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State Citation Description/Statute Name Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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Arizona State v. Robinson, 142 Ariz. 296, 297–98, 689 P.2d 555, 556–57 (Ct. App. 1984); 1987 Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen. 233 (1987) Arizona-Attorney General opinion
Are the same procedural protections that are required in criminal proceedings required in civil collection/contempt proceedings arising from criminal justice debt when those proceedings may result in incarceration? What if
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the proceedings may only result in additional fines or non-incarceration penalties?
Arizona courts have only recognized that there must be an ability to pay proceeding where a party may be incarcerated. Such a determination should consider whether the probationer made good
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faith efforts to pay.
"In view of the United States Supreme Court's holding in Bearden v. Georgia, supra, we conclude that the trial court's order, revoking appellant's probation solely on the grounds that he
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failed to complete payments on the fine and restitution, without regard to his ability to pay, amounts to a deprivation of appellant's conditional freedom in violation of the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.” “In considering a recommendation regarding a probationer who has not fully paid restitution and fines, it would be appropriate for a probation officer to consider, as guidelines, certain statutory requirements the courts must follow. A.R.S. § 13-901(E) authorizes a court to terminate a period of probation and discharge the probationer earlier than the term originally imposed only if it is in the interests of justice and “if the conduct of the defendant on probation warrants it.” A.R.S. § 13-810 establishes contempt sanctions for intentional refusal to make good faith efforts to pay restitution and also provides for modification of restitution orders if a defendant has been unable to pay restitution despite good faith efforts to do so. It would, therefore, also be appropriate for a probation officer to consider the extent of a probationer's ability to pay and whether the probationer made good faith payment efforts or intentionally refused to make efforts to pay in determining whether the defendant's conduct on probation warrants early termination and discharge from probation. The central purpose for all of these statutes is the protection of victims and a probation officer should always exercise his discretion with that purpose clearly in mind.”
Ability to pay
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Arizona 1989 Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen. 134 (1989) Arizona-Attorney General opinion Does allowing different municipalities to set their own indigency standards or fines/fees violate the equal protection afforded by the state’s constitution?
The Arizona Constitution allows the Arizona Supreme Court to allow local courts to make indigency standards, but it is unlikely that local municipal bodies can set such standards without legislative
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delegation.
"The Arizona Supreme Court's rulemaking power is derived from Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5 which gives the supreme court the “[p]ower to make rules relative to all procedural matters
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in any court.” See also Barsema v. Susong, 156 Ariz. 309, 314, 751 P.2d 969, 974 (1988). The supreme court is authorized to delegate indigency determinations to the presiding judge of the superior court in each county by Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 11 which provides that the presiding judge of each county “shall exercise administrative supervision over the superior court and judges thereof in their counties, and shall have other duties as may be provided by law or by rules of the Supreme Court.”“The Arizona Supreme Court has authorized the presiding judge of each county to establish a procedure for the appointment of counsel by the Superior Court for each indigent person entitled to the appointment of counsel. Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 11 (emphasis added). We have not found any constitutional or statutory authority under which the presiding judge may delegate to a county the duty of making indigency determinations and assessments respecting the appointment of counsel in Superior Court criminal proceedings. Moreover, a county has only such powers as have been expressly or impliedly conferred by the legislature. Davis v. Hidden, 124 Ariz. 546, 548, 606 P.2d 36, 38 (App.1979); Maricopa County v. Black, 19 Ariz.App. 239, 241, 506 P.2d 279, 281 (1973). The powers of a county are exercised by and through its board of supervisors. A.R.S. § 11–201; see also Davis v. Hidden, 124 Ariz. at 548, 606 P.2d at 38; Ricca v. Bojorquez, 13 Ariz.App. 10, 13, 473 P.2d 812, 815 (1970). The powers and duties of the counties' boards of supervisors are set forth in A.R.S. § 11–251 and do not include indigency screening or determinations for the superior courts. Thus, Pima County has not been conferred such power by the Legislature.”
Ability to pay
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Arizona See, e.g., State v. Townsend, No. 1 CA-CR 11-0420, 2012 WL 3306960, at *3 (Ariz. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2012) (choosing not to answer who has the burden of proof) Arizona-Attorney General opinion Who has the burden of proof in an ability to pay determination? What is the standard of proof required? Arizona Courts have not yet answered this question.
"The State contends that Townsend bore the burden of proving that she was unable to pay restitution. Even assuming that the State is correct, we conclude Townsend met that burden
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of proof here."
Ability to pay
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Arizona State v. Lopez, 175 Ariz. 79, 81, 853 P.2d 1126, 1128 (Ct. App. 1993) Arizona-Attorney General opinion Should ability to pay be considered when imposing fines or fees or only when collecting fines or fees? Case law has established that ability to pay need not be considered when imposing fines or fees.
"Therefore, although we will consider ability to pay as one factor toward a claim that a fine is disproportionate, the trial court does not have to explicitly consider the defendant's
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ability to pay when imposing a fine or its payment schedule"
Ability to pay
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Arizona Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen. No. I95-18 (Dec. 18, 1995) Arizona-Attorney General opinion What authority do county or municipal courts have to set fines or fees? Municipal Courts only have authority to collect the fines and fees which state statutes provide for.
"Only city councils of charter cities which are established under Ariz. Const. art. XIII, § 24 may establish fees and surcharges to be collected by city courts, if their charters
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or ordinances authorize them to do so.5 City courts are also subject to the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court. Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 3; Winter v. Coor, 144 Ariz. 56, 59, 695 P.2d 1094, 1097 (1985).Ordinary municipal corporations such as cities and towns may not, however, establish court fees and surcharges to be collected by municipal courts within their jurisdiction. Unlike charter cities, their authority derives solely from state statutes. Maricopa County v. Maricopa County Mun. Water Conservation Dist., 171 Ariz. 325, 830 P.2d 846 (App. 1991). In establishing various municipal court fees under A.R.S. § 22-404(B), the Legislature prohibited any others “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law.” We have reviewed the statutes in Title 9 relating to the authority of non-charter cities and towns and found no statutes authorizing a city or town to set court fees and surcharges."
Fines and fees
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Arizona 1989 Ariz. Op. Att'y Gen. 134 (1989) Arizona-Attorney General opinion What authority does the state supreme court have to impose binding state-wide rules on the imposition or collection of fees and fines? The Arizona Constitution grants the Supreme Court the right to impose binding state-wide rules for procedural matters related to fines and fees.
"The Arizona Supreme Court's rulemaking power is derived from Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 5 which gives the supreme court the “[p]ower to make rules relative to all procedural matters
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in any court.” "
Enforcement
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Georgia 1989 Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 160 (Ga.A.G.), Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. No. U89-8, 1989 WL 264820 Authority to delegate power of collection of probation supervision services to private actors Which fines and/or fees may be collected by a private vendor? When it comes to probation services at least, County governments may not enter into agreements with private corporations for probation services unless authorized by legislation.
O.C.G.A. § 42–8–43 provides that those county probation systems in existence on February 8, 1956, would not be affected by the passage of the State-wide Probation Act, and further provides
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that ‘[t]he personnel of the [county] system shall continue to be appointed and employed under the same procedure as used prior to February 8, 1956, and the system shall be financed under the same method as it was financed prior to February 8, 1956.’ Based on this provision, it is my opinion that any remaining county probation systems could not be converted into a system operated by a private corporation without legislative authority; therefore, the Community Corrections Corporation's proposal could not be accepted by any county still operating a county probation system.
Fines and fees
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Georgia 1983 Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 247 (Ga.A.G.), Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. No. U83-29, 1983 WL 41746 Fees for feeding prisoners Under what circumstances does a conflict of interest in the imposition or enforcement of court debt violate state law? In the limited context of feeding prisoners, sheriffs may not be paid fees for feeding prisoners in their custody, either directly or via a contract entered into after competitive bidding.
Finally, you suggest that such a contract might create a conflict of interest because the sheriff's legal duty to care for county prisoners would be at odds with his financial
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interest in his contract. I agree with your conclusion. To the extent that the sheriff would be responsible to supervise the performance of one contracting to feed county prisoners, this conflict of interest, standing alone, would make the sheriff ineligible to enter into such a contract. An analogous situation was addressed in Op. Att'y Gen. U83-8 (copy attached), and it was concluded that a county commission chairman could not contract to supply groceries to his county. Use of a sealed bid procedure to award the contract was found not to avoid the conflict of interest because the chairman would still be required to supervise performance under the contract. After Op. Att'y Gen. U83-8 was issued, the General Assembly acted to authorize certain transactions between political subdivisions and their officers and employees, including sales of personal property made pursuant to sealed competitive bids. O.C.G.A. § 16-10-6(a)(2)(B) (Ga. Laws 1983, pp. 1326, 1339). The new Code section does not affect your question because in my view the feeding of prisoners does not constitute the sale of personal property to the county.
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Georgia Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. No. U92-4 (Ga.A.G.), 1992 WL 478489 Georgia-Attorney General opinion Other applicable oppinions
[A] sheriff must accept into custody those individuals convicted of criminal offenses who have been sentenced to a term of incarceration, and that the sheriff may not require payment of
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a surcharge as a condition precedent to service of the sentence.
Pretermitting any discussion of the sheriff's authority to impose such a surcharge, Georgia law makes clear that the sheriff may not condition service of the sentence upon payment of the
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surcharge. The sheriff, by virtue of his office, is jailer of the county. O.C.G.A. § 42–4–1(a). As such, he has a legal duty to take into custody those convicted of crimes and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. O.C.G.A. § 42–4–12. The refusal to do so is a felony offense. Id. Further, a writ of mandamus may issue to compel performance of this duty. Griffin v. Chatham County, 244 Ga. 628, 629 (1979). For the foregoing reasons, it is my unofficial opinion that a sheriff must accept into custody those individuals convicted of criminal offenses who have been sentenced to a term of incarceration, and that the sheriff may not require payment of a surcharge as a condition precedent to service of the sentence.
Fines and fees
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Georgia 1985 Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 203 (Ga.A.G.), Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. No. U85-32, 1985 WL 68946 Collection of public defender fees from indigent defendants Superior court's ability to collect fees from an indigent defendant for representation by a public defender is limited to the amount that indigent defendant can afford to reimburse.
In my opinion, O.C.G.A. § 17-12-10(c) governs the extent to which reimbursement to the county may be required from indigent defendants. The power to tax the costs of representation by
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a public defender is, under the statute, limited ‘[t]o the extent that [the defendant] . . . is able to provide for the employment of an attorney, the other necessary services and facilities of representation, and court costs . . .’ Thus, the court would not be authorized to order reimbursement beyond the indigent defendant's ability to pay for the services rendered by the public defender. However, this does not exclude partial reimbursements where the defendant is capable of paying some portion of the expenses of representation, as where, for example, the defendant is neither destitute nor a pauper. O.C.G.A. § 17-12-10(a)…. …In summary, it is my unofficial opinion that under O.C.G.A. § 17-12-10(c) a superior court may tax additional amounts onto any fine or restitution where a criminal defendant was represented by a full or part-time public defender, but the court may only order such payments or reimbursements to the extent of the individual defendant's financial capability to pay.
Fines and fees
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Georgia 1987 Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 96 (Ga.A.G.), Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. No. U87-4, 1987 WL 119551 Fees and expenses of medical examining teams and hospital committees Fees for psychiatric examinations performed on defendant in a criminal case should not be imposed on defendant but on the county treasury.
In neither the civil nor criminal context is the cost of these examinations and testimony placed on the person to be examined, or even on the person or entity initiating
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the legal action. The mental retardation comprehensive evaluating teams are statutorily required to be provided by the State Department of Human Resources. O.C.G.A. § 37-4-40. In the criminal context, psychiatric examinations of defendants are properly a charge upon the county treasury, whether required to benefit the defendant, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), or as an aid to the court during trial or prior to sentencing, O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-130.1, 17-7-131; Lingo v. State, supra. Op. Att'y Gen. U85-29 29. In regard to the latter, the Georgia Supreme Court has said that “the psychiatrist appointed by the court for a sanity examination of the defendant may not be regarded as a prosecution witness, but is instead a witness for the court.” Massey v. State, 226 Ga. 703, 704 (1970). Nor is his testimony subject to exclusion by virtue of the defendant's psychiatrist-patient privilege. Pierce v. State, 243 Ga. 454 (1979).
Fines and fees
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Montana 49 Mont. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 18, 2002 WL 1009805 Montana-Attorney General opinion What authority do county or municipal courts have to set fines or fees?
The Montana Constitution and Montana law authorize amunicipal court judge to release a defendant on a time-pay bail bond, defined as a bond in an amount set by the judge to be
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paid in installments.
If the court finds some form of bail necessary, however, Mont. Code Ann. § 46-9-301, provides more specific factors for a court to consider. These factors include, among other matters
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not related to the safety of the victim and the community, that the amount shall be “not oppressive,” and that the amount shall be “considerate of the financial ability of the accused.” Id., §§ 46-9-301(4) and (6). The time-pay bail bonds system comports with these requirements.The Montana Constitution and Montana law authorize a municipal court judge to release a defendant on a time-pay bail bond, defined as a bond in an amount set by the judge to be paid in installments.
Ability to pay
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Montana 41 Mont. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 59 Montana-Attorney General opinion Other applicable opinions Cash bail for minor offenses may be increased to include applicable surcharges
In order to collect the additional $10 charge required by section 46-18-236, MCA, a court may exercise its power under section 46-9-302, MCA, and increase the bail schedule for minor
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offenses in a like amount.
Enforcement