determining whether or not a person is indigent and entitled to the appointment of counsel, the court shall consider whether the person is a needy person and the extent of his ability to pay. The court may consider such factors as income or funds from employment or any other source, including public assistance, to which the accused is entitled, property owned by the accused or in which he has an economic interest, outstanding obligations, the number and ages of dependents, employment and job training history, and level of education. **5 See also State v. Adams, 369 So.2d 1327, 1329 (La.1979) (citing La.Rev.Stat. 15:147 and 15:148); W. LaFave and J. Israel, 2 Criminal Procedure § 11.2(e) (1984) (“recognizing that the Supreme Court has never offered a specific definition of indigency, but noting that most jurisdictions consider the following factors: (1) income from employment and governmental programs such as social security and unemployment benefits; (2) money on deposit; (3) ownership of real and personal property; (4) total indebtedness and expense; (5) the number of persons dependent on the appellant for support; (6) the cost of the transcript on appeal; and (7) the likely fee of retained counsel for the appeal.”).

be imposed only for purposes relating to the administration of justice.  This requirement is inherent in our constitutional right of access to the courts and the constitutional separation of powers doctrine. Moreover, our clerks of court should not be made tax collectors for our state, nor should the threshold to our justice system **12 be used as a toll booth to collect money for random programs created by the legislature.” After examining the statute, we found that the money collected did not go to court services, or to any other entity associated with the judicial system. Instead, the money went to a private, nonprofit corporation to be used at its discretion for domestic violence programs. Because the “fee” was not assessed to defray the expenses of litigation or to support the court system, and was a revenue raising measure designed to fund a particular social program, we found that the “fee” imposed by the statute was, in reality, a tax. Safety Net, 692 So.2d at 1041. This Court held that La. R.S. 13:1906 imposed an unconstitutional filing fee in violation of the right of access to the *652 courts and of the separation of powers doctrine because its purpose—to fund domestic abuse services—was unrelated to the administration of justice. Id. at 1043.

to Dauvill, or that his officers ever attempted to refrain from inspection duties out of loyalty to their Chief does not preclude a finding of a violation of § 1112B. It is well settled that the Ethics Code is not a criminal statute whose aim is the punishment of persons guilty of public wrongdoing. Rather, its purpose is to prevent public officers and employees from becoming involved in conflicts of interest situations by prohibiting public servants from engaging in certain conduct. Bankston v. Board of Ethics for Elected Officials, 98–0189, p. 1 (La.6/22/98); 715 So.2d 1181, 1181–1182.  The Code prohibits not only actual conflicts of interest, but also guards against the appearance of impropriety, and prevents situations which create the perception of conflicts of interest. Id. at p. 9; 1187; Fulda v. Louisiana Office of Public Health, 96–0647, p. 2 (La.5/10/96); 673 So.2d 201, 202; In Re Beychok, 495 So.2d 1278, 1281 (La.1986); *6 In re Marceaux, 96–1215, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/14/97); 689 So.2d 670, 673. In Glazer v. Commission on Ethics for Public Employees, 431 So.2d 752, 756 (La.1983), the court explained:A conflict of interest is a situation which would require an official to serve two masters, presenting a potential, rather than an actuality, of wrongdoing. The wrongdoing does not have to occur in order for a prohibited conflict to exist. A public official may have done no wrong in the ordinary sense of the word, but a conflict of interest may put him in danger of doing wrong.... The Code is aimed at avoiding even this danger. (Citation omitted) Villanueva v. Comm'n on Ethics for Pub. Employees, 812 So.2d 1, 5–6 (La. Ct. App.1999)

costs. Additionally, when enforcement of a statute, as written, violates constitutional principles, the courts have consistently declined to read the statute to reach an unconstitutional result. For example, La.Code Crim.P. art. 884 provides “[i]f a sentence imposed includes a fine or costs, the sentence shall provide that in default of payment thereof the defendant shall be imprisoned for a specified period not to exceed one year.” Despite the clear mandate of this provision, the courts have consistently held an indigent person may not be incarcerated because he is unable to pay a fine or court costs.

material factors relating to his ability to pay as the court prescribe State v. McGowan, 359 So.2d 972, 975 (La.1978)

v. Williams, 489 So.2d 286, 291–92 (La. Ct. App.1986)

authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.

is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.

sought to enforce the fine with incarceration, the duty to hold a hearing under R.C. 2947.14(A) is not triggered. We note, further, that payment of the fine in this case was technically a condition of Meyer's probation, and therefore, should he be unable to pay and his probation sought to be revoked, he is entitled to a hearing under Crim.R. 32.3. In either case, the hearing requirement is conditioned upon the trial court's decision to incarcerate him.

failed to cooperate with the budget process in a timely manner, and has sufficient money to operate the courts for the remainder of 2009. These claims lack merit. For the board's claim that the judge failed to timely pursue various alternatives for reducing costs, Judge Hague submitted evidence that the majority of juveniles appearing before the juvenile court are indigent and that an increase in court fees and costs would simply increase unpaid sums instead of increasing county revenue."

may be expected to have, the means to pay all or some part of the cost of the legal services rendered to him.

2705.02. However, appellee does not suggest precisely which order appellant was charged with disobeying. We find that the court should have recognized that this case invoked the *134 procedures required under R.C. 2947.14 for committing an offender to jail for failure to pay a fine. This statute and its predecessor1were designed by the legislature to provide a method for collecting a fine from one who is unwilling to pay.

were peculiarly within his own knowledge. They could not be known with the same certainty to the complainant, nor could she easily produce evidence to maintain the proposition were the burden of proof placed upon her.”

Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which forbids imprisonment for debt in civil actions. (Paragraph one of the syllabus of Second National Bank of Sandusky v. Becker, 62 Ohio St. 289, 56 N.E. 1025, 51 L.R.A. 860, approved and followed.) Section 2947.20, Revised Code, insofar as it lodges authority in the judge or magistrate to order a defendant committed to jail or to a workhouse for failure to pay court costs, is violative of Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, and is unconstitutional [. . .] An indigent person taxed with costs in a civil action is not jailed to work off this obligation. Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, expressly prohibits imprisonment for civil debt.6 In criminal cases, court costs, assessed *103 to defray the administrative costs of the litigation, are likewise subject to the same prohibition. The purpose of assessing costs in criminal and in civil cases is the same and there is no justification for imprisonment for nonpayment of costs in criminal cases but not in civil cases [. . .] By being involved in court proceedings, any litigant, by implied contract, becomes liable for the payment of court costs if taxed as a part of the court's judgment. A judgment for costs in a criminal case is a civil, not a criminal, obligation, and may be collected only by the methods provided for the collection of civil judgments. To hold otherwise would permit that which is constitutionally prohibited.

an obligation, such as a fine, that subjects a debtor to arrest.