criminal fine included in criminal sentence is nondischargeable in Chapter 13 bankruptcy; criminal fines not contingent upon sentence, traffic fines arising from traffic infractions, and civil traffic fines are dischargeable in Chapter 13 bankruptcies."

failed to complete payments on the fine and restitution, without regard to his ability to pay, amounts to a deprivation of appellant's conditional freedom in violation of the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.” “In considering a recommendation regarding a probationer who has not fully paid restitution and fines, it would be appropriate for a probation officer to consider, as guidelines, certain statutory requirements the courts must follow. A.R.S. § 13-901(E) authorizes a court to terminate a period of probation and discharge the probationer earlier than the term originally imposed only if it is in the interests of justice and “if the conduct of the defendant on probation warrants it.” A.R.S. § 13-810 establishes contempt sanctions for intentional refusal to make good faith efforts to pay restitution and also provides for modification of restitution orders if a defendant has been unable to pay restitution despite good faith efforts to do so. It would, therefore, also be appropriate for a probation officer to consider the extent of a probationer's ability to pay and whether the probationer made good faith payment efforts or intentionally refused to make efforts to pay in determining whether the defendant's conduct on probation warrants early termination and discharge from probation. The central purpose for all of these statutes is the protection of victims and a probation officer should always exercise his discretion with that purpose clearly in mind.”

in any court.” See also Barsema v. Susong, 156 Ariz. 309, 314, 751 P.2d 969, 974 (1988). The supreme court is authorized to delegate indigency determinations to the presiding judge of the superior court in each county by Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 11 which provides that the presiding judge of each county “shall exercise administrative supervision over the superior court and judges thereof in their counties, and shall have other duties as may be provided by law or by rules of the Supreme Court.”“The Arizona Supreme Court has authorized the presiding judge of each county to establish a procedure for the appointment of counsel by the Superior Court for each indigent person entitled to the appointment of counsel. Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 11 (emphasis added). We have not found any constitutional or statutory authority under which the presiding judge may delegate to a county the duty of making indigency determinations and assessments respecting the appointment of counsel in Superior Court criminal proceedings. Moreover, a county has only such powers as have been expressly or impliedly conferred by the legislature. Davis v. Hidden, 124 Ariz. 546, 548, 606 P.2d 36, 38 (App.1979); Maricopa County v. Black, 19 Ariz.App. 239, 241, 506 P.2d 279, 281 (1973). The powers of a county are exercised by and through its board of supervisors. A.R.S. § 11–201; see also Davis v. Hidden, 124 Ariz. at 548, 606 P.2d at 38; Ricca v. Bojorquez, 13 Ariz.App. 10, 13, 473 P.2d 812, 815 (1970). The powers and duties of the counties' boards of supervisors are set forth in A.R.S. § 11–251 and do not include indigency screening or determinations for the superior courts. Thus, Pima County has not been conferred such power by the Legislature.”

of proof here."

ability to pay when imposing a fine or its payment schedule"

or ordinances authorize them to do so.5 City courts are also subject to the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court. Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 3; Winter v. Coor, 144 Ariz. 56, 59, 695 P.2d 1094, 1097 (1985).Ordinary municipal corporations such as cities and towns may not, however, establish court fees and surcharges to be collected by municipal courts within their jurisdiction. Unlike charter cities, their authority derives solely from state statutes. Maricopa County v. Maricopa County Mun. Water Conservation Dist., 171 Ariz. 325, 830 P.2d 846 (App. 1991). In establishing various municipal court fees under A.R.S. § 22-404(B), the Legislature prohibited any others “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.” We have reviewed the statutes in Title 9 relating to the authority of non-charter cities and towns and found no statutes authorizing a city or town to set court fees and surcharges."

in any court.” "

county has made the decision to include a café in the county courthouse facility for use by court personnel and the general public, revenue collected pursuant to section 318.18(13), Florida Statutes, to fund court facilities may be used for the renovation of such space.

Florida Statutes. Moreover, it is ultimately within the county’s discretion whether to fund a "local requirement" designated by the chief judge of the circuit.

collection agent or attorney for support services provided by the clerk when an unpaid amount owed to the clerk is referred to an agent for collection. Rather, any administrative support costs incurred by the clerk after referring unpaid fines and fees for collection should most appropriately be paid from "filing fees, service charges, court costs, and fines" as provided in section 28.35(4)(a), Florida Statutes.

courses and may not be used to fund general education for law enforcement officers, except in those instances where completion of general education courses is a requirement for successful completion of a criminal justice degree program.

violation of the respective county or municipal ordinance and the court has included payment of the assessment in its order.

the statute specifies those offenses for which the assessment will be imposed. 2. Section 938.19, Florida Statutes, requires that funds received from the $3 assessment be deposited into an account specifically for the operation and administration of the teen court and does not authorize application of the funds to other programs or to the county's general revenue fund.

for which the person pleads guilty or nolo contendere or is convicted or adjudicated delinquent. 2. The date on which the offense occurs determines the amount of additional costs. Thus, a person who commits a crime prior to July 1, 1992, but is convicted of the crime after that date would be assessed the amount authorized by section 960.20, Florida Statutes, on the date of the offense. 3. If the offense for which probation has been revoked constitutes a felony, misdemeanor, delinquent act, or criminal traffic offense and the probationer is adjudicated guilty of this offense or pleads no contest to the charges, the additional costs may be imposed. However, if the offense for which probation is revoked results only in the imposition of a sentence that was withheld when the defendant was placed on probation, section 960.20, Florida Statutes, does not authorize the imposition of such additional costs. 4. Section 960.20, Florida Statutes, requires that the court must state on the record in detail the reasons for waiving the assessment of additional costs.

that ‘[t]he personnel of the [county] system shall continue to be appointed and employed under the same procedure as used prior to February 8, 1956, and the system shall be financed under the same method as it was financed prior to February 8, 1956.’ Based on this provision, it is my opinion that any remaining county probation systems could not be converted into a system operated by a private corporation without legislative authority; therefore, the Community Corrections Corporation's proposal could not be accepted by any county still operating a county probation system.

interest in his contract. I agree with your conclusion. To the extent that the sheriff would be responsible to supervise the performance of one contracting to feed county prisoners, this conflict of interest, standing alone, would make the sheriff ineligible to enter into such a contract. An analogous situation was addressed in Op. Att'y Gen. U83-8 (copy attached), and it was concluded that a county commission chairman could not contract to supply groceries to his county. Use of a sealed bid procedure to award the contract was found not to avoid the conflict of interest because the chairman would still be required to supervise performance under the contract. After Op. Att'y Gen. U83-8 was issued, the General Assembly acted to authorize certain transactions between political subdivisions and their officers and employees, including sales of personal property made pursuant to sealed competitive bids. O.C.G.A. § 16-10-6(a)(2)(B) (Ga. Laws 1983, pp. 1326, 1339). The new Code section does not affect your question because in my view the feeding of prisoners does not constitute the sale of personal property to the county.

surcharge. The sheriff, by virtue of his office, is jailer of the county. O.C.G.A. § 42–4–1(a). As such, he has a legal duty to take into custody those convicted of crimes and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. O.C.G.A. § 42–4–12. The refusal to do so is a felony offense. Id. Further, a writ of mandamus may issue to compel performance of this duty. Griffin v. Chatham County, 244 Ga. 628, 629 (1979). For the foregoing reasons, it is my unofficial opinion that a sheriff must accept into custody those individuals convicted of criminal offenses who have been sentenced to a term of incarceration, and that the sheriff may not require payment of a surcharge as a condition precedent to service of the sentence.

a public defender is, under the statute, limited ‘[t]o the extent that [the defendant] . . . is able to provide for the employment of an attorney, the other necessary services and facilities of representation, and court costs . . .’ Thus, the court would not be authorized to order reimbursement beyond the indigent defendant's ability to pay for the services rendered by the public defender. However, this does not exclude partial reimbursements where the defendant is capable of paying some portion of the expenses of representation, as where, for example, the defendant is neither destitute nor a pauper. O.C.G.A. § 17-12-10(a)…. …In summary, it is my unofficial opinion that under O.C.G.A. § 17-12-10(c) a superior court may tax additional amounts onto any fine or restitution where a criminal defendant was represented by a full or part-time public defender, but the court may only order such payments or reimbursements to the extent of the individual defendant's financial capability to pay.

the legal action. The mental retardation comprehensive evaluating teams are statutorily required to be provided by the State Department of Human Resources. O.C.G.A. § 37-4-40. In the criminal context, psychiatric examinations of defendants are properly a charge upon the county treasury, whether required to benefit the defendant, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), or as an aid to the court during trial or prior to sentencing, O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-130.1, 17-7-131; Lingo v. State, supra. Op. Att'y Gen. U85-29 29. In regard to the latter, the Georgia Supreme Court has said that “the psychiatrist appointed by the court for a sanity examination of the defendant may not be regarded as a prosecution witness, but is instead a witness for the court.” Massey v. State, 226 Ga. 703, 704 (1970). Nor is his testimony subject to exclusion by virtue of the defendant's psychiatrist-patient privilege. Pierce v. State, 243 Ga. 454 (1979).