unless otherwise ordered by the court." The Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that when the word 'shall' is employed, it is usually legally accepted as mandatory, Mau v. Stoner, 14 Wyo., 183, 83 P. 218, 219 (1905). In construing statutes, "Unless the context otherwise indicates, the use of the word 'shall' (except in its future tense) indicates a mandatory intent". 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 25.04 [*2] p. 301 (4th Ed. Sands); Ginnavan v. Silverstone, 246 Md. 500, 229 A.2d 124, 127." Mayland v. State, Wyo., 568 P.2d 897, 899 (1977). Clearly, the legislature, by the word 'shall', intended the clerk of court to collect and disburse restitution payments. Upon an order of restitution by the sentencing court, it becomes mandatory for the office of the clerk to administer the restitution. "The clerk of each of the courts shall exercise the powers conferred and perform the duties enjoined upon him by statute and by the common law; and in the performance of his duties he shall be under the direction of his court." Section 5-7-101, W.S. 1977. Although the statute does not specifically provide for disbursement, where the legislature provided for the clerk to collect restitution it can be inferred that the legislature also intended the clerk to disburse restitution. Section 14-6-229(f)(i), W.S. 1977, allows a juvenile court to order a child to make restitution for any damage or loss caused by his wrongful act. Title 14 of the Wyoming Statutes does not specifically state a procedure for collecting and disbursing restitution payments from juveniles. However, Wyoming courts have [*3] held that statutes dealing with related subjects or having the same general purpose must be read in pari material in order to ascertain intelligent meaning and achieve uniformity. Kuntz v. Kinne, Wyo., 395 P.2d 286 (1964); Stringer v. Board of County Commissioners of Big Horn County, Who., 347 P.2d 197 (1960). Therefore, Section 14-6-229(f)(i), W.S. 1977, and Section 7-13-312, W.S. 1977, must be read in pari materia as to methods of collecting and disbursing restitution payments from both juvenile and criminal defendants.

pursuant to §§ 7-13-307, through 7-13-315, W.S. 1977, goes directly to the Wyoming Crime Victims Compensation Commission after the Commission awards compensation to the victim. Such restitution is deposited in the Commission's account and used to set off against a judgment in favor of the state in a civil action. Section 1-40-112(c)(i), W.S. 1977, (1986 Cum. Supp.). [*7] The Commission reduces the amount of the compensation due the victim by the amount of restitution paid. Section 1-40-122(c)(ii). If restitution has been ordered, but not paid, the victim may be compensated by the Commission and shall reimburse the Commission when and if the defendant pays. Section 1-40-112, W.S. 1977 (1986 Cum. Supp.) was amended by the 1987 general session of the 49th Wyoming Legislature. A new subsection (g), effective May 22, 1987, states any payment of benefits to, or on behalf of a victim or other claimant under the Crime Victims Compensation Act creates a debt due the state by any person found by a criminal court to have committed a criminal act. Payment of the debt shall be a condition of probation, Laws 1987, ch. 119, § 1-40-112(g). In making payment of the debt a condition of probation or parole, the court or board of parole sets the schedule or amount of payments. The Commission has the authority to authorize compensation payments directly to the victim or to a third party. Section 1-40-108(d)(iii), W.S. 1977, (1986 Cum. Supp.). Similarly, the court could order direct payments to victims under the Restitution to Crime Victims Act, Sections 7-13-307 through 7-13-315, W.S. 1977. The victim's remedies for non-payment would be reporting the failure to the prosecuting attorney, the court or the probation and parole officer if applicable.

failed to complete payments on the fine and restitution, without regard to his ability to pay, amounts to a deprivation of appellant's conditional freedom in violation of the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.” “In considering a recommendation regarding a probationer who has not fully paid restitution and fines, it would be appropriate for a probation officer to consider, as guidelines, certain statutory requirements the courts must follow. A.R.S. § 13-901(E) authorizes a court to terminate a period of probation and discharge the probationer earlier than the term originally imposed only if it is in the interests of justice and “if the conduct of the defendant on probation warrants it.” A.R.S. § 13-810 establishes contempt sanctions for intentional refusal to make good faith efforts to pay restitution and also provides for modification of restitution orders if a defendant has been unable to pay restitution despite good faith efforts to do so. It would, therefore, also be appropriate for a probation officer to consider the extent of a probationer's ability to pay and whether the probationer made good faith payment efforts or intentionally refused to make efforts to pay in determining whether the defendant's conduct on probation warrants early termination and discharge from probation. The central purpose for all of these statutes is the protection of victims and a probation officer should always exercise his discretion with that purpose clearly in mind.”

in any court.” See also Barsema v. Susong, 156 Ariz. 309, 314, 751 P.2d 969, 974 (1988). The supreme court is authorized to delegate indigency determinations to the presiding judge of the superior court in each county by Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 11 which provides that the presiding judge of each county “shall exercise administrative supervision over the superior court and judges thereof in their counties, and shall have other duties as may be provided by law or by rules of the Supreme Court.”“The Arizona Supreme Court has authorized the presiding judge of each county to establish a procedure for the appointment of counsel by the Superior Court for each indigent person entitled to the appointment of counsel. Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 11 (emphasis added). We have not found any constitutional or statutory authority under which the presiding judge may delegate to a county the duty of making indigency determinations and assessments respecting the appointment of counsel in Superior Court criminal proceedings. Moreover, a county has only such powers as have been expressly or impliedly conferred by the legislature. Davis v. Hidden, 124 Ariz. 546, 548, 606 P.2d 36, 38 (App.1979); Maricopa County v. Black, 19 Ariz.App. 239, 241, 506 P.2d 279, 281 (1973). The powers of a county are exercised by and through its board of supervisors. A.R.S. § 11–201; see also Davis v. Hidden, 124 Ariz. at 548, 606 P.2d at 38; Ricca v. Bojorquez, 13 Ariz.App. 10, 13, 473 P.2d 812, 815 (1970). The powers and duties of the counties' boards of supervisors are set forth in A.R.S. § 11–251 and do not include indigency screening or determinations for the superior courts. Thus, Pima County has not been conferred such power by the Legislature.”

of proof here."

ability to pay when imposing a fine or its payment schedule"

Records Act, 51 O.S. 24A.3 (1998). A court clerk must make such pleadings available for public inspection and copying once the district attorney has filed the pleading with the court clerk, 51 O.S. 24A.5 (1998), unless the pleading has been sealed by a court or is protected by a privilege of confidentiality, such as the confidentiality of a grand jury indictment by 22 O.S. 385, until such time as the order of the court expires or is removed and until the grand jury indictment is made public pursuant to statutory provision. A district attorney may keep information contained within the district attorney's litigation files confidential and so not disclose an information or other pleadings. See 51 O.S. 24A.12 (1991). 2. A court clerk or district attorney has no authority to withhold public records from inspection and copying. Such officers must provide "prompt, reasonable access" to the public pursuant to 51 O.S. 24A.5 (1998). This generally may include only the time required to locate and compile such public records. Id. 3. A district attorney may keep confidential records contained in the litigation files of that office. Police departments are not required to provide public access to records of the police department except as provided in Section 51 O.S. 24A.8 of the Open Records Act or pursuant to court order. Neither a district attorney nor a police department must make available for public inspection and copying a record which includes a list of all charges contained in an information. See 51 O.S. 24A.2 - 51 O.S. 24A.8 and 51 O.S. 24A.12 (1998).