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State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Colorado |
Strickland v. People, 197 Colo. 488, 594 P.2d 578 (1979) People v. Afentul, 773 P.2d 1081, 1085 (Colo. 1989) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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Before revocation of probation for failure to make ordered restitution payments can be effected, trial court must find that defendant had the ability to pay at the time the payments + See moreshould have been made.
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"For purposes of requirement that, before probation may be revoked based upon a finding that probationer did not pay moneys due under condition of probation, probationer must have the present + See moreability to pay, the ability to pay is measured by three factors: that job for which probationer is qualified is available; that job would produce an income adequate to meet his obligations; and that probationer unjustifiably refuses to take it." "Evidence of the defendant's failure to pay restitution constitutes prima facie evidence that the defendant has violated the conditions of the deferred sentencing. When the prosecution presents this prima facie evidence, the burden then shifts to the defendant to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that he was financially unable to make the payments at the time they should have been made" (Afentul, citing Strickland)
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Enforcement |
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Iowa | State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | Ability to pay |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) | Ability to pay must be determined before imposition. |
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2 + See moreauthorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
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Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? |
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay.
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The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
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Ability to pay |
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Maryland | 86 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 183 (2001) (citing Reddick v. State, 608 A.2d 1246 (1992); Smith v. State, 506 A.2d 1165 (1986); Turner v. State, 516 A.2d 579 (1986)). |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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All that is required is that the court must first assess the defendant's ability to pay the fine by inquiring into the defendant's family and financial situation before incarcerating defendant + See morefor inability to pay. No specific procedural mechanisms have been established.
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"State law provides that a court may sentence a convicted defendant who has failed to pay a fine to an additional period of confinement to “work off” the fine. However, + See moreunder both State law and the federal Constitution, the court must first assess the defendant's ability to pay the fine by inquiring into the defendant's family and financial situation. Any additional period of incarceration imposed for failure to pay the fine must be within statutory limits and may not, in any event, exceed 90 days. Finally, the total period of incarceration imposed on an indigent defendant may not exceed the statutory maximum for the underlying offense."
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Ability to pay |
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Maryland |
Md. Const. art. IV, § 18 (granting the Court of Appeals the authority to enacts rules with the force of law); see, e.g., MD R ADR Rule 17-208 (the Court + See moreof Appeals authorizes its Chief Judge to approve fee schedules)
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Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? | No. Maryland's Constitution allows the Court of Appeals to impose binding state-wide rules, including fines and fees. |
"The Court of Appeals from time to time shall adopt rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration of the appellate courts and in the other + See morecourts of this State, which shall have the force of law until rescinded, changed or modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law. The power of courts other than the Court of Appeals to make rules of practice and procedure, or administrative rules, shall be subject to the rules and regulations adopted by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law." "Subject to the approval of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, the county administrative judge of each circuit court shall develop and adopt maximum hourly rate fee schedules for court-designated individuals conducting each type of fee-for-service ADR"
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Revenue flow |
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Maryland |
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 7-503; Rucker v. Harford Cty., 558 A.2d 399, 404 (Md. 1989) (citing Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. + See more376, 488 (1860) (Grand, C.J., concurring))
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Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other + See morelaw enforcement agencies?
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Law enforcement officials can collect fees. However, law enforcement officials should not be given any duties which directly conflict with their law enforcement duties. |
“[T]he Constitution ... does not specify or describe the powers and duties of the sheriff. These are left to the common law and the Acts of Assembly.... There is nothing + See moreto prohibit the Legislature from adding to or diminishing his duties, provided those added be not in conflict with his office as sheriff.”
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Enforcement |
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Maryland | Baldwin v. State, 444 A.2d 1058, 1066 (Md. 1982) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | The state may seek reimbursement of any amount which a defendant can reasonably be expected to pay. |
"The initial determination, under the law, is to be made by the Public Defender; and to assist him in making it, § 7(b) authorizes him to “make such investigation of + See morethe financial status of each defendant at such time or times as the circumstances shall warrant....”Obviously cognizant that shifting sands of fortune might subsequently render inaccurate a previous eligibility determination, and also recognizing that time might not always permit a thorough investigation into the financial status of a defendant prior to the rendition of services, the General Assembly provided in art. 27A a comprehensive scheme whereby the Public Defender could obtain reimbursement from defendants later found able to pay for part or all of his services."
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Ability to pay |
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Maryland | Rutherford v. Rutherford, 464 A.2d 228, 237 (Md. 1983) | Other applicable case law | An indigent defendant in a civil contempt proceeding cannot be sentenced to incarceration unless he or she has been afforded the right to counsel |
"Therefore, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, an indigent defendant in a civil contempt proceeding cannot be sentenced + See moreto incarceration unless he has been afforded the right to appointed counsel. This does not mean that a constitutional right to appointed counsel attaches in every civil contempt proceeding involving an indigent defendant. Rather, we hold only that, under the due process requirements of the federal and state constitutions, an indigent defendant in a civil contempt proceeding cannot be sentenced to actual incarceration unless counsel has been appointed to represent him or he has waived the right to counsel"
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Ability to pay |
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Maryland | McDaniel v. State, 45 A.3d 916, 924 (Md. 2012) | Other applicable case law | When a defendant is ordered to make restitution to a crime victim, the defendant must timely object or the issue is waived. |
"When a court orders a defendant to make restitution to a crime victim, and the defendant believes that the court either fails to inquire into his ability to pay or + See moreerrs in determining his ability to pay, the defendant must make a timely objection to the order, else the issue is waived"
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Ability to pay |
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New Jersey | State v. Bolvito, 86 A.3d 131, 139 |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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Less about protections for ability-to-pay determination, the case law has considered courts to broadly consider ability to pay |
When it assesses a defendant's ability to pay, the sentencing court should look beyond the defendant's current assets and anticipated income during the period of incarceration. The Legislature did not + See moreimpose time constraints on an SCVTF penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:14–10. If unpaid, the penalty does not evaporate at the conclusion of the defendant's custodial sentence or his or her period of parole supervision. To the extent that a defendant's educational background and employment history may affect his or her potential to achieve post-incarceration employment and a steady income, such factors may be relevant to the inquiry. For purposes of the sentencing court's determination, a defendant's ability to pay should not be measured only by current circumstances, but assessed over the long term
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Ability to pay |
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New Jersey | Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127, 148, (NJ 2006) abrogated by Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | an indigent facing loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in municipal court is entitled to counsel |
In addition, without referencing our State Constitution, we held in Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt that “as a matter of simple justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to a conviction entailing + See moreimprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude without first having had due and fair opportunity to have counsel assigned without cost.” 58 N.J. 281, 295, 277 A.2d 216 (1971); see also R. 7:3–2(b) (“If the court is satisfied that the defendant is indigent and that the defendant faces a consequence of magnitude ..., the court shall assign the municipal public defender to represent the defendant.”). In Rodriguez, we considered “the substantial loss of driving privileges” as one type of “serious consequence” that would warrant assigning counsel to an indigent defendant. 58 N.J. at 295, 277 A.2d 216. We acknowledged “[t]he importance of counsel in an accusatorial system,” underscoring that in a case with “any complexities[,] the untrained defendant is in no position to defend himself,” and that in a case without “complexities, his lack of legal representation may place him at a disadvantage.” ...We can find no principled reason why an indigent facing loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in municipal court, termination of parental rights in family court, or tier classification in a Megan's Law proceeding would be entitled to counsel under state law but an indigent facing jail for allegedly willfully refusing to pay a child support judgment would not. Moreover, the indigent subject to incarceration for failure to pay support can hardly be distinguished from the indigent conferred with the right to counsel in an involuntary civil commitment hearing. We are persuaded that the due process guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution compels the assignment of counsel to indigent parents who are at risk of incarceration at child support enforcement hearings.
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Ability to pay |
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New Jersey | State v. De Bonis, 58 N.J. 182, 190 (1971) | Other applicable caselaw | defendants are allowed to pay fines in installments |
As we have said, there has been no bar to installment payments. The matter has rested in the court's discretion. The question now before us is whether the Federal Constitution + See morerequires an opportunity to pay a fine in installments.
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Ability to pay |