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State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Ohio | State v. Meyer, 124 Ohio App. 3d 373, 377 (1997) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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An ability-to-pay hearing is not required when a fine is merely imposed. Rather, it is only required when the trial court decides to incarcerate the defendant for failure to pay. + See moreDefendant is entitled to representation and an opportunity to present evidence.
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We hold, therefore, that R.C. 2947.14(A) did not require a hearing in the present case because the trial court merely imposed a fine. Because the trial court has not yet + See moresought to enforce the fine with incarceration, the duty to hold a hearing under R.C. 2947.14(A) is not triggered. We note, further, that payment of the fine in this case was technically a condition of Meyer's probation, and therefore, should he be unable to pay and his probation sought to be revoked, he is entitled to a hearing under Crim.R. 32.3. In either case, the hearing requirement is conditioned upon the trial court's decision to incarcerate him.
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Ability to pay |
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Ohio | State ex rel. Hague v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2009-Ohio-6140, ¶ 18, 123 Ohio St. 3d 489, 493 (Ohio 2009) | Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? | No. In fact, one case found that county commissioners violated the separation-of-powers doctrine for not funding courts when the court could not collect enough revenue from cases |
"The board and commissioners claim that they have rebutted the presumed reasonableness of the requesting funding because Judge Hague failed to make sufficient operational changes to reduce the courts' budget, + See morefailed to cooperate with the budget process in a timely manner, and has sufficient money to operate the courts for the remainder of 2009. These claims lack merit. For the board's claim that the judge failed to timely pursue various alternatives for reducing costs, Judge Hague submitted evidence that the majority of juveniles appearing before the juvenile court are indigent and that an increase in court fees and costs would simply increase unpaid sums instead of increasing county revenue."
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Revenue flow |
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Ohio | no |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other + See morelaw enforcement agencies?
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Ohio Courts have not addressed this question | no | |
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Ohio | State v. Fisher, No. CA98-09-190, 2002 WL 745330 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | Probably not. Courts rest their opinions on statutory law which provides that an indigent defendant may be required to pay attorneys fees only after an ability-to-pay determination is made. |
Thus, an indigent defendant may properly be required to pay his attorney fees only after the court makes an affirmative determination on the record that the defendant has, or reasonably + See moremay be expected to have, the means to pay all or some part of the cost of the legal services rendered to him.
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Fines and fees |
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Ohio | City of Alliance v. Kelly, 548 N.E.2d 952 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) | Other applicable caselaw | Contempt proceedings may not be used to incarcerate people for non-payment of fines. A person may only be sentenced pursuant to the procedural safeguards provided in Section 2947.14 |
The appellee in this action urges that we accept the trial court's characterization of these proceedings as contempt for failure to obey an order of the court pursuant to R.C. + See more2705.02. However, appellee does not suggest precisely which order appellant was charged with disobeying. We find that the court should have recognized that this case invoked the *134 procedures required under R.C. 2947.14 for committing an offender to jail for failure to pay a fine. This statute and its predecessor1were designed by the legislature to provide a method for collecting a fine from one who is unwilling to pay.
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Enforcement |
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Ohio | Liming v. Damos, 133 Ohio St. 3d 509, 514 (Ohio 2012) | The Burden of proving inability to pay is on the party subject to a contempt order |
Placing the burden of showing inability to pay on the party charged with contempt is not unreasonable. As we explained in Cook, “[t]he defendant's financial condition and ability to pay + See morewere peculiarly within his own knowledge. They could not be known with the same certainty to the complainant, nor could she easily produce evidence to maintain the proposition were the burden of proof placed upon her.”
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Ability to pay | |
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Ohio | Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St. 2d 95, 95 (1969) | Court costs and fees are civil, not criminal, obligations and may be collected only by the methods provided for the collection of civil judgments |
The duty to pay court costs is a civil obligation arising from an implied contract. Obligations arising upon implied contracts and judgments *96 thereon are debts, within the purview of + See moreSection 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which forbids imprisonment for debt in civil actions. (Paragraph one of the syllabus of Second National Bank of Sandusky v. Becker, 62 Ohio St. 289, 56 N.E. 1025, 51 L.R.A. 860, approved and followed.) Section 2947.20, Revised Code, insofar as it lodges authority in the judge or magistrate to order a defendant committed to jail or to a workhouse for failure to pay court costs, is violative of Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, and is unconstitutional [. . .] An indigent person taxed with costs in a civil action is not jailed to work off this obligation. Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, expressly prohibits imprisonment for civil debt.6 In criminal cases, court costs, assessed *103 to defray the administrative costs of the litigation, are likewise subject to the same prohibition. The purpose of assessing costs in criminal and in civil cases is the same and there is no justification for imprisonment for nonpayment of costs in criminal cases but not in civil cases [. . .] By being involved in court proceedings, any litigant, by implied contract, becomes liable for the payment of court costs if taxed as a part of the court's judgment. A judgment for costs in a criminal case is a civil, not a criminal, obligation, and may be collected only by the methods provided for the collection of civil judgments. To hold otherwise would permit that which is constitutionally prohibited.
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Enforcement | |
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Ohio | Strongsville v. Waiwood ,577 N.E.2d 63 (Ohio 1989) | A court may not order a person to appear orissue a warrant for unpaid court costs. |
An arrest warrant issued after defendant failed to attend a hearing for failure to pay court costs was defective because failure to pay court costs is a civil liability not + See morean obligation, such as a fine, that subjects a debtor to arrest.
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Enforcement | |
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Ohio | State v. Ellis, 2d Dist., 2008 Ohio 2719. | If community service is in lieu of either fines or court costs, contempt may not be imposed for failure to perform | Accordingly, the trial court's judgment finding Ellis in criminal contempt for nonperformance of community service work to satisfy his fines and court costs is reversed. | Enforcement | |
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Ohio | Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Goldie, 894 N.E.2d 1226 (2008). | Failing to follow the dictates of R.C. 2947.14 and using contempt as a sanction to collect fines can result in disciplinary violations | #VALUE! | Enforcement | |
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Ohio | In re GMS Mgt. Co., Inc. v. Unpaid Court Costs, Fees and Delinquencies, 932 N.E.2d 405 (2010). | The court may not collect fines by refusing to accept filings. |
Plaintiff-appellant, GMS Management Company, Inc., appeals a decision of Judge David D'Apolito of Mahoning County Court No. 4, which found that GMS owes over $3,000 for court costs and ordered + See morethe clerk of that court to refuse to accept any new pleadings even if court costs are advanced until all prior delinquent costs and fees have been paid in full. We agree with appellant's argument that this decision was unconstitutionally entered without notice or an opportunity to be heard and is an unconstitutional denial of access to the courts. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded based upon constitutional violations.
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Enforcement | |
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Ohio | State v. Short, 2nd Dist. Darke No. 2011 CA 16, 2012-Ohio-2546. | The court may not order the forfeiture of a driver's license as a means of collecting costs. |
We agree that the municipal court lacked authority to order the forfeiture of Short's license for his failure to pay court costs. Accordingly, the court's order of forfeiture of Short's driver's + See morelicense is vacated.
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Enforcement | |
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Ohio | State v. Cruise, 185 Ohio App. 3d 230, 233 (2009) | The court may not use money forfeited by a defendant as a means of collecting costs. | The trial court erred as a matter of law in diverting money forfeited by the appellee to pay court costs and attorney fees. | Enforcement | |
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Minnesota | Perkins v. State, 559 N.W. 2d 678, 692-93 (1997) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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In terms of timeline, at least, the sentencing judge need not specifically find that defendant has ability to pay fine before imposing it as part of sentence. |
In State v. Martinson, the court of appeals analyzed its prior decisions requiring sentencing judges to consider a defendant's ability to pay before imposing costs of prosecution, and held that + See moresimilar findings should be made before imposing a fine. 460 N.W.2d 342, 344 (Minn.App.1990), pet. for rev. denied (Minn., Oct. 25, 1990). The Martinson court noted that requiring such findings was consistent with the recommendations of the A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice. Id. at 343; see 3 A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice § 18-2.7 (1979). But in a subsequent case, the court of appeals held that a sentencing judge need not make findings as to a defendant's ability to pay a fine unless the judge decides to reduce the amount of the fine below the statutory minimum for the offense. State v. Patterson, 511 N.W.2d 476, 479 (Minn.App.1994), pet. for rev. denied (Minn., Mar. 31, 1994). Then, in State v. Lambert, 392 N.W.2d 242 (1986), the court of appeals affirmed the Patterson court's decision that a sentencing judge need not determine a defendant's ability to pay the statutory minimum fine. 547 N.W.2d 446, 447-48 (Minn.App.1996). Most recently, the court of appeals held that when a sentencing judge imposes a fine between the statutory maximum and the statutory minimum, the judge must find that the defendant is able to pay the fine. State v. Salinas, No. C6-96-180, slip. op. at 4 (Minn.App., filed Sept. 17, 1996). Perkins v. State, 559 N.W. 2d 678, 692-93 (1997).
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Ability to pay |
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Minnesota | State v. Tennin, 674 N.W. 2d 403, 408 (2004) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | Any statute creating a co-payment obligation upon appointment of public defender violates indigent defendant's right to counsel under state and federal Constitutions. |
Nonetheless, the requirement to repay costs of counsel is not without limit. In analyzing a recoupment statute from the State of Oregon, the United States Supreme Court held that Oregon's statute requiring an individual + See moreto reimburse the state for the services of a public defender was in line with the Sixth Amendment where “[t]hose who remain indigent or for whom repayment would work ‘manifest hardship’ are forever exempt from any obligation to repay.” Id. The question thus arises, does Minn.Stat. § 611.17, subd. 1 (c) (Supp.2003), which states that “[u]pon appointment of the public defender, an individual who receives public defender services shall be obligated to pay to the court a co-payment for representation provided by a public defender,” exempt persons who remain indigent or for whom repayment of the co-payment would work a manifest hardship? The answer to this question is critical to our analysis of the certified question. State v. Tennin, 674 N.W. 2d 403, 408 (2004) (quoting Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 53, 94 (1974)).
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Ability to pay |
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Minnesota | State v. Palubicki, 727 N.W. 2d 662 (2007) | Other applicable caselaw |
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to pay restitution to murder victim's adult children for expenses arising from their voluntary attendance at murder trial, as their + See moreclaimed expenses resulted from the crime; abrogating In re Welfare of D.D.G., 532 N.W.2d 279, State v. DeGrote, 2004 WL 556946. M.S.A. §§ 611A.04(1)(a), 611A.01(b).
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Fines and fees | |
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Minnesota | State v. Lopez-Solis, 589 N.W. 2d 290, 205 (1999) | Costs incurred by a medical examiner in conducting an autopsy, preparing an autopsy report, and testifying at trial are not recoverable under the prosecution costs statute |
Lopez–Solis argues that the costs of a medical examiner conducting an autopsy, preparing an autopsy report, and testifying at trial are costs that should not be imposed against a criminal defendant + See morefollowing conviction. Lopez–Solis contends that because the legislature requires county sheriffs to report all violent deaths to the medical examiner and because it is within the medical examiner's discretion whether to conduct an autopsy, the medical examiner should be viewed as an independent party. See Minn.Stat. § 390.32 (1996). We agree with Lopez–Solis that expenses incurred by medical examiners in conducting an autopsy, preparing an autopsy report, and testifying at trial may not be imposed against a criminal defendant following conviction. These services are provided independent of a criminal prosecution and therefore are not recoverable. Therefore, the $1,200 awarded by the trial court for Dr. Roe's trial testimony is reversed. State v. Lopez-Solis, 589 N.W. 2d 290, 205 (1999)
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Fines and fees | |
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Minnesota | State v. Fader, 358 N.W. 2d 42, 48 (1984) |
Criminal sexual abuse defendant was entitled to vacation of an order requiring him to make $10,000 restitution, with the matter remanded to the trial court for reconsideration, where there was + See moreno factual showing of economic loss to the victim and her family in that amount. M.S.A. § 609.342(a).
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The court may condition probation on restitution “when practicable.” Minn.Stat. § 609.135, subd. 1 (1982). Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary, III.A.2. (1983) urges judges to make expanded use of restitution + See moreas a condition of probation, especially for persons with short criminal history scores convicted of property crimes, adding that the use of restitution may be appropriate in other cases also.
In our opinion, the word “restitution” connotes restoring or compensating the victim for his loss. If the legislature intended the term to be used more loosely, as a form of punitive damages, it should have used some other word or made its particular use of the word clearer.
The record indicates that defendant, although with some difficulty, is able to pay the $10,000, but the record does not provide a factual basis for the restitution award. Under the circumstances, we remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration, at which time the parties may present evidence bearing on the issue of economic loss to the victim and her family. We add that any decision by the trial court to award restitution does not by itself bar the victim and her family from independently seeking damages from defendant in a separate civil action, although any restitution awarded in this proceeding would operate as a setoff against any award obtained in such an action. State v. Fader, 358 N.W. 2d 42, 48 (1984)
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Ability to pay | |
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Minnesota | Hopp v. Hopp, 156 N.W.2d 212, 216 (1968) |
Trial judge has measure of authority and discretion in civil contempt proceedings, particularly in divorce cases where alimony and support are ordered, far in excess of that existing in criminal + See morecases because of limited and essential purpose of civil contempt proceedings.
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The process by which this power is exercised is termed a civil contempt proceeding. The distinctive quality of a civil, as distinguished from a criminal, contempt is that of purpose. + See moreIn exercising civil contempt powers in divorce cases, the only objective is to secure compliance with an order presumed to be reasonable. Punishment for past misconduct is not involved; that is a field reserved to criminal proceedings of which criminal contempt is one example.
Peterson v. Peterson, Minn., 153 N.W.2d 825; Zieman v. Zieman, 265 Minn. 190, 121 N.W.2d 77; 17 C.J.S. Contempt ss 5(2) to 7.
Because of the limited and essential purpose of civil contempt proceedings, particularly in divorce cases where alimony and support are ordered, we must recognize here a measure of authority and discretion in the trial judge far in excess of that which exists in criminal cases. In civil contempt, the function of the court is to make the rights of one individual as against another meaningful. When the duty is performed, the concern of the court is satisfied. If the duty is one specifically defined by a proper decree of the court, it must be free to compel performance by methods with are speedy, efficient, and sufficiently flexible to meet the problem at hand. Particularly in support cases, the proper discharge of the judge's responsibilities should not be frustrated by delay and formalism. Hopp v. Hopp, 156 N.W.2d 212, 216 (1968)
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