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State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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New York People v. Knapp, 132 A.D.3d 1290, 1290, 17 N.Y.S.3d 231, 231 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); People v. Travis, 64 A.D.3d 808, 809, 882 N.Y.S.2d 530, 532 (2009) Other applicable case law Consideration of ability to pay is not required when restitution order is nonprobationary "‘Consideration of defendant's ability to pay was not required because restitution was ordered as part of a nonprobationary sentence that included a period of incarceration as a significant component’” Ability to pay
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New York People v. Aloma, 92 A.D.2d 572, 572–73, 459 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (1983) Defendant must raise issue of ability to pay to preserve claim on appeal
"At sentencing, defense counsel merely noted that it was appropriate for the court 'to consider the defendant's ability to pay a fine' and stated in conclusory terms his belief that
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defendant did not have a 'substantial amount of money'. At no point, either before or after the imposition of sentence, was a request made by defendant or his counsel that a hearing be held on his ability to pay a fine"
Ability to pay
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New York People v. Ryan, 83 A.D.3d 1128, 1130, 920 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (2011) Failure to inform defendant of applicable surcharges prior to defendant's guilty plea, does not deprive defendant of opportunity to voluntarily weight available option and accept a plea.
Defendant's plea was not rendered involuntary by County Court's failure to mention, prior to the plea, the mandatory surcharge, crime victim's assistance fee and Vehicle and Traffic Law fee associated
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with his conviction. The Court of Appeals has held that such administrative fees “are not components of a defendant's sentence” (People v. Hoti, 12 N.Y.3d 742, 743, 878 N.Y.S.2d 645, 906 N.E.2d 373 [2009] ). Accordingly, the court's failure to pronounce these charges prior to the plea does not deprive a person of the opportunity to voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently weigh the available options and accept a plea
Fines and fees
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New York Cty. of Nassau v. Canavan, 1 N.Y.3d 134, 139–40, 802 N.E.2d 616, 621–22 (2003) Grossly disproportionate fines are unconstitutional. Disproportionality is determined by looking to the seriousness of the crime, available penalties, and resources of the defendant
The Excessive Fines Clause thus “limits the government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as ‘punishment for some offense’ ” Forfeitures—payments in kind—are “fines” if they
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constitute punishment for an offense (see United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 [1998] ) . . . Inasmuch as a punitive forfeiture of an instrumentality of a crime “violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense” . . . In determining gross disproportionality, we consider such factors as the seriousness of the offense, the severity of the harm caused and of the potential harm had the defendant not been caught, the relative value of the forfeited property and the maximum punishment to which defendant could have been subject for the crimes charged, and the economic circumstances of the defendant.
Fines and fees
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Iowa State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. Ability to pay
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Iowa Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) Ability to pay must be determined before imposition.
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2
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authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay.
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
Ability to pay
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Mississippi Baldwin v. State, 891 So.2d 274, 276 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004); Moody v. State, 716 So.2d 562, 565-66 (Miss. 1998).
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
The state supreme court has held that it is a violation of the U.S. Constitution and the MS state constitution's equal protection provisions to subject a defendant to jail time
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simply because he is unable to pay a fine without first making a determination of the defendant's ability to pay. There appears to be no specific minimum requirements for ability-to-pay determinations. Apparently, however, the burden is on the defendant to inform and show the court that he is indigent.
"During the revocation hearing in May 2002, Baldwin never testified that he was indigent. In fact, Baldwin stated that a former employer was going to rehire him. Baldwin offered to
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have his wages garnished. Baldwin also stated that he gets anywhere from $2,000 and $3,000 back after taxes through earned income credit and would use that money for restitution.We cannot find that there was any abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in determining whether or not Baldwin could make his restitution payments. This issue is without merit." Baldwin v. State, 891 So.2d 274, 276 (Miss. Ct. App. 2004). “[O]ne who is unable to pay will always be in a position of facing a felony conviction and jail time, while those with adequate resources will not. The automatic nature of the fine is what makes it discriminating to the poor, in that only the poor will face jail time. We hold that an indigent's equal protection rights are violated when all potential defendants are offered one way to avoid prosecution and that one way is to pay a fine, and there is no determination as to an individual's ability to pay such a fine. Subjecting one to a jail term merely because he cannot afford to pay a fine, due to no fault of his own, is unconstitutional. Moody v. State, 716 So.2d 562, 565-66 (Miss. 1998) (citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983)).
Ability to pay
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Mississippi Mississippi Judicial Performance Com'n v. A Justice Court Judge, 580 So.2d 1259, 1261-62 (Miss. 1991) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? Judges are prohibited from collecting fees except in special circumstances. Such circumstances require the judge to seek written permission from the court clerk
“We cannot say that it is absolutely wrong for a justice court judge to personally accept fine monies, because it is not expressly forbidden by statute. On the other hand,
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the statutes do not authorize it any more than they authorize a circuit judge to personally receive fine monies in his court, or a chancellor to personally receive public monies in his. There is a clear legislative intent to remove justice court judges from collection of fines. Only the justice court clerk has the statutory authority to collect fines, give receipts for fines, and account for all fine monies paid to the county.” Mississippi Judicial Performance Com'n v. A Justice Court Judge, 580 So.2d at 1262 “This Court therefore makes the following admonition to justice court judges insofar as individually accepting fine monies: Don't.” Id. “Just as with a circuit judge or chancellor, it should only be in some isolated and clearly necessitous circumstance that a justice court judge ever undertake the responsibility himself of receiving any fine money. If that extreme occasion arises, he must give a written receipt, keep the money segregated and apart from his own, and at the very first opportunity deliver it to the justice court clerk with an explanation of why he received it himself.” Id.
Revenue flow
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Mississippi Isham v. State, 161 So.3d 1076, 1084 (Miss. 2015). Other applicable caselaw Indigent defendants are entitled to state-funded criminal expert witnesses.
 "In order to be entitled to a State-funded expert, a criminal defendant must prove not only that the expert is necessary to the preparation of his defense, but he also
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must prove his indigency. Ake, 470 U.S. at 70, 105 S.Ct. 1087. Here, the trial court's order assigning Isham a public defender clearly indicates that he was financially unable to pay for an attorney, and the case proceeded on the basis that Isham was indigent." Id.
Fines and fees
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Mississippi
Quitman County v. State, 910 So.2d 1032, 1034-35 (Miss. 2005); Perisha Wallace, "No Equal Justice for the Poor: Mississippi's Failed Attempt to Honor the Right to Counsel Mandates," 9 S.
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J. POL’Y & JUSTICE 81, 86-89 (2015).
Other applicable caselaw
According to Mississippi state law, the counties, not the state, have the responsibility of covering expenses for public defender services. This is an unusual system compared to public defender funding
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schemes in other states. The county system has been criticized for failing to ensure adequate representation for indigent defendants in criminal proceedings. The lack of state funding for defender services may be in violation of the 6th Amendment right to counsel provisions articulated by Supreme Court cases Gideon v. Wainwright and Strickland v. Washington.
Section 25-32-7 of the Mississippi Code Annotated is the statutory authority that requires counties to fund the representation of indigent criminal defendants and specifically provides for the compensation and expenses
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for the public defender's office. Section 25-32-7 provides that: The public defender shall be provided with office space, secretarial assistance, and all reasonable expenses of operating the office, at least equal to or more than the county prosecuting attorney, or the district attorney if the public defender represents the entire circuit court district. The compensation and expenses of the public defender's office shall be paid by the county or counties if two (2) or more counties are acting jointly. The funds shall be paid upon allowance by the board of supervisors by order spread upon the minutes of the board. Also, § 99-15-17, in pertinent part provides “[t]he fees and expenses [of counsel for indigents] as allowed by the appropriate judge shall be paid by the county treasurer out of the general fund of the county in which the prosecution was commenced.” Quitman I, 807 So.2d at 407. Quitman v. State, 910 So.2d at 1035. Mississippi's per-capita spending rate on public defense is $4.15. It is the lowest in the country, $7.31 lower than the national average. As a result, the county funded part-time lawyers continuously lack funding to conduct the most basic investigations, to conduct legal research, or to hire experts, yet another clear violation of Gideon and Strickland. In many counties, hiring an investigator or a psychiatrist in a non-death penalty case is only possible if the lawyer pays for it out of his or her own pocket. Indigent defense lawyers must handle their own appeals, often without more compensation. While attorneys representing defendants are entitled to receive payment for overhead, the amount of overhead allowed is in the presiding county judges' discretion, and is often times capped. Counties have set very low amounts as the maximum available for compensation of indigent counsel, and the judge must approve any excess funding. Unfortunately, judges are reluctant to develop a reputation for spending tax dollars on criminal defendants, so they often deny any such requests. As a result, the most basic investigations are not completed by the lawyer. The publication identified children as young as 14 who were sent to state prison for decades “after being represented by lawyers who did no investigation on their cases” and “who spent less time talking to [[the children] than a sales clerk might spend with a customer buying a pair of shoes.” Perisha Wallace, "No Equal Justice for the Poor: Mississippi's Failed Attempt to Honor the Right to Counsel Mandates,” 9 S. J. POL’Y & JUSTICE at 88-89. (Citations omitted).
Revenue flow
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Minnesota Perkins v. State, 559 N.W. 2d 678, 692-93 (1997)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
In terms of timeline, at least, the sentencing judge need not specifically find that defendant has ability to pay fine before imposing it as part of sentence.
In State v. Martinson, the court of appeals analyzed its prior decisions requiring sentencing judges to consider a defendant's ability to pay before imposing costs of prosecution, and held that
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similar findings should be made before imposing a fine. 460 N.W.2d 342, 344 (Minn.App.1990), pet. for rev. denied (Minn., Oct. 25, 1990). The Martinson court noted that requiring such findings was consistent with the recommendations of the A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice. Id. at 343; see 3 A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice § 18-2.7 (1979). But in a subsequent case, the court of appeals held that a sentencing judge need not make findings as to a defendant's ability to pay a fine unless the judge decides to reduce the amount of the fine below the statutory minimum for the offense. State v. Patterson, 511 N.W.2d 476, 479 (Minn.App.1994), pet. for rev. denied (Minn., Mar. 31, 1994). Then, in State v. Lambert, 392 N.W.2d 242 (1986), the court of appeals affirmed the Patterson court's decision that a sentencing judge need not determine a defendant's ability to pay the statutory minimum fine. 547 N.W.2d 446, 447-48 (Minn.App.1996). Most recently, the court of appeals held that when a sentencing judge imposes a fine between the statutory maximum and the statutory minimum, the judge must find that the defendant is able to pay the fine. State v. Salinas, No. C6-96-180, slip. op. at 4 (Minn.App., filed Sept. 17, 1996). Perkins v. State, 559 N.W. 2d 678, 692-93 (1997).
Ability to pay
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Minnesota State v. Tennin, 674 N.W. 2d 403, 408 (2004) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? Any statute creating a co-payment obligation upon appointment of public defender violates indigent defendant's right to counsel under state and federal Constitutions.
Nonetheless, the requirement to repay costs of counsel is not without limit. In analyzing a recoupment statute from the State of Oregon, the United States Supreme Court held that Oregon's statute requiring an individual
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to reimburse the state for the services of a public defender was in line with the Sixth Amendment where “[t]hose who remain indigent or for whom repayment would work ‘manifest hardship’ are forever exempt from any obligation to repay.” Id. The question thus arises, does Minn.Stat. § 611.17, subd. 1 (c) (Supp.2003), which states that “[u]pon appointment of the public defender, an individual who receives public defender services shall be obligated to pay to the court a co-payment for representation provided by a public defender,” exempt persons who remain indigent or for whom repayment of the co-payment would work a manifest hardship? The answer to this question is critical to our analysis of the certified question. State v. Tennin, 674 N.W. 2d 403, 408 (2004) (quoting Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 53, 94 (1974)).
Ability to pay
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Minnesota State v. Palubicki, 727 N.W. 2d 662 (2007) Other applicable caselaw
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to pay restitution to murder victim's adult children for expenses arising from their voluntary attendance at murder trial, as their
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claimed expenses resulted from the crime; abrogating In re Welfare of D.D.G., 532 N.W.2d 279, State v. DeGrote, 2004 WL 556946. M.S.A. §§ 611A.04(1)(a), 611A.01(b).
Fines and fees
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Minnesota State v. Lopez-Solis, 589 N.W. 2d 290, 205 (1999) Costs incurred by a medical examiner in conducting an autopsy, preparing an autopsy report, and testifying at trial are not recoverable under the prosecution costs statute
Lopez–Solis argues that the costs of a medical examiner conducting an autopsy, preparing an autopsy report, and testifying at trial are costs that should not be imposed against a criminal defendant
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following conviction. Lopez–Solis contends that because the legislature requires county sheriffs to report all violent deaths to the medical examiner and because it is within the medical examiner's discretion whether to conduct an autopsy, the medical examiner should be viewed as an independent party. See Minn.Stat. § 390.32 (1996). We agree with Lopez–Solis that expenses incurred by medical examiners in conducting an autopsy, preparing an autopsy report, and testifying at trial may not be imposed against a criminal defendant following conviction. These services are provided independent of a criminal prosecution and therefore are not recoverable. Therefore, the $1,200 awarded by the trial court for Dr. Roe's trial testimony is reversed. State v. Lopez-Solis, 589 N.W. 2d 290, 205 (1999)
Fines and fees
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Minnesota State v. Fader, 358 N.W. 2d 42, 48 (1984)
Criminal sexual abuse defendant was entitled to vacation of an order requiring him to make $10,000 restitution, with the matter remanded to the trial court for reconsideration, where there was
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no factual showing of economic loss to the victim and her family in that amount. M.S.A. § 609.342(a).
The court may condition probation on restitution “when practicable.” Minn.Stat. § 609.135, subd. 1 (1982). Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines and Commentary, III.A.2. (1983) urges judges to make expanded use of restitution
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as a condition of probation, especially for persons with short criminal history scores convicted of property crimes, adding that the use of restitution may be appropriate in other cases also. In our opinion, the word “restitution” connotes restoring or compensating the victim for his loss. If the legislature intended the term to be used more loosely, as a form of punitive damages, it should have used some other word or made its particular use of the word clearer. The record indicates that defendant, although with some difficulty, is able to pay the $10,000, but the record does not provide a factual basis for the restitution award. Under the circumstances, we remand the case to the trial court for reconsideration, at which time the parties may present evidence bearing on the issue of economic loss to the victim and her family. We add that any decision by the trial court to award restitution does not by itself bar the victim and her family from independently seeking damages from defendant in a separate civil action, although any restitution awarded in this proceeding would operate as a setoff against any award obtained in such an action. State v. Fader, 358 N.W. 2d 42, 48 (1984)
Ability to pay
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Minnesota Hopp v. Hopp, 156 N.W.2d 212, 216 (1968)
Trial judge has measure of authority and discretion in civil contempt proceedings, particularly in divorce cases where alimony and support are ordered, far in excess of that existing in criminal
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cases because of limited and essential purpose of civil contempt proceedings.
The process by which this power is exercised is termed a civil contempt proceeding. The distinctive quality of a civil, as distinguished from a criminal, contempt is that of purpose.
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In exercising civil contempt powers in divorce cases, the only objective is to secure compliance with an order presumed to be reasonable. Punishment for past misconduct is not involved; that is a field reserved to criminal proceedings of which criminal contempt is one example. Peterson v. Peterson, Minn., 153 N.W.2d 825; Zieman v. Zieman, 265 Minn. 190, 121 N.W.2d 77; 17 C.J.S. Contempt ss 5(2) to 7. Because of the limited and essential purpose of civil contempt proceedings, particularly in divorce cases where alimony and support are ordered, we must recognize here a measure of authority and discretion in the trial judge far in excess of that which exists in criminal cases. In civil contempt, the function of the court is to make the rights of one individual as against another meaningful. When the duty is performed, the concern of the court is satisfied. If the duty is one specifically defined by a proper decree of the court, it must be free to compel performance by methods with are speedy, efficient, and sufficiently flexible to meet the problem at hand. Particularly in support cases, the proper discharge of the judge's responsibilities should not be frustrated by delay and formalism. Hopp v. Hopp, 156 N.W.2d 212, 216 (1968)
Enforcement