be consistent with the designation and classification of offenses under the Penal Law. We further conclude that the Village may provide for increased penalties for subsequent convictions under its zoning code, but may not designate any such offense as a felony. Finally, we are of the opinion that disgorgement of profits upon conviction of a zoning violation may be obtained through the use of an alternate sentence as authorized by the Penal Law, or through enactment of a carefully crafted civil forfeiture law."

and (3) is given a suspended sentence that may “end up in the actual depri¬vation of [his] liberty[.]” Based on the scenario you have presented, if the con¬temnor is indigent and, as it appears, he was not advised of and did not waive the right to counsel, he was entitled to an attorney at the time he pleaded guilty to the contempt charges. Consequently, he cannot be incarcerated on the con¬tempt charges. Under Shelton, appointment of counsel for indigent defendants is a con-stitutional prerequisite to the imposition of a conditional or suspended term of imprisonment. Although the contempt proceeding is considered “quasi-criminal” in nature and characterized as a “violation,” rather than a “crime” [see Ivey v. State, 698 So. 2d 179, 184 n.2 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995), aff’d, 698 So. 2d 187 (Ala. 1997)], because the defendant faces the possibility of incarceration [see ALA. CODE §13A-5-7 (1994) (stating that a defendant faces a term of imprisonment for both misdemeanors and violations)], he is entitled to counsel. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (recognition of right to appointed counsel in a civil proceeding “where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation”); see also Opinion to Rex K. Rainer, Director, Department of Finance, dated July 23, 1982, A.G. No. 82-00465; Ridgway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409, 1413 (5th Cir. 1983).

his pro¬bation can be revoked. These guidelines include: 1. Written notice to the probationer of the claimed violations of probation. 2. Disclosure to the probationer of evidence against him or her. 3. Opportunity of probationer to be heard in per-son and to present witnesses and documentary evidence. 4. The right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the judge specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation). 5. A written statement by the judge as to the evi-dence relied on and reasons for revoking proba-tion. 6. The trial judge who granted probation may also conduct the revocation hearing. (We are not convinced that a detached and neutral judge should hold a revocation hearing. Judges preside over retrials. There appears to be no sound rea-son why the judge who granted probation could not fairly and impartially preside over revocation of probation hearing.) 7. We see no valid reason for having two hear¬ings if the probationer has been given sufficient notice of the charges and the evidence to be relied on for revocation of probation. If the pro¬bationer has not had time to prepare to refute the charges and evidence against him, he can have a timely continuance. 8. The judge conducting the probation hearing should decide on a case by case basis whether due process requires that an indigent probationer be represented by counsel. 9. It is not to be understood that proof beyond a reasonable doubt or the preponderance of the evidence are the standards to be applied in determining whether the probation should be revoked. The trial judge must only be reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the probationer has violated the conditions of his probation. Fiorella v. State, 40 Ala.App. 587, 121 So.2d 875 (1960). Armstrong v. State, 294 Ala. 100, 102-03, 312 So. 2d 620, 622-23 (Ala. 1975) (footnote omitted).

statute, however, gives the judge broad authority to place conditions on probation. ALA. CODE _ 12-14-13 (1995). The statute not only pro¬vides a listing of conditions that the judge may require the probationer to comply with, but also gives the judge the authority to require the probationer to comply with "any other conditions." Id. Therefore, it is the opinion of this Office that a municipal judge can assess a super¬vision fee upon each probationer as a condition of probation. Any condition placed on a probationer that requires the payment of a fee, fine, or restitution should not exceed the probationer's ability to pay. See ALA. R. CRIM. P. 27.1, Committee Comments.

the defendant has completed his or her sentence or probation for the underlying offense. The defendant may serve time until the fine is paid or no longer than one day for each $15 of the fine, no longer than the maximum term of imprisonment for the offense, and no longer than one year if the offense is a felony.

the Attorney Gen-eral to the Honorable Bernice Kuykendall, Mayor, City of Cordova, dated September 2, 1987, A.G. No. 87-00303. As public records, the contents thereof, with certain limitations, may be published in the newspaper. Opinion of the Attorney General to the Honorable William T. Musgrove Jr., Attorney, City of Florence, dated October 6, 1988, A.G. No. 89-00003. The name, address, birth date, offense, and the amount of the past-due fine, as nonconfidential information contained in a municipal court record, may be published in a local newspaper as part of the collec-tion process. Id.

the payment of court-ordered fines and costs, and authorizes imprisonment for non-indigent defendants who fail to pay. Rule 27.2, ARCrP, authorizes a judge to order a defendant to pay court costs and fines as a condition of probation. As previously discussed, in cases involving breaches of con¬ditions of probation, including conditions requiring payment of fines, costs, restitution, or other court-ordered assessments, the court must con¬duct an initial appearance hearing upon the arrest of a probationer before the probationer is incarcerated. The court must inquire into the proba¬tioner’s financial status and determine whether the probationer is indigent since incarceration of an indigent for nonpayment is prohibited.

Justices of the Peace may establish a mail-in fine center, ... in which case the summons may be made returnable to the applicable mail-in fine center.? 21 Del. C. Section 709(a) The statute does not authorize a municipality to establish a mail-in fine center for payment of fines for motor vehicle offenses which occur within the town. Nor can a town avail itself of the voluntary assessment procedure unless it has an Alderman's or Mayor's Court that is ?duly established.? 21 Del. C. Section 703(d). Stated differently, there must be an actual court, to which payments for motor vehicle offenses can be remitted ?to dispose of the charge without the necessity of personally appearing in the court to which the summons is returnable.? Id. Section 709(a). In conclusion, the Town of Elsmere is not an entity designated by statute to receive criminal history information from DELJIS. It may only operate a voluntary assessment system through a duly established Alderman's or Mayor's Court. In the absence of such a court, it may not charge, impose or collect ?court costs? or any similar fee from persons charged with motor vehicle violations within its boundaries.

exclusive jurisdiction over the care, charge, custody, control, management, administration and supervision of: (14) Collecting as a condition of supervision, a fee based on the Accountability Level of the offender. An offender sentenced to an Accountability Level I sanction shall be charged a $10 monthly fee; an offender sentenced to an Accountability Level II sanction shall be charged a $20 monthly fee; and an offender sentenced to an Accountability Level III sanction shall be charged a $25 monthly fee. The Director of Community Services shall develop policies and procedures with regard to determining an offender's ability to pay the monthly fee. Such policies and procedures shall be applied on a consistent basis to all offenders, and shall be subject to approval by the Commissioner of Correction. In the event the Department determines an offender is unable to pay the monthly fee due to lack of employment or other significant extenuating circumstances, such as an offender's responsibility to remit payment for victim compensation, restitution or child support, said inability shall not constitute a violation of supervision. The offender shall remain liable to pay the fee at such time as the Department determines he or she is able to do so. (Emphasis Supplied) For the reasons outlined below, we conclude that the Department is permitted to assess a supervision fee on offenders sentenced prior to the effective date of 11 Del.C. Sec. 6504(14).

et seq; MSA 28.1131 et seq, authorizes the imposition of costs in criminal cases. If a defendant has been found guilty, and if it appears to the satisfaction of the court that the defendant is an appropriate candidate, the court may place the defendant on probation. Section 1. As a condition of probation, the court may require the defendant to pay costs. Section 3(2)(c). Such costs, however, are limited to expenses specifically incurred in prosecuting the defendant, in providing legal assistance to the defendant, and in providing probation supervision of the defendant. Section 3(4).

used to support libraries. If excess revenue in the Crime Victim's Rights Fund is used for purposes other than to enforce and pay for the crime victim rights enumerated in art 1, § 24, the use could face scrutiny to determine if the assessments conflict with art 8, § 9 or other constitutional provisions. . . . Therefore, to the extent that the Legislature intends to authorize uses of the Fund to pay for the constitutionally enumerated crime victim's rights, it must consider whether each proposed use is within the language of art 1, § 24, given the principles of constitutional construction that guide the Court.