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State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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Louisiana State v. Frank, 803 So.2d 1, 7 (La.2001), as revised (Apr. 16, 2001)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
The court may consider such factors as income or funds from employment or any other source, including public assistance, to which the accused is entitled, property owned by the accused
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or in which he has an economic interest, outstanding obligations, the number and ages of dependents, employment and job training history, and level of education.
A trial court must consider several factors before determining whether a defendant is indigent and may review its determination at any time during the proceedings. Louisiana Rev.Stat. 15:147(B)(1) provides that:In
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determining whether or not a person is indigent and entitled to the appointment of counsel, the court shall consider whether the person is a needy person and the extent of his ability to pay. The court may consider such factors as income or funds from employment or any other source, including public assistance, to which the accused is entitled, property owned by the accused or in which he has an economic interest, outstanding obligations, the number and ages of dependents, employment and job training history, and level of education. **5 See also State v. Adams, 369 So.2d 1327, 1329 (La.1979) (citing La.Rev.Stat. 15:147 and 15:148); W. LaFave and J. Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure § 11.2(e) (1984) (“recognizing that the Supreme Court has never offered a specific definition of indigency, but noting that most jurisdictions consider the following factors: (1) income from employment and governmental programs such as social security and unemployment benefits; (2) money on deposit; (3) ownership of real and personal property; (4) total indebtedness and expense; (5) the number of persons dependent on the appellant for support; (6) the cost of the transcript on appeal; and (7) the likely fee of retained counsel for the appeal.”).
Ability to pay
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Louisiana State v. Lanclos, 980 So.2d 643, 651 (La.2008) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? Fines and fees collected must go towards 'functions of the judicial system'
This Court stated that “[f]following the trend restricting the imposition of court fees to instances where they fund functions of the judicial system, we hold that court filing fees may
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be imposed only for purposes relating to the administration of justice.  This requirement is inherent in our constitutional right of access to the courts and the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. Moreover, our clerks of court should not be made tax collectors for our state, nor should the threshold to our justice system **12 be used as a toll booth to collect money for random programs created by the legislature.” After examining the statute, we found that the money collected did not go to court services, or to any other entity associated with the judicial system. Instead, the money went to a private, nonprofit corporation to be used at its discretion for domestic violence programs. Because the “fee” was not assessed to defray the expenses of litigation or to support the court system, and was a revenue raising measure designed to fund a particular social program, we found that the “fee” imposed by the statute was, in reality, a tax. Safety Net, 692 So.2d at 1041. This Court held that La. R.S. 13:1906 imposed an unconstitutional filing fee in violation of the right of access to the *652 courts and of the separation of powers doctrine because its purpose—to fund domestic abuse services—was unrelated to the administration of justice. Id. at 1043.
Revenue flow
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Louisiana Villanueva v. Comm'n on Ethics for Pub. Employees, 812 So.2d 1, 5–6 (La. Ct. App.1999)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other
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law enforcement agencies?
There does not need to be an actual conflict of interest, only the appearance of one
Furthermore, the mere fact that there is no evidence indicating that Mr. Villanueva attempted to use his influence to obtain the permit or refused to enforce the law with respect
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to Dauvill, or that his officers ever attempted to refrain from inspection duties out of loyalty to their Chief does not preclude a finding of a violation of § 1112B. It is well settled that the Ethics Code is not a criminal statute whose aim is the punishment of persons guilty of public wrongdoing. Rather, its purpose is to prevent public officers and employees from becoming involved in conflicts of interest situations by prohibiting public servants from engaging in certain conduct. Bankston v. Board of Ethics for Elected Officials, 98–0189, p. 1 (La.6/22/98); 715 So.2d 1181, 1181–1182.  The Code prohibits not only actual conflicts of interest, but also guards against the appearance of impropriety, and prevents situations which create the perception of conflicts of interest. Id. at p. 9; 1187; Fulda v. Louisiana Office of Public Health, 96–0647, p. 2 (La.5/10/96); 673 So.2d 201, 202; In Re Beychok, 495 So.2d 1278, 1281 (La.1986); *6 In re Marceaux, 96–1215, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/14/97); 689 So.2d 670, 673. In Glazer v. Commission on Ethics for Public Employees, 431 So.2d 752, 756 (La.1983), the court explained:A conflict of interest is a situation which would require an official to serve two masters, presenting a potential, rather than an actuality, of wrongdoing. The wrongdoing does not have to occur in order for a prohibited conflict to exist. A public official may have done no wrong in the ordinary sense of the word, but a conflict of interest may put him in danger of doing wrong.... The Code is aimed at avoiding even this danger. (Citation omitted) Villanueva v. Comm'n on Ethics for Pub. Employees, 812 So.2d 1, 5–6 (La. Ct. App.1999)
Transparency
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Louisiana State v. Rideau, 943 So.2d 559, 568 (La. Ct. App.2006), writ denied, 963 So.2d 395 (La.2007) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? Yes; especially with indigent defendants the reviewing courts often set aside excessive recoupment fines
Our supreme court has recognized, especially against indigent defendants, the constitution of this State and the United States, does place limits on the power of courts to assess fines and
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costs. Additionally, when enforcement of a statute, as written, violates constitutional principles, the courts have consistently declined to read the statute to reach an unconstitutional result. For example, La.Code Crim.P. art. 884 provides “[i]f a sentence imposed includes a fine or costs, the sentence shall provide that in default of payment thereof the defendant shall be imprisoned for a specified period not to exceed one year.” Despite the clear mandate of this provision, the courts have consistently held an indigent person may not be incarcerated because he is unable to pay a fine or court costs.
Fines and fees
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Louisiana State v. McGowan, 359 So.2d 972, 975 (La.1978) Other applicable caselaw
(b) Release on bail alone shall not disqualify a person for appointment of counsel. In each case, the person subject to the penalty of perjury shall certify in writing such
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material factors relating to his ability to pay as the court prescribe State v. McGowan, 359 So.2d 972, 975 (La.1978)
Ability to pay
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Louisiana State v. Williams, 489 So.2d 286, 291–92 (La. Ct. App.1986) Other applicable caselaw
Louisiana courts have consistently held that an indigent may not be given a fine in default of which a prison term is imposed in excess of the statutory maximum State
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v. Williams, 489 So.2d 286, 291–92 (La. Ct. App.1986)
Enforcement
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Indiana IN Const. Art. 1, § 16
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
There is a constitutional limitation on excessive fines in the criminal context.
Section 16. Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature
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of the offense.
Ability to pay
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Indiana Ind. Code § 33-37-2-3; Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1.7
Coleman v. State, 61 N.E.3d 390, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)
Trial court must conduct an indigency hearing when it imposes fines or costs as part of a defendant's sentence; however, no specific requirement indicates when the hearing must be held
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as long as the hearing is held before the sentence is completed.
Further, the trial court must conduct an indigency hearing when it imposes fines or costs as part of a defendant's sentence. Johnson v. State, 27 N.E.3d 793, 794-95 (Ind.Ct.App.2015),
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see also Ind.Code § 33–37–2–3(a). However, no specific requirement indicates when the hearing must be held as long as the hearing is held before the sentence is completed. Johnson, 27 N.E.3d at 794–95.
Ability to pay
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Indiana Meunier-Short v. State, 52 N.E.3d 927, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)
An indigency determination merely prevents the defendant from being imprisoned for his inability to pay costs or fines. A trial court has the authority to assess fines, costs, and fees
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against an indigent defendant; a different result would amount to inverse discrimination since it would enable an indigent to avoid both the fine and imprisonment for nonpayment whereas other defendants must always suffer one or the other.
Meunier–Short contends a trial court may not impose costs or fines upon an indigent defendant. But we have previously held, “A defendant's indigency does not shield him from all costs
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or fees related to his conviction.” Banks v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1050, 1051 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. An indigency determination merely prevents the defendant from being imprisoned for his inability to pay. Henderson, 44 N.E.3d at 815. Notwithstanding the indigency hearing requirement contained in Indiana Code sections 33–37–2–3(a) and 35–38–1–18(a), a trial court has the authority to assess fines, costs, and fees against an indigent defendant; “indeed, a different result would amount to inverse discrimination since it would enable an indigent to avoid both the fine and imprisonment for nonpayment whereas other defendants must always suffer one or the other ...” Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970).
Ability to pay
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Indiana Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind. 1994) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? The power of the Legislature to impose and regulate fines, exercised within constitutional limits, is not subject to review by the courts
"To summarize, we hold that Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution imposes two requirements upon statutes that grant unequal privileges or immunities to differing classes of persons. First,
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the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated. Finally, in determining whether a statute complies with or violates Section 23, courts must exercise substantial deference to legislative discretion."
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Indiana IN Const. Art. 5, § 17
State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 20, 24 (1857)

State v. Rowe, 103 Ind. 118, 2 N.E. 294, 295 (1885)
The provision of the Indiana Constitution that the governor shall have power to remit fines under such regulations as may be prescribed by law has been held only to authorize
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the remission of fines by the governor in pursuance of provisions of law. The power of the governor in this respect is not absolute, but can only be exercised pursuant to legislative direction.
...The Governor may remit fines and forfeitures, under such regulations as may be provided by law… It is plain, we think, that the power of remission is not granted absolutely to
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the governor, but only the power of exercising it pursuant to legislative direction. If the remission ought to be made in this case, the statutory requirement can yet be complied with, and the remission granted. The sense in which the governor may be authorized to “remit fines and forfeitures” is that he may release or absolve the person against whom a fine or forfeiture has been adjudged from its payment after judgment.
Enforcement
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Indiana IN Const. Art. 8, § 2 Under the Indiana Constitution all fines assessed for breaches of the penal laws of the state belong to the common school fund of the state.
...The fund to be derived from the sale of County Seminaries, and the moneys and property heretofore held for such Seminaries; from the fines assessed for breaches of the penal
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laws of the State; and from all forfeitures which may accrue;…
Revenue flow
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Indiana IN Const. Art. 1, § 16 Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? There is a constitutional limitation on excessive fines in the criminal context.
Section 16. Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature
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of the offense.
Ability to pay
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Indiana Ind. Code § 33-37-2-3
Eliseo v. State, 14 N.E.3d 778, 780 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)
(e) If, after a hearing under subsection (a) or (b), the court determines that a convicted person is able to pay part of the costs of representation, the court shall
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order the person to pay an amount of not more than the cost of the defense services rendered on behalf of the person. The clerk shall deposit the amount paid by a convicted person under this subsection in the county's supplemental public defender services fund established under Ind. Code § 33-40-3-1. Eliseo argues the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed a public defender fee of more than $100.00. He cites Ind.Code § 35–33–7–6, which sets a $100.00 cap for the public defender fee following a felony conviction. But the trial court “can order reimbursement [of fees] under any [of the statutes] or a combination thereof.” Jackson v. State, 968 N.E.2d 328, 333 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). Two other statutes, Ind.Code § 33–40–3–65 and Ind.Code § 33–37–2–36 give the trial court discretion in determining the public defender fee imposed. As stated above, because the trial court ordered payment after incarceration, it most likely relied on Ind.Code § 33–37–2–3 in determining the amount of the public defender fee, which does not have a cap on the amount. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Eliseo pay a public defender fee of $300.00. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 638 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (holding the requirement to pay a $500.00 public defender fee was not an abuse of discretion).
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. Ability to pay
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Iowa Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) Ability to pay must be determined before imposition.
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2
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authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay.
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
Ability to pay
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West Virginia State v. Murrell, 201 W. Va. 648, 649–50, 499 S.E.2d 870, 871–72 (1997).
Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Haught, 179 W.Va. 557, 371 S.E.2d 54 (1988).
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
(1) While there is no prohibition against the imposition of the maximum penalty prescribed by law, indigent defendants may not be incarcerated solely because of their inability to pay court-ordered
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fines or costs. (2) The court may impose of a statutory fine without determination of ability to pay, but before a trial court conditions its recommendation for a defendant's parole upon the defendant's payment of statutory fines, costs and attorney's fees, the trial court must consider the financial resources of the defendant, the defendant's ability to pay and the nature of the burden that the payment of such costs will impose upon the defendant.
"An individual is not excused from the imposition of the maximum sentence allowed under a statute simply because he is indigent, even if that sentence includes the imposition of fines
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pursuant to statute. Consistent with the principles of Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), and *650 **872 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983), however, while there is no prohibition against the imposition of the maximum penalty prescribed by law, indigent defendants may not be incarcerated solely because of their inability to pay court-ordered fines or costs." State v. Murrell, 201 W. Va. 648, 649–50, 499 S.E.2d 870, 871–72 (1997).
Ability to pay
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West Virginia W. Va. Const. art. VIII, § 3 Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? No. West Virginia's Constitution allows the Court of Appeals to impose binding state-wide rules.
“The court shall have power to promulgate rules for all cases and proceedings, civil and criminal, for all of the courts of the State relating to writs, warrants, process, practice
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and procedure, which shall have the force and effect of law.”
Enforcement