a case by case basis so as to accord attention to any and all factors tending to indicate an individual's financial condition. . . . [T]he the criteria for determining . . . whether an individual is indigent, include the ready availability of real or personal property owned; employment benefits; pensions; annuities; social security; unemployment compensation; inheritances; number and age of dependents; outstanding debts, obligations and liabilities; and any other relevant considerations concerning the financial condition of an individual.

unless otherwise ordered by the court." The Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that when the word 'shall' is employed, it is usually legally accepted as mandatory, Mau v. Stoner, 14 Wyo., 183, 83 P. 218, 219 (1905). In construing statutes, "Unless the context otherwise indicates, the use of the word 'shall' (except in its future tense) indicates a mandatory intent". 1A Sutherland Statutory Construction, § 25.04 [*2] p. 301 (4th Ed. Sands); Ginnavan v. Silverstone, 246 Md. 500, 229 A.2d 124, 127." Mayland v. State, Wyo., 568 P.2d 897, 899 (1977). Clearly, the legislature, by the word 'shall', intended the clerk of court to collect and disburse restitution payments. Upon an order of restitution by the sentencing court, it becomes mandatory for the office of the clerk to administer the restitution. "The clerk of each of the courts shall exercise the powers conferred and perform the duties enjoined upon him by statute and by the common law; and in the performance of his duties he shall be under the direction of his court." Section 5-7-101, W.S. 1977. Although the statute does not specifically provide for disbursement, where the legislature provided for the clerk to collect restitution it can be inferred that the legislature also intended the clerk to disburse restitution. Section 14-6-229(f)(i), W.S. 1977, allows a juvenile court to order a child to make restitution for any damage or loss caused by his wrongful act. Title 14 of the Wyoming Statutes does not specifically state a procedure for collecting and disbursing restitution payments from juveniles. However, Wyoming courts have [*3] held that statutes dealing with related subjects or having the same general purpose must be read in pari material in order to ascertain intelligent meaning and achieve uniformity. Kuntz v. Kinne, Wyo., 395 P.2d 286 (1964); Stringer v. Board of County Commissioners of Big Horn County, Who., 347 P.2d 197 (1960). Therefore, Section 14-6-229(f)(i), W.S. 1977, and Section 7-13-312, W.S. 1977, must be read in pari materia as to methods of collecting and disbursing restitution payments from both juvenile and criminal defendants.

pursuant to §§ 7-13-307, through 7-13-315, W.S. 1977, goes directly to the Wyoming Crime Victims Compensation Commission after the Commission awards compensation to the victim. Such restitution is deposited in the Commission's account and used to set off against a judgment in favor of the state in a civil action. Section 1-40-112(c)(i), W.S. 1977, (1986 Cum. Supp.). [*7] The Commission reduces the amount of the compensation due the victim by the amount of restitution paid. Section 1-40-122(c)(ii). If restitution has been ordered, but not paid, the victim may be compensated by the Commission and shall reimburse the Commission when and if the defendant pays. Section 1-40-112, W.S. 1977 (1986 Cum. Supp.) was amended by the 1987 general session of the 49th Wyoming Legislature. A new subsection (g), effective May 22, 1987, states any payment of benefits to, or on behalf of a victim or other claimant under the Crime Victims Compensation Act creates a debt due the state by any person found by a criminal court to have committed a criminal act. Payment of the debt shall be a condition of probation, Laws 1987, ch. 119, § 1-40-112(g). In making payment of the debt a condition of probation or parole, the court or board of parole sets the schedule or amount of payments. The Commission has the authority to authorize compensation payments directly to the victim or to a third party. Section 1-40-108(d)(iii), W.S. 1977, (1986 Cum. Supp.). Similarly, the court could order direct payments to victims under the Restitution to Crime Victims Act, Sections 7-13-307 through 7-13-315, W.S. 1977. The victim's remedies for non-payment would be reporting the failure to the prosecuting attorney, the court or the probation and parole officer if applicable.

avoid imprisonment.

pursuant to statute.”

Siegel (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 843, 846.) However, as Antazo makes clear, such a penalty may nevertheless be imposed upon an indigent in certain circumstances (3 Cal.3d 100, 116):‘[O]ur holding is simply that an indigent who would pay his fine if he could, must be given an option comparable to an offender who is not indigent. When the indigent offender refuses to avail himself of such alternatives at the inception, or defaults or otherwise fails to meet the conditions of the particular alternative which is offered him without a showing of reasonable excuse, the indigent offender becomes in the eyes of the court exactly the same as the contumacious offender who is not indigent. When either of these conditions obtain the offender's indigency ceases to be dispositive and he may, consistently with the mandate of the equal protection clause, be relegated to ‘working out’ his fine by imprisonment.' 65 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 581 (1982).

is ineligible for public employment or public office other than judicial employment or judicial office. A judge of the superior or municipal court may, however, become eligible for election to other public office by taking a leave of absence without pay prior to filing a declaration of candidacy. Acceptance of the public office is a resignation from the office of judge. “A judicial officer may not receive fines or fees for personal use.” 66 Cal. Op. Att'y Gen. 440 (1983).

to collect the fine on a criminal judgment where the district attorney has been the prosecutor. On the other hand, there is no clear authority in the office of the attorney general to undertake any action to collect the fines which have been imposed in criminal cases prosecuted by a district attorney. The attorney general would have authority to take action to enforce fines in cases prosecuted by the attorney general. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 228.125. Similarly, the Department of Prisons has no specific authority to collect fines through deductions from wages or other property of offenders, or to institute any action against an offender to obtain the payment of a fine. The department is given specific authority to collect only certain debts owed by inmates, such as restitution or family support. See Nev.Rev.Stat. § 209.346 and 209.4811-209.4843; 209.352. Criminal fines are not included as a debt which may be collected by the Department of Prisons. This specific grant of authority to collect only certain debts implies a lack of authority to collect others. See Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 26, 422 P.2d 237 (1967). .

for the imposition of costs upon the convicted offender is that only nonindigent persons can be the subject of recoupment measures. These statutes do not have a chilling effect on the exercise of other constitutional rights under the fifth and sixth amendments.

before a master is a critical stage of such a proceeding. Accordingly, both the right to counsel and the obligation of the Public Defender to provide representation for indigents apply.If incarceration is not sought as a remedy in a contempt proceeding, the constitutional right to counsel is not implicated.6 Nor is the Public Defender obligated to provide representation.

into the reason why the defendant has failed to pay the fine. If the failure to pay is attributable to indigency the court must also consider alternate methods of punishment. If the court ultimately decides that an additional period of incarceration is necessary to serve the interests of deterrence and punishment, the aggregate period of incarceration cannot exceed the maximum sentence for the underlying offense."

failed to complete payments on the fine and restitution, without regard to his ability to pay, amounts to a deprivation of appellant's conditional freedom in violation of the fundamental fairness required by the Fourteenth Amendment.” “In considering a recommendation regarding a probationer who has not fully paid restitution and fines, it would be appropriate for a probation officer to consider, as guidelines, certain statutory requirements the courts must follow. A.R.S. § 13-901(E) authorizes a court to terminate a period of probation and discharge the probationer earlier than the term originally imposed only if it is in the interests of justice and “if the conduct of the defendant on probation warrants it.” A.R.S. § 13-810 establishes contempt sanctions for intentional refusal to make good faith efforts to pay restitution and also provides for modification of restitution orders if a defendant has been unable to pay restitution despite good faith efforts to do so. It would, therefore, also be appropriate for a probation officer to consider the extent of a probationer's ability to pay and whether the probationer made good faith payment efforts or intentionally refused to make efforts to pay in determining whether the defendant's conduct on probation warrants early termination and discharge from probation. The central purpose for all of these statutes is the protection of victims and a probation officer should always exercise his discretion with that purpose clearly in mind.”

in any court.” See also Barsema v. Susong, 156 Ariz. 309, 314, 751 P.2d 969, 974 (1988). The supreme court is authorized to delegate indigency determinations to the presiding judge of the superior court in each county by Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 11 which provides that the presiding judge of each county “shall exercise administrative supervision over the superior court and judges thereof in their counties, and shall have other duties as may be provided by law or by rules of the Supreme Court.”“The Arizona Supreme Court has authorized the presiding judge of each county to establish a procedure for the appointment of counsel by the Superior Court for each indigent person entitled to the appointment of counsel. Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 11 (emphasis added). We have not found any constitutional or statutory authority under which the presiding judge may delegate to a county the duty of making indigency determinations and assessments respecting the appointment of counsel in Superior Court criminal proceedings. Moreover, a county has only such powers as have been expressly or impliedly conferred by the legislature. Davis v. Hidden, 124 Ariz. 546, 548, 606 P.2d 36, 38 (App.1979); Maricopa County v. Black, 19 Ariz.App. 239, 241, 506 P.2d 279, 281 (1973). The powers of a county are exercised by and through its board of supervisors. A.R.S. § 11–201; see also Davis v. Hidden, 124 Ariz. at 548, 606 P.2d at 38; Ricca v. Bojorquez, 13 Ariz.App. 10, 13, 473 P.2d 812, 815 (1970). The powers and duties of the counties' boards of supervisors are set forth in A.R.S. § 11–251 and do not include indigency screening or determinations for the superior courts. Thus, Pima County has not been conferred such power by the Legislature.”

of proof here."

ability to pay when imposing a fine or its payment schedule"

Constitution provides for the funding of the common school fund, part of which is derived “from the fines assessed for breaches of the penal laws of the State; and from all forfeitures which may accrue.” Art. 8, § 2. A proceeding under Indiana's forfeiture law is civil in nature, and it is only fines and forfeitures from criminal proceedings that must be paid into the common school fund.