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State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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North Carolina State v. Hunter, 315 N.C. 371, 376 (1986)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
State law requires that NC courts "take into consideration the resources of the defendant, her ability to earn, her obligation to support dependents, and such other matters as shall pertain
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to her ability to make restitution or reparation" when ordering restitution.
We do not interpret N.C.G.S. § 15A–1343 to require the trial judge to find and enter facts when imposing a judgment of probation. Rather it requires the court to take
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into consideration the resources of the defendant, her ability to earn, her obligation to support dependents, and such other matters as shall pertain to her ability to make restitution or reparation. This record clearly shows that these matters were considered by Judge Allsbrook in his judgment ordering restitution. He knew defendant's age, her relationship to the victim, that she resided with her mother, that she was indigent for legal purposes, and that the victim's family had insurance of an uncertain amount in scope at the time of the sentencing hearing. The court's action in remitting the original fine and delegating the determination and scheduling of payments in restitution to the probation officer evidenced the trial judge's full recognition of the matters to be considered pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A–1343(d).
Ability to pay
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North Carolina Matter of Alamance Cty. Court Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 99 (1991) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? Not explicitly, but it may be limited on a case-by-case basis
We hold that when inaction by those exercising legislative authority threatens fiscally to undermine the integrity of the judiciary, a court may invoke its inherent power to do what is
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reasonably necessary for “the orderly and efficient exercise of the administration of justice.” Beard v. N.C. State Bar, 320 N.C. at 129, 357 S.E.2d at 696. Article V prohibits the judiciary from taking public monies without statutory authorization. But our statutes obligate counties and cities to provide physical facilities for the judicial system operating within their boundaries. N.C.G.S. § 7A–300(a)(11) (1989); N.C.G.S. § 7A–302 (1989). These facilities must be adequate to serve the functioning of the judiciary within the borders of those political subdivisions. Such adequacy necessarily includes safeguarding the constitutional rights of parties and ascertaining that parties' statutory rights—such as handicap access—are similarly protected. Although the statutes do not expressly pass the duty of providing adequate judicial facilities to the court in case of default of local authorities, the court has the inherent authority to direct local authorities to perform that duty.
Revenue flow
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North Carolina Pers. v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 662–63 (4th Cir. 1988)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other
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law enforcement agencies?
Private counsel for interested parties may co-prosecute cases with government counsel when such participation "(1) has been approved by government counsel; (2) consists solely of rendering assistance in a subordinate
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role to government counsel; and (3) does not rise in practice to the level of effective control of the prosecution."
The issue here is whether and, if so, to what extent, private counsel for interested parties may be authorized to participate with government counsel in such a prosecution. Young flatly
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proscribes turning the prosecution completely over to private counsel for interested parties, but it certainly did not proscribe all participation by such counsel. . . . The limits of such allowable assistance were also suggested: assistance may not extend to the point that “counsel for the private party [is] ... in control of the prosecution.” Id.8 We therefore read Young at least implicitly to approve (or certainly not to forbid) the practice of allowing private counsel for interested parties to participate formally with government counsel in the prosecution of contempt citations so long as that participation (1) has been approved by government counsel; (2) consists solely of rendering assistance in a subordinate role to government counsel; and (3) does not rise in practice to the level of effective control of the prosecution. As indicated, we find authority for this rule of limited participation at least implicit in Young and we think it wholly conformable to Young 's underlying principles. Accordingly, we adopt it as the appropriate rule governing the participation of private counsel for interested parties in contempt prosecutions.
Transparency
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North Carolina State v. Webb, 358 N.C. 92, 101–02 (2004) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? Yes, a defendant may only be held liable for counsel fees in criminal trials if the defendant is convicted.
A convicted defendant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a valid judgment for costs can be entered. State v. Crews, 284 N.C. 427, 201 S.E.2d
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840 (1974). Costs are imposed only at sentencing, so any convicted indigent defendant is given notice of the *102 appointment fee at the sentencing hearing and is also given an opportunity to be heard and object to the imposition of this cost. Therefore, the constitutional requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard are satisfied. Accordingly, the imposition of the appointment fee on convicted indigent defendants passes federal constitutional muster.
Fines and fees
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North Carolina Shore v. Edmisten, 290 N.C. 628, 633–34 (1976) Other applicable case law Though a defendant may not be held liable for the fees of court appointed counsel after a conviction, he may be held liable for restitution for high costs.
A state or a local agency can be the recipient of restitution where the offense charged results in particular damages or loss to it over and above its normal
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operating costs. It would be reasonable, for example, to require a defendant to pay the state for expenses incurred to provide him with court appointed counsel should he ever become financially able to pay. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). It would not however be reasonable to require the defendant to pay the state's overhead attributable to the normal costs of prosecuting him. People v. Baker, 37 Cal.App.3d 117, 112 Cal.Rptr. 137 (1974); State v. Mulvaney, 61 N.J. 202, 293 A.2d 668 (1972); Cf. People v. Teasdale, 335 Mich. 1, 55 N.W.2d 149 (1952).
Fines and fees
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Washington DC Smith v. Smith, 427 A.2d 928, 932 (D.C. 1981)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
Courts must hold indigence hearing before determining failure to pay was willful (and punishing); Defendant bears burden of showing inability to pay; Court must consider earnings as well as capacity in
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current job market given educational background and work experience
"When faced with a motion for contempt establishing noncompliance with a support order, the defendant bears the burden of showing an inability to pay or some other excuse for failure
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to comply. ... Ability to pay, of course, “is not merely a function of actual earnings but is to be derived, more broadly, from earning capacity in the current job market, given one's educational background and work experience.” ... Because appellant's motion to reduce support gave the trial court sufficient notice that he might be unable to meet his obligations under the stay of the contempt commitment, the trial court was obliged to hold a hearing and make a finding of ability to pay before revoking the stay.
Ability to pay
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Washington DC Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891, 904 (D.C. Cir. 1970) Other applicable case law As in criminal cases, courts must consider ability to pay in civil cases
The equal protection clause applies to both civil and criminal cases; the Constitution protects life, liberty and property. It is the importance of the right to the individual, not the
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technical distinction between civil and criminal, which should be of importance to a court in deciding what procedures are constitutionally required in each case.44 Often a poor litigant will have more at stake in a civil case than in a criminal case.... We hold today only that the United States must pay for transcripts for indigent litigants allowed to appeal in forma pauperis to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals if the trial judge or a judge of the DCCA certifies that the appeal raises a substantial question the resolution of which requires a transcript. We do not hold that every civil case will require a transcript on appeal.59 We indicate no opinion as to whether one will be necessary in this case.
Ability to pay