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State Citation Description/Statute Name Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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Alabama Ala. Att'y Gen. Op. 2003-086 Alabama-Attorney General opinion
Are the same procedural protections that are required in criminal proceedings required in civil collection/contempt proceedings arising from criminal justice debt when those proceedings may result in incarceration? What if
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the proceedings may only result in additional fines or non-incarceration penalties?
An indigent defendant facing contempt proceedings where he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, which is suspended, is entitled to the appointment of counsel pursuant to Alabama v. Shelton.
Under Alabama v. Shelton, 122 S. Ct. 1764, 1767 (2002), a defendant is entitled to counsel if he: (1) is indigent; (2) has not waived the right to coun¬sel;
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and (3) is given a suspended sentence that may “end up in the actual depri¬vation of [his] liberty[.]” Based on the scenario you have presented, if the con¬temnor is indigent and, as it appears, he was not advised of and did not waive the right to counsel, he was entitled to an attorney at the time he pleaded guilty to the contempt charges. Consequently, he cannot be incarcerated on the con¬tempt charges. Under Shelton, appointment of counsel for indigent defendants is a con-stitutional prerequisite to the imposition of a conditional or suspended term of imprisonment. Although the contempt proceeding is considered “quasi-criminal” in nature and characterized as a “violation,” rather than a “crime” [see Ivey v. State, 698 So. 2d 179, 184 n.2 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995), aff’d, 698 So. 2d 187 (Ala. 1997)], because the defendant faces the possibility of incarceration [see ALA. CODE §13A-5-7 (1994) (stating that a defendant faces a term of imprisonment for both misdemeanors and violations)], he is entitled to counsel. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (recognition of right to appointed counsel in a civil proceeding “where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation”); see also Opinion to Rex K. Rainer, Director, Department of Finance, dated July 23, 1982, A.G. No. 82-00465; Ridgway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409, 1413 (5th Cir. 1983).
Enforcement
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Alabama Ala. Att'y Gen. Op. 2002-036 Alabama-Attorney General opinion
The United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Alabama have set forth minimal due process procedures to be afforded to a probationer in a probation revocation hearing. In a
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probation revocation hearing, the probationer must be given written notice of the claimed violations of probation, a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on, and the reasons for revoking his probation. Because review of probation revocation proceedings from district or municipal court is in the nature of certiorari, no appeal bonds would be set. The right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings is not absolute. The judge conducting the probation hearing should decide on a case-by-case basis whether due process requires that an indigent probationer be represented by counsel.
the Supreme Court of Alabama has set forth the requirements and guidelines that must be met for minimal due process to be accorded the probationer under Morrissey and Gagnon before
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his pro¬bation can be revoked. These guidelines include: 1. Written notice to the probationer of the claimed violations of probation. 2. Disclosure to the probationer of evidence against him or her. 3. Opportunity of probationer to be heard in per-son and to present witnesses and documentary evidence. 4. The right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the judge specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation). 5. A written statement by the judge as to the evi-dence relied on and reasons for revoking proba-tion. 6. The trial judge who granted probation may also conduct the revocation hearing. (We are not convinced that a detached and neutral judge should hold a revocation hearing. Judges preside over retrials. There appears to be no sound rea-son why the judge who granted probation could not fairly and impartially preside over revocation of probation hearing.) 7. We see no valid reason for having two hear¬ings if the probationer has been given sufficient notice of the charges and the evidence to be relied on for revocation of probation. If the pro¬bationer has not had time to prepare to refute the charges and evidence against him, he can have a timely continuance. 8. The judge conducting the probation hearing should decide on a case by case basis whether due process requires that an indigent probationer be represented by counsel. 9. It is not to be understood that proof beyond a reasonable doubt or the preponderance of the evidence are the standards to be applied in determining whether the probation should be revoked. The trial judge must only be reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the probationer has violated the conditions of his probation. Fiorella v. State, 40 Ala.App. 587, 121 So.2d 875 (1960). Armstrong v. State, 294 Ala. 100, 102-03, 312 So. 2d 620, 622-23 (Ala. 1975) (footnote omitted).
Enforcement
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Alabama Ala. Att'y Gen. Op. 1998-00043 Alabama-Attorney General opinion What authority do county or municipal courts have to set fines or fees?
A municipality may enter into a contract with a pri¬vate probation service to fulfill the needs of the munic¬ipal court. Furthermore, a municipal judge can assess a supervision fee upon
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each probationer as a condition of probation. This fee, however, cannot exceed the proba¬tioner's ability to pay.
Court costs are prescribed by statute and cannot be extended. See Attorney General's Opinion to Honorable Steven E. Blair, dated August 11, 1995, A.G. No. 95-00283. The municipal probation
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statute, however, gives the judge broad authority to place conditions on probation. ALA. CODE _ 12-14-13 (1995). The statute not only pro¬vides a listing of conditions that the judge may require the probationer to comply with, but also gives the judge the authority to require the probationer to comply with "any other conditions." Id. Therefore, it is the opinion of this Office that a municipal judge can assess a super¬vision fee upon each probationer as a condition of probation. Any condition placed on a probationer that requires the payment of a fee, fine, or restitution should not exceed the probationer's ability to pay. See ALA. R. CRIM. P. 27.1, Committee Comments.
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Alabama Ala. Att'y Gen. Op. 2012-027 Alabama-Attorney General opinion Other applicable opinions Non-indigent defendants may be incarcerated for failure to pay a fine after serving his or her sentence for the underlying offense
Subject to the limitations of Rule 26.11 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court may place a nonindigent defendant in jail for failure to pay a fine after
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the defendant has completed his or her sentence or probation for the underlying offense. The defendant may serve time until the fine is paid or no longer than one day for each $15 of the fine, no longer than the maximum term of imprisonment for the offense, and no longer than one year if the offense is a felony.
Enforcement
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Alabama Ala. Att'y Gen. Op. 2002-336 Alabama-Attorney General opinion Other applicable opinions A municpality may publish, in a newspaper of local circulation, the names of those individuals with outstanding warrants for unpaid fines and the amount of those fines.
This Office has previously opined that municipal court records are public records to which the public has access with certain limitations as to confidential information contained therein. Opinion of
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the Attorney Gen-eral to the Honorable Bernice Kuykendall, Mayor, City of Cordova, dated September 2, 1987, A.G. No. 87-00303. As public records, the contents thereof, with certain limitations, may be published in the newspaper. Opinion of the Attorney General to the Honorable William T. Musgrove Jr., Attorney, City of Florence, dated October 6, 1988, A.G. No. 89-00003. The name, address, birth date, offense, and the amount of the past-due fine, as nonconfidential information contained in a municipal court record, may be published in a local newspaper as part of the collec-tion process. Id.
Enforcement
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Alabama Ala. Att'y Gen. Op. 2000-020 Alabama-Attorney General opinion Other applicable opinions
When a defendant is arrested for failure to appear or failure to pay, Rule 4.3(b)(3), ARCrP, requires that a judge or magistrate conduct an initial appearance hearing within 72 hours
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of arrest if the defendant has not obtained his or her release from jail.
Regarding circumstances where a defendant fails to pay court-ordered monies, Rule 26.11, ARCrP, provides that a judge must conduct a hearing to determine the financial means of a defendant for
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the payment of court-ordered fines and costs, and authorizes imprisonment for non-indigent defendants who fail to pay. Rule 27.2, ARCrP, authorizes a judge to order a defendant to pay court costs and fines as a condition of probation. As previously discussed, in cases involving breaches of con¬ditions of probation, including conditions requiring payment of fines, costs, restitution, or other court-ordered assessments, the court must con¬duct an initial appearance hearing upon the arrest of a probationer before the probationer is incarcerated. The court must inquire into the proba¬tioner’s financial status and determine whether the probationer is indigent since incarceration of an indigent for nonpayment is prohibited.
Enforcement
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Washington Wash. Att'y Gen. Op. 1993 NO. 11 (1993) Ability to pay - considered at imposition and collection of fines and fees Should ability to pay be considered when imposing fines or fees or only when collecting fines or fees? They must be considered both when imposing and collecting fines and fees
[A] county considering an ordinance authorizing a court to impose a multiple booking fee as part of a criminal sentence should heed constitutional considerations relating to the offender's ability to
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pay the fee. Some statutes providing for the repayment of costs incurred on behalf of a criminal defendant, also known as recoupment statutes, have been challenged as unconstitutional. The courts generally have upheld these statutes, provided that they contain certain safeguards. As set forth in Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 40 L.Ed.2d 642, 94 S.Ct. 2116 (1974), and summarized in State v. Earls, 51 Wn.App. 192, 195–96, 752 P.2d 402 (1988), the safeguards are:(1) The requirement of repayment must not be mandatory;(2) Repayment may be imposed only upon convicted defendants;(3) Repayment may only be ordered if the defendant is or will be able to pay;(4) The financial resources of the defendant must be taken into consideration;(5) A repayment obligation may not be imposed if it appears there is no likelihood the defendant's indigency will end;(6) The convicted person must be permitted to petition the court for remission of the payment of costs or any unpaid portion thereof;(7) The convicted person cannot be held in contempt for failure to repay if the default was not attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the court order or a failure to make a good faith effort to make repayment.
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Washington Wash. Att'y Gen. Op. 1993 NO. 11 (1993) Authority to set fines/fees What authority do county or municipal courts have to set fines or fees? Counties are given extensive freedoms to set fines and fees for municipal violations, but cannot do so in fields in which the state preempts
Counties have broad authority under article 11, section 11 of the state constitution to act in furtherance of their police power. That section provides: “Any county, city, town or township
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may make and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.” The State Supreme Court has described this provision as follows: This is a direct delegation of the police power as ample within its limits as that possessed by the legislature itself. It requires no legislative sanction for its exercise so long as the subject-matter is local, and the regulation reasonable and consistent with the general laws. Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wn.2d 106, 109, 356 P.2d 292 (1960); see also Brown v. Yakima, 116 Wn.2d 556, 559, 807 P.2d 353 (1991).Under this provision, counties may enact ordinances regarding “all those measures which bear a reasonable and substantial relation to promotion of the general welfare of the people.” State v. Seattle, 94 Wn.2d 162, 165, 615 P.2d 461 (1980). County ordinances prescribing local offenses and punishments for them would constitute police power measures of the county under article 11, section 11 of the Washington Constitution. Such county ordinances may not, however, “conflict” with state laws. The courts have interpreted this to mean that counties may not legislate in a particular area when the state has preempted the field, or when the county legislation and state legislation on the same subject cannot be harmonized. Brown, 116 Wn.2d at 559.
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Washington See answer for 8 above Washington-Attorney General opinion What authority does the state supreme court have to impose binding state-wide rules on the imposition or collection of fees and fines? See answer for 8 above See answer for 8 above
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Washington Not answered Washington-Attorney General opinion Under what circumstances does a conflict of interest in the imposition or enforcement of court debt violate state law? Not answered Not answered
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West Virginia W. Va. Code §48-1-304 W.V. Code
Are the same procedural protections that are required in criminal proceedings required in civil collection/contempt proceedings arising from criminal justice debt when those proceedings may result in incarceration? What if
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the proceedings may only result in additional fines or non-incarceration penalties?
In the case of a charge of contempt based upon the failure of the defendant to pay alimony, child support or separate maintenance, if the court or jury finds that
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the defendant did not pay because he was financially unable to pay, the defendant may not be imprisoned on charges of contempt of court.
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West Virginia
(1) State v. Stamm, 222 W. Va. 276, 278, 664 S.E.2d 161, 163 (2008) (2) State ex rel. Zirkle v. Fox, 203 W. Va. 668, 669, 510 S.E.2d 502, 503 (1998) (3)
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W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-11A-5
Case Law / W.V. Code Who has the burden of proof in an ability to pay determination? What is the standard of proof required?
(1) In criminal failure to meet obligation to minor (W. Va. Code § 61-5-29), the State has the burden of proof and the standard is beyond a reasonable doubt. (2)However,
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in civil contempt cases, if contemnor alleges financial inability to pay, he bears the burden of proving such inability to comply with a court mandate in order to avoid imprisonment. (3)Finally, in restitution determinations, the burden is on the defendant and the standard is a preponderance of the evidence.
Where a contemnor alleges financial inability to pay in a civil contempt proceeding, he bears the burden of proving such inability to comply with a court mandate in order to
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avoid imprisonment.
Ability to pay
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West Virginia (1)State v. Murrell, 201 W.Va. 648, 499 S.E.2d 870 (1997)(2) W. Va. Code §50-3-2. Case Law Should ability to pay be considered when imposing fines or fees or only when collecting fines or fees?
No. Ability to pay does not have to be considered when imposing fines or fees; certain fines and fees are required by law to be imposed (see, e.g., W. Va.
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Code §50-3-2.)
“An individual is not excused from the imposition of the maximum sentence allowed under a statute simply because he is indigent, even if that sentence includes the imposition of fines
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pursuant to statute.”
Ability to pay
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West Virginia W. Va. Code §8-10-1, 2; W. Va. Code § 62-4-16. W.V. Code What authority do county or municipal courts have to set fines or fees?
Municipal courts have power to impose fines, penalties and cost when not otherwise provided by charter provision or general law. However, municipal judges may substitute community service in lieu of
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sentence of incarceration or imposition of fine.
Fines and fees
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West Virginia W. Va. Const. art. VIII, § 3 State Constitution What authority does the state supreme court have to impose binding state-wide rules on the imposition or collection of fees and fines? West Virginia's Constitution allows the Court of Appeals to impose binding state-wide rules. No on point Attorney General Opinion.
“The court shall have power to promulgate rules for all cases and proceedings, civil and criminal, for all of the courts of the State relating to writs, warrants, process, practice
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and procedure, which shall have the force and effect of law.”
Enforcement
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West Virginia W. Va. Code § 7-8-14(c) W.V. Code Other applicable opinions
“A defendant who has been sentenced to pay costs and who is not in willful default in the payment of the costs may at any time petition the sentencing court
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for remission of the payment of costs or of any unpaid portion of the costs. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that payment of the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or the defendant's family or dependents, the court may excuse payment of all or part of the amount due in costs, or modify the method of payment.”