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6 Results
State | Citation | Description/Statute Name | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Georgia | 1989 Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 160 (Ga.A.G.), Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. No. U89-8, 1989 WL 264820 | Authority to delegate power of collection of probation supervision services to private actors | Which fines and/or fees may be collected by a private vendor? | When it comes to probation services at least, County governments may not enter into agreements with private corporations for probation services unless authorized by legislation. |
O.C.G.A. § 42843 provides that those county probation systems in existence on February 8, 1956, would not be affected by the passage of the State-wide Probation Act, and further provides + See morethat [t]he personnel of the [county] system shall continue to be appointed and employed under the same procedure as used prior to February 8, 1956, and the system shall be financed under the same method as it was financed prior to February 8, 1956. Based on this provision, it is my opinion that any remaining county probation systems could not be converted into a system operated by a private corporation without legislative authority; therefore, the Community Corrections Corporation's proposal could not be accepted by any county still operating a county probation system.
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Fines and fees |
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Georgia | Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. No. U92-4 (Ga.A.G.), 1992 WL 478489 | Georgia-Attorney General opinion | Other applicable oppinions |
[A] sheriff must accept into custody those individuals convicted of criminal offenses who have been sentenced to a term of incarceration, and that the sheriff may not require payment of + See morea surcharge as a condition precedent to service of the sentence.
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Pretermitting any discussion of the sheriff's authority to impose such a surcharge, Georgia law makes clear that the sheriff may not condition service of the sentence upon payment of the + See moresurcharge. The sheriff, by virtue of his office, is jailer of the county. O.C.G.A. § 4241(a). As such, he has a legal duty to take into custody those convicted of crimes and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. O.C.G.A. § 42412. The refusal to do so is a felony offense. Id. Further, a writ of mandamus may issue to compel performance of this duty. Griffin v. Chatham County, 244 Ga. 628, 629 (1979).
For the foregoing reasons, it is my unofficial opinion that a sheriff must accept into custody those individuals convicted of criminal offenses who have been sentenced to a term of incarceration, and that the sheriff may not require payment of a surcharge as a condition precedent to service of the sentence.
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Fines and fees |
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Georgia | 1985 Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 203 (Ga.A.G.), Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. No. U85-32, 1985 WL 68946 | Collection of public defender fees from indigent defendants | Superior court's ability to collect fees from an indigent defendant for representation by a public defender is limited to the amount that indigent defendant can afford to reimburse. |
In my opinion, O.C.G.A. § 17-12-10(c) governs the extent to which reimbursement to the county may be required from indigent defendants. The power to tax the costs of representation by + See morea public defender is, under the statute, limited [t]o the extent that [the defendant] . . . is able to provide for the employment of an attorney, the other necessary services and facilities of representation, and court costs . . . Thus, the court would not be authorized to order reimbursement beyond the indigent defendant's ability to pay for the services rendered by the public defender. However, this does not exclude partial reimbursements where the defendant is capable of paying some portion of the expenses of representation, as where, for example, the defendant is neither destitute nor a pauper. O.C.G.A. § 17-12-10(a)
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In summary, it is my unofficial opinion that under O.C.G.A. § 17-12-10(c) a superior court may tax additional amounts onto any fine or restitution where a criminal defendant was represented by a full or part-time public defender, but the court may only order such payments or reimbursements to the extent of the individual defendant's financial capability to pay.
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Fines and fees | |
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Georgia | 1987 Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 96 (Ga.A.G.), Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. No. U87-4, 1987 WL 119551 | Fees and expenses of medical examining teams and hospital committees | Fees for psychiatric examinations performed on defendant in a criminal case should not be imposed on defendant but on the county treasury. |
In neither the civil nor criminal context is the cost of these examinations and testimony placed on the person to be examined, or even on the person or entity initiating + See morethe legal action. The mental retardation comprehensive evaluating teams are statutorily required to be provided by the State Department of Human Resources. O.C.G.A. § 37-4-40. In the criminal context, psychiatric examinations of defendants are properly a charge upon the county treasury, whether required to benefit the defendant, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), or as an aid to the court during trial or prior to sentencing, O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-130.1, 17-7-131; Lingo v. State, supra. Op. Att'y Gen. U85-29 29. In regard to the latter, the Georgia Supreme Court has said that the psychiatrist appointed by the court for a sanity examination of the defendant may not be regarded as a prosecution witness, but is instead a witness for the court. Massey v. State, 226 Ga. 703, 704 (1970). Nor is his testimony subject to exclusion by virtue of the defendant's psychiatrist-patient privilege. Pierce v. State, 243 Ga. 454 (1979).
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Fines and fees | |
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Utah | Ms. Faye Price, Informal Opinion No. 79-51, 1979 WL 32606, at *1 (Feb. 15, 1979) | Informal Opinion No. 79-51, | Does allowing different municipalities to set their own indigence standards or fines/fees violate the equal protection afforded by the states constitution? |
Possibly. Ability to pay should be consistently applied in reference to statute that requires parents and guardians to pay for the cost and maintenance of State Training School residents. Therefore, + See moreit is possible that determining ability to pay when assessing criminal justice debt presents same constitutional issues.
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there could be constitutional difficulties arise from the manner in which it is applied if great care is not taken to insure that the determination of financial responsibility is made + See moreon a strictly consistent and rational basis.
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Ability to pay |
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Utah | Ronald W. Thompson, Informal Opinion No. 77-150, 1978 WL 25972, at *1 (Feb. 7, 1978) | Informal Opinion No. 77-150 | see above | see above |
There is no requirement in the statute that there be a judicial determination of indigence, and it does not appear that a county could properly limit its payments to persons + See morewho have been judicially determined indigent.
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Ability to pay |