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State Citation Description/Statute Name Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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Alabama Ala. Att'y Gen. Op. 2003-086 Alabama-Attorney General opinion
Are the same procedural protections that are required in criminal proceedings required in civil collection/contempt proceedings arising from criminal justice debt when those proceedings may result in incarceration? What if
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the proceedings may only result in additional fines or non-incarceration penalties?
An indigent defendant facing contempt proceedings where he is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, which is suspended, is entitled to the appointment of counsel pursuant to Alabama v. Shelton.
Under Alabama v. Shelton, 122 S. Ct. 1764, 1767 (2002), a defendant is entitled to counsel if he: (1) is indigent; (2) has not waived the right to coun¬sel;
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and (3) is given a suspended sentence that may “end up in the actual depri¬vation of [his] liberty[.]” Based on the scenario you have presented, if the con¬temnor is indigent and, as it appears, he was not advised of and did not waive the right to counsel, he was entitled to an attorney at the time he pleaded guilty to the contempt charges. Consequently, he cannot be incarcerated on the con¬tempt charges. Under Shelton, appointment of counsel for indigent defendants is a con-stitutional prerequisite to the imposition of a conditional or suspended term of imprisonment. Although the contempt proceeding is considered “quasi-criminal” in nature and characterized as a “violation,” rather than a “crime” [see Ivey v. State, 698 So. 2d 179, 184 n.2 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995), aff’d, 698 So. 2d 187 (Ala. 1997)], because the defendant faces the possibility of incarceration [see ALA. CODE §13A-5-7 (1994) (stating that a defendant faces a term of imprisonment for both misdemeanors and violations)], he is entitled to counsel. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (recognition of right to appointed counsel in a civil proceeding “where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litigation”); see also Opinion to Rex K. Rainer, Director, Department of Finance, dated July 23, 1982, A.G. No. 82-00465; Ridgway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409, 1413 (5th Cir. 1983).
Enforcement
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Alabama Ala. Att'y Gen. Op. 2002-036 Alabama-Attorney General opinion
The United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Alabama have set forth minimal due process procedures to be afforded to a probationer in a probation revocation hearing. In a
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probation revocation hearing, the probationer must be given written notice of the claimed violations of probation, a written statement by the factfinder as to the evidence relied on, and the reasons for revoking his probation. Because review of probation revocation proceedings from district or municipal court is in the nature of certiorari, no appeal bonds would be set. The right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings is not absolute. The judge conducting the probation hearing should decide on a case-by-case basis whether due process requires that an indigent probationer be represented by counsel.
the Supreme Court of Alabama has set forth the requirements and guidelines that must be met for minimal due process to be accorded the probationer under Morrissey and Gagnon before
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his pro¬bation can be revoked. These guidelines include: 1. Written notice to the probationer of the claimed violations of probation. 2. Disclosure to the probationer of evidence against him or her. 3. Opportunity of probationer to be heard in per-son and to present witnesses and documentary evidence. 4. The right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the judge specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation). 5. A written statement by the judge as to the evi-dence relied on and reasons for revoking proba-tion. 6. The trial judge who granted probation may also conduct the revocation hearing. (We are not convinced that a detached and neutral judge should hold a revocation hearing. Judges preside over retrials. There appears to be no sound rea-son why the judge who granted probation could not fairly and impartially preside over revocation of probation hearing.) 7. We see no valid reason for having two hear¬ings if the probationer has been given sufficient notice of the charges and the evidence to be relied on for revocation of probation. If the pro¬bationer has not had time to prepare to refute the charges and evidence against him, he can have a timely continuance. 8. The judge conducting the probation hearing should decide on a case by case basis whether due process requires that an indigent probationer be represented by counsel. 9. It is not to be understood that proof beyond a reasonable doubt or the preponderance of the evidence are the standards to be applied in determining whether the probation should be revoked. The trial judge must only be reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the probationer has violated the conditions of his probation. Fiorella v. State, 40 Ala.App. 587, 121 So.2d 875 (1960). Armstrong v. State, 294 Ala. 100, 102-03, 312 So. 2d 620, 622-23 (Ala. 1975) (footnote omitted).
Enforcement
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Alabama Ala. Att'y Gen. Op. 1998-00043 Alabama-Attorney General opinion What authority do county or municipal courts have to set fines or fees?
A municipality may enter into a contract with a pri¬vate probation service to fulfill the needs of the munic¬ipal court. Furthermore, a municipal judge can assess a supervision fee upon
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each probationer as a condition of probation. This fee, however, cannot exceed the proba¬tioner's ability to pay.
Court costs are prescribed by statute and cannot be extended. See Attorney General's Opinion to Honorable Steven E. Blair, dated August 11, 1995, A.G. No. 95-00283. The municipal probation
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statute, however, gives the judge broad authority to place conditions on probation. ALA. CODE _ 12-14-13 (1995). The statute not only pro¬vides a listing of conditions that the judge may require the probationer to comply with, but also gives the judge the authority to require the probationer to comply with "any other conditions." Id. Therefore, it is the opinion of this Office that a municipal judge can assess a super¬vision fee upon each probationer as a condition of probation. Any condition placed on a probationer that requires the payment of a fee, fine, or restitution should not exceed the probationer's ability to pay. See ALA. R. CRIM. P. 27.1, Committee Comments.
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Alabama Ala. Att'y Gen. Op. 2012-027 Alabama-Attorney General opinion Other applicable opinions Non-indigent defendants may be incarcerated for failure to pay a fine after serving his or her sentence for the underlying offense
Subject to the limitations of Rule 26.11 of the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court may place a nonindigent defendant in jail for failure to pay a fine after
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the defendant has completed his or her sentence or probation for the underlying offense. The defendant may serve time until the fine is paid or no longer than one day for each $15 of the fine, no longer than the maximum term of imprisonment for the offense, and no longer than one year if the offense is a felony.
Enforcement
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Alabama Ala. Att'y Gen. Op. 2002-336 Alabama-Attorney General opinion Other applicable opinions A municpality may publish, in a newspaper of local circulation, the names of those individuals with outstanding warrants for unpaid fines and the amount of those fines.
This Office has previously opined that municipal court records are public records to which the public has access with certain limitations as to confidential information contained therein. Opinion of
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the Attorney Gen-eral to the Honorable Bernice Kuykendall, Mayor, City of Cordova, dated September 2, 1987, A.G. No. 87-00303. As public records, the contents thereof, with certain limitations, may be published in the newspaper. Opinion of the Attorney General to the Honorable William T. Musgrove Jr., Attorney, City of Florence, dated October 6, 1988, A.G. No. 89-00003. The name, address, birth date, offense, and the amount of the past-due fine, as nonconfidential information contained in a municipal court record, may be published in a local newspaper as part of the collec-tion process. Id.
Enforcement
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Alabama Ala. Att'y Gen. Op. 2000-020 Alabama-Attorney General opinion Other applicable opinions
When a defendant is arrested for failure to appear or failure to pay, Rule 4.3(b)(3), ARCrP, requires that a judge or magistrate conduct an initial appearance hearing within 72 hours
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of arrest if the defendant has not obtained his or her release from jail.
Regarding circumstances where a defendant fails to pay court-ordered monies, Rule 26.11, ARCrP, provides that a judge must conduct a hearing to determine the financial means of a defendant for
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the payment of court-ordered fines and costs, and authorizes imprisonment for non-indigent defendants who fail to pay. Rule 27.2, ARCrP, authorizes a judge to order a defendant to pay court costs and fines as a condition of probation. As previously discussed, in cases involving breaches of con¬ditions of probation, including conditions requiring payment of fines, costs, restitution, or other court-ordered assessments, the court must con¬duct an initial appearance hearing upon the arrest of a probationer before the probationer is incarcerated. The court must inquire into the proba¬tioner’s financial status and determine whether the probationer is indigent since incarceration of an indigent for nonpayment is prohibited.
Enforcement
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Arizona State v. Robinson, 142 Ariz. 296, 297–98, 689 P.2d 555, 556–57 (Ct. App. 1984); 1987 Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen. 233 (1987) Arizona-Attorney General opinion
Are the same procedural protections that are required in criminal proceedings required in civil collection/contempt proceedings arising from criminal justice debt when those proceedings may result in incarceration? What if
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the proceedings may only result in additional fines or non-incarceration penalties?
Arizona courts have only recognized that there must be an ability to pay proceeding where a party may be incarcerated. Such a determination should consider whether the probationer made good
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faith efforts to pay.
"In view of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Bearden v. Georgia, supra, we conclude that the trial court's order, revoking appellant's probation solely on the grounds that he
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failed to complete payments on the fine and restitution, without regard to his ability to pay, amounts to a deprivation of appellant's conditional freedom in violation of the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.” “In considering a recommendation regarding a probationer who has not fully paid restitution and fines, it would be appropriate for a probation officer to consider, as guidelines, certain statutory requirements the courts must follow. A.R.S. § 13-901(E) authorizes a court to terminate a period of probation and discharge the probationer earlier than the term originally imposed only if it is in the interests of justice and “if the conduct of the defendant on probation warrants it.” A.R.S. § 13-810 establishes contempt sanctions for intentional refusal to make good faith efforts to pay restitution and also provides for modification of restitution orders if a defendant has been unable to pay restitution despite good faith efforts to do so. It would, therefore, also be appropriate for a probation officer to consider the extent of a probationer's ability to pay and whether the probationer made good faith payment efforts or intentionally refused to make efforts to pay in determining whether the defendant's conduct on probation warrants early termination and discharge from probation. The central purpose for all of these statutes is the protection of victims and a probation officer should always exercise his discretion with that purpose clearly in mind.”
Ability to pay
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Arizona 1989 Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen. 134 (1989) Arizona-Attorney General opinion Does allowing different municipalities to set their own indigency standards or fines/fees violate the equal protection afforded by the state’s constitution?
The Arizona Constitution allows the Arizona Supreme Court to allow local courts to make indigency standards, but it is unlikely that local municipal bodies can set such standards without legislative
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delegation.
"The Arizona Supreme Court's rulemaking power is derived from Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5 which gives the supreme court the “[p]ower to make rules relative to all procedural matters
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in any court.” See also Barsema v. Susong, 156 Ariz. 309, 314, 751 P.2d 969, 974 (1988). The supreme court is authorized to delegate indigency determinations to the presiding judge of the superior court in each county by Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 11 which provides that the presiding judge of each county “shall exercise administrative supervision over the superior court and judges thereof in their counties, and shall have other duties as may be provided by law or by rules of the Supreme Court.”“The Arizona Supreme Court has authorized the presiding judge of each county to establish a procedure for the appointment of counsel by the Superior Court for each indigent person entitled to the appointment of counsel. Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 11 (emphasis added). We have not found any constitutional or statutory authority under which the presiding judge may delegate to a county the duty of making indigency determinations and assessments respecting the appointment of counsel in Superior Court criminal proceedings. Moreover, a county has only such powers as have been expressly or impliedly conferred by the legislature. Davis v. Hidden, 124 Ariz. 546, 548, 606 P.2d 36, 38 (App.1979); Maricopa County v. Black, 19 Ariz.App. 239, 241, 506 P.2d 279, 281 (1973). The powers of a county are exercised by and through its board of supervisors. A.R.S. § 11–201; see also Davis v. Hidden, 124 Ariz. at 548, 606 P.2d at 38; Ricca v. Bojorquez, 13 Ariz.App. 10, 13, 473 P.2d 812, 815 (1970). The powers and duties of the counties' boards of supervisors are set forth in A.R.S. § 11–251 and do not include indigency screening or determinations for the superior courts. Thus, Pima County has not been conferred such power by the Legislature.”
Ability to pay
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Arizona See, e.g., State v. Townsend, No. 1 CA-CR 11-0420, 2012 WL 3306960, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2012) (choosing not to answer who has the burden of proof) Arizona-Attorney General opinion Who has the burden of proof in an ability to pay determination? What is the standard of proof required? Arizona Courts have not yet answered this question.
"The State contends that Townsend bore the burden of proving that she was unable to pay restitution. Even assuming that the State is correct, we conclude Townsend met that burden
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of proof here."
Ability to pay
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Arizona State v. Lopez, 175 Ariz. 79, 81, 853 P.2d 1126, 1128 (Ct. App. 1993) Arizona-Attorney General opinion Should ability to pay be considered when imposing fines or fees or only when collecting fines or fees? Case law has established that ability to pay need not be considered when imposing fines or fees.
"Therefore, although we will consider ability to pay as one factor toward a claim that a fine is disproportionate, the trial court does not have to explicitly consider the defendant's
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ability to pay when imposing a fine or its payment schedule"
Ability to pay
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Arizona Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen. No. I95-18 (Dec. 18, 1995) Arizona-Attorney General opinion What authority do county or municipal courts have to set fines or fees? Municipal Courts only have authority to collect the fines and fees which state statutes provide for.
"Only city councils of charter cities which are established under Ariz. Const. art. XIII, § 24 may establish fees and surcharges to be collected by city courts, if their charters
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or ordinances authorize them to do so.5 City courts are also subject to the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court. Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 3; Winter v. Coor, 144 Ariz. 56, 59, 695 P.2d 1094, 1097 (1985).Ordinary municipal corporations such as cities and towns may not, however, establish court fees and surcharges to be collected by municipal courts within their jurisdiction. Unlike charter cities, their authority derives solely from state statutes. Maricopa County v. Maricopa County Mun. Water Conservation Dist., 171 Ariz. 325, 830 P.2d 846 (App. 1991). In establishing various municipal court fees under A.R.S. § 22-404(B), the Legislature prohibited any others “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.” We have reviewed the statutes in Title 9 relating to the authority of non-charter cities and towns and found no statutes authorizing a city or town to set court fees and surcharges."
Fines and fees
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Arizona 1989 Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen. 134 (1989) Arizona-Attorney General opinion What authority does the state supreme court have to impose binding state-wide rules on the imposition or collection of fees and fines? The Arizona Constitution grants the Supreme Court the right to impose binding state-wide rules for procedural matters related to fines and fees.
"The Arizona Supreme Court's rulemaking power is derived from Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5 which gives the supreme court the “[p]ower to make rules relative to all procedural matters
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in any court.” "
Enforcement
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California 65 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 581 (1982) "May a penalty assessment be levied against a criminal defendant who does not have a present ability to pay such assessment?"
Are the same procedural protections that are required in criminal proceedings required in civil collection/contempt proceedings arising from criminal justice debt when those proceedings may result in incarceration? What if
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the proceedings may only result in additional fines or non-incarceration penalties?
Indigent defendants cannot be imprisoned solely because they cannot pay a penalty. However, when indigent defendants refuse or fail to meet the terms of an alternative option, they can be
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imprisoned, as the court sees them the same as a non-indigent defendant.
The effect of Antazo was to bar a trial judge from sending a defendant to jail or prison solely because he was unable to pay the monetary penalty. (In re
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Siegel (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 843, 846.) However, as Antazo makes clear, such a penalty may nevertheless be imposed upon an indigent in certain circumstances (3 Cal.3d 100, 116):‘[O]ur holding is simply that an indigent who would pay his fine if he could, must be given an option comparable to an offender who is not indigent. When the indigent offender refuses to avail himself of such alternatives at the inception, or defaults or otherwise fails to meet the conditions of the particular alternative which is offered him without a showing of reasonable excuse, the indigent offender becomes in the eyes of the court exactly the same as the contumacious offender who is not indigent. When either of these conditions obtain the offender's indigency ceases to be dispositive and he may, consistently with the mandate of the equal protection clause, be relegated to ‘working out’ his fine by imprisonment.' 65 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 581 (1982).
Ability to pay
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California 66 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 440 (1983). Personal use of fines and fees prohibited Under what circumstances does a conflict of interest in the imposition or enforcement of court debt violate state law? Judges cannot receive fines or fees for personal use.
Article VI, section 17, of the California Constitution, provides: “A judge of a court of record may not practice law and during the term for which the judge was selected
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is ineligible for public employment or public office other than judicial employment or judicial office. A judge of the superior or municipal court may, however, become eligible for election to other public office by taking a leave of absence without pay prior to filing a declaration of candidacy. Acceptance of the public office is a resignation from the office of judge. “A judicial officer may not receive fines or fees for personal use.” 66 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 440 (1983).
Revenue flow
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North Carolina N.C.A.G. Mar. 21, 1996 RE: Advisory Opinion; Exceptions to Statutory Exemptions for Execution of Judgment on Criminal Restitution Orders Other applicable opinions North Carolina is not barred from structuring a program to collect costs; however, the state's initiatives, must be narrowly drawn so as to avoid chilling the indigent's right to counsel
North Carolina [is not] barred from structuring a program to collect the amount it is owed from a financially-able defendant through reasonable and fairly administered procedures. The state's initiatives in
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this area naturally must be narrowly drawn to avoid either chilling the indigent's exercise of the right to counsel, or creating discriminating terms of repayment based solely on the defendant's poverty. Beyond these threshold requirements, however, the State has wide latitude to shape its attorneys fees recoupment or restitution program along the lines it deems most appropriate for achieving lawful state objectives. Id. at 123-124. (emphasis added.)
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North Carolina N.C.A.G. June 10, 1980 Criminal Law and Procedure; Sentences; Probation; Restitution; Bankruptcy Proceedings Person who received illegal gains as a part of criminal activity may not discharge legal financial obligations in bankruptcy
It would thus be against our statute and public policy to permit a defendant who has received illegal gains and who was ordered to make restitution as a condition of
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his sentence to vacate such conditions by a discharge in bankruptcy." People v. Mosesson, 356 N.Y.S. 2d 483, 484-85, (1974). See also: People on Inf. of Anerbach v. Topping Bros., 359 N.Y.S. 2d 985 (1974).