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State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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New York People v. Knapp, 132 A.D.3d 1290, 1290, 17 N.Y.S.3d 231, 231 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); People v. Travis, 64 A.D.3d 808, 809, 882 N.Y.S.2d 530, 532 (2009) Other applicable case law Consideration of ability to pay is not required when restitution order is nonprobationary "‘Consideration of defendant's ability to pay was not required because restitution was ordered as part of a nonprobationary sentence that included a period of incarceration as a significant component’” Ability to pay
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New York People v. Aloma, 92 A.D.2d 572, 572–73, 459 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (1983) Defendant must raise issue of ability to pay to preserve claim on appeal
"At sentencing, defense counsel merely noted that it was appropriate for the court 'to consider the defendant's ability to pay a fine' and stated in conclusory terms his belief that
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defendant did not have a 'substantial amount of money'. At no point, either before or after the imposition of sentence, was a request made by defendant or his counsel that a hearing be held on his ability to pay a fine"
Ability to pay
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New York People v. Ryan, 83 A.D.3d 1128, 1130, 920 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (2011) Failure to inform defendant of applicable surcharges prior to defendant's guilty plea, does not deprive defendant of opportunity to voluntarily weight available option and accept a plea.
Defendant's plea was not rendered involuntary by County Court's failure to mention, prior to the plea, the mandatory surcharge, crime victim's assistance fee and Vehicle and Traffic Law fee associated
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with his conviction. The Court of Appeals has held that such administrative fees “are not components of a defendant's sentence” (People v. Hoti, 12 N.Y.3d 742, 743, 878 N.Y.S.2d 645, 906 N.E.2d 373 [2009] ). Accordingly, the court's failure to pronounce these charges prior to the plea does not deprive a person of the opportunity to voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently weigh the available options and accept a plea
Fines and fees
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New York Cty. of Nassau v. Canavan, 1 N.Y.3d 134, 139–40, 802 N.E.2d 616, 621–22 (2003) Grossly disproportionate fines are unconstitutional. Disproportionality is determined by looking to the seriousness of the crime, available penalties, and resources of the defendant
The Excessive Fines Clause thus “limits the government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as ‘punishment for some offense’ ” Forfeitures—payments in kind—are “fines” if they
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constitute punishment for an offense (see United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 [1998] ) . . . Inasmuch as a punitive forfeiture of an instrumentality of a crime “violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense” . . . In determining gross disproportionality, we consider such factors as the seriousness of the offense, the severity of the harm caused and of the potential harm had the defendant not been caught, the relative value of the forfeited property and the maximum punishment to which defendant could have been subject for the crimes charged, and the economic circumstances of the defendant.
Fines and fees
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Iowa State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. Ability to pay
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Iowa Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) Ability to pay must be determined before imposition.
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2
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authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay.
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
Ability to pay
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New Jersey State v. Bolvito, 86 A.3d 131, 139
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
Less about protections for ability-to-pay determination, the case law has considered courts to broadly consider ability to pay
When it assesses a defendant's ability to pay, the sentencing court should look beyond the defendant's current assets and anticipated income during the period of incarceration. The Legislature did not
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impose time constraints on an SCVTF penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:14–10. If unpaid, the penalty does not evaporate at the conclusion of the defendant's custodial sentence or his or her period of parole supervision. To the extent that a defendant's educational background and employment history may affect his or her potential to achieve post-incarceration employment and a steady income, such factors may be relevant to the inquiry. For purposes of the sentencing court's determination, a defendant's ability to pay should not be measured only by current circumstances, but assessed over the long term
Ability to pay
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New Jersey Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127, 148, (NJ 2006) abrogated by Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? an indigent facing loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in municipal court is entitled to counsel
In addition, without referencing our State Constitution, we held in Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt that “as a matter of simple justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to a conviction entailing
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imprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude without first having had due and fair opportunity to have counsel assigned without cost.” 58 N.J. 281, 295, 277 A.2d 216 (1971); see also R. 7:3–2(b) (“If the court is satisfied that the defendant is indigent and that the defendant faces a consequence of magnitude ..., the court shall assign the municipal public defender to represent the defendant.”). In Rodriguez, we considered “the substantial loss of driving privileges” as one type of “serious consequence” that would warrant assigning counsel to an indigent defendant. 58 N.J. at 295, 277 A.2d 216. We acknowledged “[t]he importance of counsel in an accusatorial system,” underscoring that in a case with “any complexities[,] the untrained defendant is in no position to defend himself,” and that in a case without “complexities, his lack of legal representation may place him at a disadvantage.” ...We can find no principled reason why an indigent facing loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in municipal court, termination of parental rights in family court, or tier classification in a Megan's Law proceeding would be entitled to counsel under state law but an indigent facing jail for allegedly willfully refusing to pay a child support judgment would not. Moreover, the indigent subject to incarceration for failure to pay support can hardly be distinguished from the indigent conferred with the right to counsel in an involuntary civil commitment hearing. We are persuaded that the due process guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution compels the assignment of counsel to indigent parents who are at risk of incarceration at child support enforcement hearings.
Ability to pay
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New Jersey State v. De Bonis, 58 N.J. 182, 190 (1971) Other applicable caselaw defendants are allowed to pay fines in installments
As we have said, there has been no bar to installment payments. The matter has rested in the court's discretion. The question now before us is whether the Federal Constitution
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requires an opportunity to pay a fine in installments. 
Ability to pay
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North Carolina State v. Hunter, 315 N.C. 371, 376 (1986)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
State law requires that NC courts "take into consideration the resources of the defendant, her ability to earn, her obligation to support dependents, and such other matters as shall pertain
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to her ability to make restitution or reparation" when ordering restitution.
We do not interpret N.C.G.S. § 15A–1343 to require the trial judge to find and enter facts when imposing a judgment of probation. Rather it requires the court to take
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into consideration the resources of the defendant, her ability to earn, her obligation to support dependents, and such other matters as shall pertain to her ability to make restitution or reparation. This record clearly shows that these matters were considered by Judge Allsbrook in his judgment ordering restitution. He knew defendant's age, her relationship to the victim, that she resided with her mother, that she was indigent for legal purposes, and that the victim's family had insurance of an uncertain amount in scope at the time of the sentencing hearing. The court's action in remitting the original fine and delegating the determination and scheduling of payments in restitution to the probation officer evidenced the trial judge's full recognition of the matters to be considered pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A–1343(d).
Ability to pay
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North Carolina Matter of Alamance Cty. Court Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 99 (1991) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? Not explicitly, but it may be limited on a case-by-case basis
We hold that when inaction by those exercising legislative authority threatens fiscally to undermine the integrity of the judiciary, a court may invoke its inherent power to do what is
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reasonably necessary for “the orderly and efficient exercise of the administration of justice.” Beard v. N.C. State Bar, 320 N.C. at 129, 357 S.E.2d at 696. Article V prohibits the judiciary from taking public monies without statutory authorization. But our statutes obligate counties and cities to provide physical facilities for the judicial system operating within their boundaries. N.C.G.S. § 7A–300(a)(11) (1989); N.C.G.S. § 7A–302 (1989). These facilities must be adequate to serve the functioning of the judiciary within the borders of those political subdivisions. Such adequacy necessarily includes safeguarding the constitutional rights of parties and ascertaining that parties' statutory rights—such as handicap access—are similarly protected. Although the statutes do not expressly pass the duty of providing adequate judicial facilities to the court in case of default of local authorities, the court has the inherent authority to direct local authorities to perform that duty.
Revenue flow
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North Carolina Pers. v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 662–63 (4th Cir. 1988)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other
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law enforcement agencies?
Private counsel for interested parties may co-prosecute cases with government counsel when such participation "(1) has been approved by government counsel; (2) consists solely of rendering assistance in a subordinate
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role to government counsel; and (3) does not rise in practice to the level of effective control of the prosecution."
The issue here is whether and, if so, to what extent, private counsel for interested parties may be authorized to participate with government counsel in such a prosecution. Young flatly
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proscribes turning the prosecution completely over to private counsel for interested parties, but it certainly did not proscribe all participation by such counsel. . . . The limits of such allowable assistance were also suggested: assistance may not extend to the point that “counsel for the private party [is] ... in control of the prosecution.” Id.8 We therefore read Young at least implicitly to approve (or certainly not to forbid) the practice of allowing private counsel for interested parties to participate formally with government counsel in the prosecution of contempt citations so long as that participation (1) has been approved by government counsel; (2) consists solely of rendering assistance in a subordinate role to government counsel; and (3) does not rise in practice to the level of effective control of the prosecution. As indicated, we find authority for this rule of limited participation at least implicit in Young and we think it wholly conformable to Young 's underlying principles. Accordingly, we adopt it as the appropriate rule governing the participation of private counsel for interested parties in contempt prosecutions.
Transparency
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North Carolina State v. Webb, 358 N.C. 92, 101–02 (2004) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? Yes, a defendant may only be held liable for counsel fees in criminal trials if the defendant is convicted.
A convicted defendant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a valid judgment for costs can be entered. State v. Crews, 284 N.C. 427, 201 S.E.2d
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840 (1974). Costs are imposed only at sentencing, so any convicted indigent defendant is given notice of the *102 appointment fee at the sentencing hearing and is also given an opportunity to be heard and object to the imposition of this cost. Therefore, the constitutional requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard are satisfied. Accordingly, the imposition of the appointment fee on convicted indigent defendants passes federal constitutional muster.
Fines and fees
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North Carolina Shore v. Edmisten, 290 N.C. 628, 633–34 (1976) Other applicable case law Though a defendant may not be held liable for the fees of court appointed counsel after a conviction, he may be held liable for restitution for high costs.
A state or a local agency can be the recipient of restitution where the offense charged results in particular damages or loss to it over and above its normal
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operating costs. It would be reasonable, for example, to require a defendant to pay the state for expenses incurred to provide him with court appointed counsel should he ever become financially able to pay. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). It would not however be reasonable to require the defendant to pay the state's overhead attributable to the normal costs of prosecuting him. People v. Baker, 37 Cal.App.3d 117, 112 Cal.Rptr. 137 (1974); State v. Mulvaney, 61 N.J. 202, 293 A.2d 668 (1972); Cf. People v. Teasdale, 335 Mich. 1, 55 N.W.2d 149 (1952).
Fines and fees