in which a statutory violation is committed is entitled to the other half of such funds.

agency responsible for issuing the citation. The only exceptions provided by the statute occur when the Minnesota Highway Patrol issues the citation. See Minn. Stat. § 299D.03, subd. 5 (1978), or where the fines or fees were collected prior to August 1, 1975, see Minn. Stat. § 487.33, subd. 6 (1978). However, the fines and fees referred to in Minn. Stat. § 487.33, subd. 5 (1978) are limited to certain parking fines, which must be paid over in full each month to the municipality in which the parking violation occurred, and fines and penalties collected as a result of violations of a state statute, or ordinance, charter provision, rules or regulation of a city must be equally divided on a monthly basis. In addition, monies collected as a result of a violation of an ordinance promulgated by a town board of supervisors or board of county commissioners shall be retained by the county treasurer pursuant to the last sentence of Minn. Stat. § 487.33, subd. 5 (1978).

pay the fee. Some statutes providing for the repayment of costs incurred on behalf of a criminal defendant, also known as recoupment statutes, have been challenged as unconstitutional. The courts generally have upheld these statutes, provided that they contain certain safeguards. As set forth in Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 40 L.Ed.2d 642, 94 S.Ct. 2116 (1974), and summarized in State v. Earls, 51 Wn.App. 192, 195–96, 752 P.2d 402 (1988), the safeguards are:(1) The requirement of repayment must not be mandatory;(2) Repayment may be imposed only upon convicted defendants;(3) Repayment may only be ordered if the defendant is or will be able to pay;(4) The financial resources of the defendant must be taken into consideration;(5) A repayment obligation may not be imposed if it appears there is no likelihood the defendant's indigency will end;(6) The convicted person must be permitted to petition the court for remission of the payment of costs or any unpaid portion thereof;(7) The convicted person cannot be held in contempt for failure to repay if the default was not attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the court order or a failure to make a good faith effort to make repayment.

may make and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.” The State Supreme Court has described this provision as follows: This is a direct delegation of the police power as ample within its limits as that possessed by the legislature itself. It requires no legislative sanction for its exercise so long as the subject-matter is local, and the regulation reasonable and consistent with the general laws. Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wn.2d 106, 109, 356 P.2d 292 (1960); see also Brown v. Yakima, 116 Wn.2d 556, 559, 807 P.2d 353 (1991).Under this provision, counties may enact ordinances regarding “all those measures which bear a reasonable and substantial relation to promotion of the general welfare of the people.” State v. Seattle, 94 Wn.2d 162, 165, 615 P.2d 461 (1980). County ordinances prescribing local offenses and punishments for them would constitute police power measures of the county under article 11, section 11 of the Washington Constitution. Such county ordinances may not, however, “conflict” with state laws. The courts have interpreted this to mean that counties may not legislate in a particular area when the state has preempted the field, or when the county legislation and state legislation on the same subject cannot be harmonized. Brown, 116 Wn.2d at 559.