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State Citation Description/Statute Name Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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Delaware Del. Op. Atty. Gen. 97-IB04 (Del.A.G.), 1997 WL 111291 Town's authority to establish a mail-in center for collecting fines and fees for motor vehicle violations. Other applicable opinions
Under State law, for the Town to operate a voluntary assessment system, summonses issued by the Town police must be returnable to the Mayor's Court. Only the ?Courts of the
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Justices of the Peace may establish a mail-in fine center, ... in which case the summons may be made returnable to the applicable mail-in fine center.? 21 Del. C. Section 709(a) The statute does not authorize a municipality to establish a mail-in fine center for payment of fines for motor vehicle offenses which occur within the town. Nor can a town avail itself of the voluntary assessment procedure unless it has an Alderman's or Mayor's Court that is ?duly established.? 21 Del. C. Section 703(d). Stated differently, there must be an actual court, to which payments for motor vehicle offenses can be remitted ?to dispose of the charge without the necessity of personally appearing in the court to which the summons is returnable.? Id. Section 709(a). In conclusion, the Town of Elsmere is not an entity designated by statute to receive criminal history information from DELJIS. It may only operate a voluntary assessment system through a duly established Alderman's or Mayor's Court. In the absence of such a court, it may not charge, impose or collect ?court costs? or any similar fee from persons charged with motor vehicle violations within its boundaries.
Enforcement
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Delaware Del. Op. Atty. Gen. 93-I004 (Del.A.G.), 1993 WL 594345 Department of Correction's ability to assess a supervision fee on offenders and determine ability to pay Other applicable opinions
The Department, subject only to powers vested in the judicial and certain executive departments and officers of the State, shall have the duties set forth in this chapter and the
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exclusive jurisdiction over the care, charge, custody, control, management, administration and supervision of: (14) Collecting as a condition of supervision, a fee based on the Accountability Level of the offender. An offender sentenced to an Accountability Level I sanction shall be charged a $10 monthly fee; an offender sentenced to an Accountability Level II sanction shall be charged a $20 monthly fee; and an offender sentenced to an Accountability Level III sanction shall be charged a $25 monthly fee. The Director of Community Services shall develop policies and procedures with regard to determining an offender's ability to pay the monthly fee. Such policies and procedures shall be applied on a consistent basis to all offenders, and shall be subject to approval by the Commissioner of Correction. In the event the Department determines an offender is unable to pay the monthly fee due to lack of employment or other significant extenuating circumstances, such as an offender's responsibility to remit payment for victim compensation, restitution or child support, said inability shall not constitute a violation of supervision. The offender shall remain liable to pay the fee at such time as the Department determines he or she is able to do so. (Emphasis Supplied) For the reasons outlined below, we conclude that the Department is permitted to assess a supervision fee on offenders sentenced prior to the effective date of 11 Del.C. Sec. 6504(14).
Ability to pay
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Georgia 1989 Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 160 (Ga.A.G.), Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. No. U89-8, 1989 WL 264820 Authority to delegate power of collection of probation supervision services to private actors Which fines and/or fees may be collected by a private vendor? When it comes to probation services at least, County governments may not enter into agreements with private corporations for probation services unless authorized by legislation.
O.C.G.A. § 42–8–43 provides that those county probation systems in existence on February 8, 1956, would not be affected by the passage of the State-wide Probation Act, and further provides
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that ‘[t]he personnel of the [county] system shall continue to be appointed and employed under the same procedure as used prior to February 8, 1956, and the system shall be financed under the same method as it was financed prior to February 8, 1956.’ Based on this provision, it is my opinion that any remaining county probation systems could not be converted into a system operated by a private corporation without legislative authority; therefore, the Community Corrections Corporation's proposal could not be accepted by any county still operating a county probation system.
Fines and fees
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Georgia 1983 Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 247 (Ga.A.G.), Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. No. U83-29, 1983 WL 41746 Fees for feeding prisoners Under what circumstances does a conflict of interest in the imposition or enforcement of court debt violate state law? In the limited context of feeding prisoners, sheriffs may not be paid fees for feeding prisoners in their custody, either directly or via a contract entered into after competitive bidding.
Finally, you suggest that such a contract might create a conflict of interest because the sheriff's legal duty to care for county prisoners would be at odds with his financial
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interest in his contract. I agree with your conclusion. To the extent that the sheriff would be responsible to supervise the performance of one contracting to feed county prisoners, this conflict of interest, standing alone, would make the sheriff ineligible to enter into such a contract. An analogous situation was addressed in Op. Att'y Gen. U83-8 (copy attached), and it was concluded that a county commission chairman could not contract to supply groceries to his county. Use of a sealed bid procedure to award the contract was found not to avoid the conflict of interest because the chairman would still be required to supervise performance under the contract. After Op. Att'y Gen. U83-8 was issued, the General Assembly acted to authorize certain transactions between political subdivisions and their officers and employees, including sales of personal property made pursuant to sealed competitive bids. O.C.G.A. § 16-10-6(a)(2)(B) (Ga. Laws 1983, pp. 1326, 1339). The new Code section does not affect your question because in my view the feeding of prisoners does not constitute the sale of personal property to the county.
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Georgia Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. No. U92-4 (Ga.A.G.), 1992 WL 478489 Georgia-Attorney General opinion Other applicable oppinions
[A] sheriff must accept into custody those individuals convicted of criminal offenses who have been sentenced to a term of incarceration, and that the sheriff may not require payment of
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a surcharge as a condition precedent to service of the sentence.
Pretermitting any discussion of the sheriff's authority to impose such a surcharge, Georgia law makes clear that the sheriff may not condition service of the sentence upon payment of the
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surcharge. The sheriff, by virtue of his office, is jailer of the county. O.C.G.A. § 42–4–1(a). As such, he has a legal duty to take into custody those convicted of crimes and sentenced to a term of imprisonment. O.C.G.A. § 42–4–12. The refusal to do so is a felony offense. Id. Further, a writ of mandamus may issue to compel performance of this duty. Griffin v. Chatham County, 244 Ga. 628, 629 (1979). For the foregoing reasons, it is my unofficial opinion that a sheriff must accept into custody those individuals convicted of criminal offenses who have been sentenced to a term of incarceration, and that the sheriff may not require payment of a surcharge as a condition precedent to service of the sentence.
Fines and fees
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Georgia 1985 Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 203 (Ga.A.G.), Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. No. U85-32, 1985 WL 68946 Collection of public defender fees from indigent defendants Superior court's ability to collect fees from an indigent defendant for representation by a public defender is limited to the amount that indigent defendant can afford to reimburse.
In my opinion, O.C.G.A. § 17-12-10(c) governs the extent to which reimbursement to the county may be required from indigent defendants. The power to tax the costs of representation by
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a public defender is, under the statute, limited ‘[t]o the extent that [the defendant] . . . is able to provide for the employment of an attorney, the other necessary services and facilities of representation, and court costs . . .’ Thus, the court would not be authorized to order reimbursement beyond the indigent defendant's ability to pay for the services rendered by the public defender. However, this does not exclude partial reimbursements where the defendant is capable of paying some portion of the expenses of representation, as where, for example, the defendant is neither destitute nor a pauper. O.C.G.A. § 17-12-10(a)…. …In summary, it is my unofficial opinion that under O.C.G.A. § 17-12-10(c) a superior court may tax additional amounts onto any fine or restitution where a criminal defendant was represented by a full or part-time public defender, but the court may only order such payments or reimbursements to the extent of the individual defendant's financial capability to pay.
Fines and fees
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Georgia 1987 Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. 96 (Ga.A.G.), Ga. Op. Atty. Gen. No. U87-4, 1987 WL 119551 Fees and expenses of medical examining teams and hospital committees Fees for psychiatric examinations performed on defendant in a criminal case should not be imposed on defendant but on the county treasury.
In neither the civil nor criminal context is the cost of these examinations and testimony placed on the person to be examined, or even on the person or entity initiating
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the legal action. The mental retardation comprehensive evaluating teams are statutorily required to be provided by the State Department of Human Resources. O.C.G.A. § 37-4-40. In the criminal context, psychiatric examinations of defendants are properly a charge upon the county treasury, whether required to benefit the defendant, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985), or as an aid to the court during trial or prior to sentencing, O.C.G.A. §§ 17-7-130.1, 17-7-131; Lingo v. State, supra. Op. Att'y Gen. U85-29 29. In regard to the latter, the Georgia Supreme Court has said that “the psychiatrist appointed by the court for a sanity examination of the defendant may not be regarded as a prosecution witness, but is instead a witness for the court.” Massey v. State, 226 Ga. 703, 704 (1970). Nor is his testimony subject to exclusion by virtue of the defendant's psychiatrist-patient privilege. Pierce v. State, 243 Ga. 454 (1979).
Fines and fees
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Montana 49 Mont. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 18, 2002 WL 1009805 Montana-Attorney General opinion What authority do county or municipal courts have to set fines or fees?
The Montana Constitution and Montana law authorize amunicipal court judge to release a defendant on a time-pay bail bond, defined as a bond in an amount set by the judge to be
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paid in installments.
If the court finds some form of bail necessary, however, Mont. Code Ann. § 46-9-301, provides more specific factors for a court to consider. These factors include, among other matters
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not related to the safety of the victim and the community, that the amount shall be “not oppressive,” and that the amount shall be “considerate of the financial ability of the accused.” Id., §§ 46-9-301(4) and (6). The time-pay bail bonds system comports with these requirements.The Montana Constitution and Montana law authorize a municipal court judge to release a defendant on a time-pay bail bond, defined as a bond in an amount set by the judge to be paid in installments.
Ability to pay
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Montana 41 Mont. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 59 Montana-Attorney General opinion Other applicable opinions Cash bail for minor offenses may be increased to include applicable surcharges
In order to collect the additional $10 charge required by section 46-18-236, MCA, a court may exercise its power under section 46-9-302, MCA, and increase the bail schedule for minor
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offenses in a like amount.
Enforcement
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Nevada 1987 Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 29 (1987) Execution of sentence and fine Should ability to pay be considered when imposing fines or fees or only when collecting fines or fees? court hearing must be held to determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay, before a criminal fine may be converted to an additional term of imprisonment. under Nevada law a court hearing must be held to determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay, before a criminal fine may be converted to an additional term of imprisonment. Ability to pay
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Nevada 1993 Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 102 (1993) Fines, judgments, judges What authority do county or municipal courts have to set fines or fees? Courts may, in the exercise of their judgment, set fines and fees.
NRS 244.207, which authorizes counties to establish a collection division to collect fees and monetary sanctions imposed by courts that are ultimately owed to the county when collected, does not
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violate Nevada's separation of powers provision. Although all collection efforts can be deferred by the courts, the legislative intent underlying NRS 244.207(1)(f) is to not impede collection efforts pending court rulings at any level. There is nothing in this statutory provision which impedes the courts in the exercise of their inherent judicial power to enforce their judgments and orders. Therefore, NRS 244.207 is constitutional.
Fines and fees
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Nevada 1987 Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 29 (1987) Criminal law - execution of sentence of imprisonment and fine Other applicable opinions
District Attorney may collect fines and fees when he prosecuted the case, attorney general may collect fines and fees when the attorney general's office prosecuted the case, and the Department
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of Prisons may only colelct fines and fees only when specifically granted the authority to do so by law.
Nevada statutes presently provide two methods for enforcement and collection of a criminal fine. See Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 176.065 and 176.275. In both cases, the district attorney has authority to proceed
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to collect the fine on a criminal judgment where the district attorney has been the prosecutor. On the other hand, there is no clear authority in the office of the attorney general to undertake any action to collect the fines which have been imposed in criminal cases prosecuted by a district attorney. The attorney general would have authority to take action to enforce fines in cases prosecuted by the attorney general. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 228.125. Similarly, the Department of Prisons has no specific authority to collect fines through deductions from wages or other property of offenders, or to institute any action against an offender to obtain the payment of a fine. The department is given specific authority to collect only certain debts owed by inmates, such as restitution or family support. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 209.346 and 209.4811-209.4843; 209.352. Criminal fines are not included as a debt which may be collected by the Department of Prisons. This specific grant of authority to collect only certain debts implies a lack of authority to collect others. See Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 26, 422 P.2d 237 (1967). .
Revenue flow
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Nevada 1984 Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 35 (1984) Constitutional law - evidence-criminal procedure Only nonindigent persons may be the subject of recoupment measures
Where the legislature provides an express statutory system for recoupment of litigation costs from a convicted defendant the courts will generally enforce these provisions despite constitutional challenges. An implicit condition
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for the imposition of costs upon the convicted offender is that only nonindigent persons can be the subject of recoupment measures. These statutes do not have a chilling effect on the exercise of other constitutional rights under the fifth and sixth amendments.
Ability to pay
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Nevada 1987 Nev. Op. Att'y Gen. 29 (1987) Criminal law - execution of sentence of imprisonment and fine
District Attorney may collect fines and fees when he prosecuted the case, attorney general may collect fines and fees when the attorney general's office prosecuted the case, and the Department
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of Prisons may only collect fines and fees only when specifically granted the authority to do so by law.
Nevada statutes presently provide two methods for enforcement and collection of a criminal fine. See Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 176.065 and 176.275. In both cases, the district attorney has authority to proceed
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to collect the fine on a criminal judgment where the district attorney has been the prosecutor. On the other hand, there is no clear authority in the office of the attorney general to undertake any action to collect the fines which have been imposed in criminal cases prosecuted by a district attorney. The attorney general would have authority to take action to enforce fines in cases prosecuted by the attorney general. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 228.125. Similarly, the Department of Prisons has no specific authority to collect fines through deductions from wages or other property of offenders, or to institute any action against an offender to obtain the payment of a fine. The department is given specific authority to collect only certain debts owed by inmates, such as restitution or family support. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 209.346 and 209.4811-209.4843; 209.352. Criminal fines are not included as a debt which may be collected by the Department of Prisons. This specific grant of authority to collect only certain debts implies a lack of authority to collect others. See Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 26, 422 P.2d 237 (1967). .
Fines and fees