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State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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New York | People v. Knapp, 132 A.D.3d 1290, 1290, 17 N.Y.S.3d 231, 231 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); People v. Travis, 64 A.D.3d 808, 809, 882 N.Y.S.2d 530, 532 (2009) | Other applicable case law | Consideration of ability to pay is not required when restitution order is nonprobationary | "Consideration of defendant's ability to pay was not required because restitution was ordered as part of a nonprobationary sentence that included a period of incarceration as a significant component | Ability to pay |
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New York | People v. Aloma, 92 A.D.2d 572, 57273, 459 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (1983) | Defendant must raise issue of ability to pay to preserve claim on appeal |
"At sentencing, defense counsel merely noted that it was appropriate for the court 'to consider the defendant's ability to pay a fine' and stated in conclusory terms his belief that + See moredefendant did not have a 'substantial amount of money'. At no point, either before or after the imposition of sentence, was a request made by defendant or his counsel that a hearing be held on his ability to pay a fine"
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Ability to pay | |
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New York | People v. Ryan, 83 A.D.3d 1128, 1130, 920 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (2011) | Failure to inform defendant of applicable surcharges prior to defendant's guilty plea, does not deprive defendant of opportunity to voluntarily weight available option and accept a plea. |
Defendant's plea was not rendered involuntary by County Court's failure to mention, prior to the plea, the mandatory surcharge, crime victim's assistance fee and Vehicle and Traffic Law fee associated + See morewith his conviction. The Court of Appeals has held that such administrative fees are not components of a defendant's sentence (People v. Hoti, 12 N.Y.3d 742, 743, 878 N.Y.S.2d 645, 906 N.E.2d 373 [2009] ). Accordingly, the court's failure to pronounce these charges prior to the plea does not deprive a person of the opportunity to voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently weigh the available options and accept a plea
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Fines and fees | |
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New York | Cty. of Nassau v. Canavan, 1 N.Y.3d 134, 13940, 802 N.E.2d 616, 62122 (2003) | Grossly disproportionate fines are unconstitutional. Disproportionality is determined by looking to the seriousness of the crime, available penalties, and resources of the defendant |
The Excessive Fines Clause thus limits the government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense Forfeiturespayments in kindare fines if they + See moreconstitute punishment for an offense (see United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 [1998] ) . . . Inasmuch as a punitive forfeiture of an instrumentality of a crime violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense . . . In determining gross disproportionality, we consider such factors as the seriousness of the offense, the severity of the harm caused and of the potential harm had the defendant not been caught, the relative value of the forfeited property and the maximum punishment to which defendant could have been subject for the crimes charged, and the economic circumstances of the defendant.
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Fines and fees | |
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Iowa | State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | Ability to pay |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) | Ability to pay must be determined before imposition. |
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2 + See moreauthorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
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Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? |
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay.
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The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
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Ability to pay |
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New Jersey | State v. Bolvito, 86 A.3d 131, 139 |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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Less about protections for ability-to-pay determination, the case law has considered courts to broadly consider ability to pay |
When it assesses a defendant's ability to pay, the sentencing court should look beyond the defendant's current assets and anticipated income during the period of incarceration. The Legislature did not + See moreimpose time constraints on an SCVTF penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:14–10. If unpaid, the penalty does not evaporate at the conclusion of the defendant's custodial sentence or his or her period of parole supervision. To the extent that a defendant's educational background and employment history may affect his or her potential to achieve post-incarceration employment and a steady income, such factors may be relevant to the inquiry. For purposes of the sentencing court's determination, a defendant's ability to pay should not be measured only by current circumstances, but assessed over the long term
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Ability to pay |
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New Jersey | Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127, 148, (NJ 2006) abrogated by Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | an indigent facing loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in municipal court is entitled to counsel |
In addition, without referencing our State Constitution, we held in Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt that “as a matter of simple justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to a conviction entailing + See moreimprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude without first having had due and fair opportunity to have counsel assigned without cost.” 58 N.J. 281, 295, 277 A.2d 216 (1971); see also R. 7:3–2(b) (“If the court is satisfied that the defendant is indigent and that the defendant faces a consequence of magnitude ..., the court shall assign the municipal public defender to represent the defendant.”). In Rodriguez, we considered “the substantial loss of driving privileges” as one type of “serious consequence” that would warrant assigning counsel to an indigent defendant. 58 N.J. at 295, 277 A.2d 216. We acknowledged “[t]he importance of counsel in an accusatorial system,” underscoring that in a case with “any complexities[,] the untrained defendant is in no position to defend himself,” and that in a case without “complexities, his lack of legal representation may place him at a disadvantage.” ...We can find no principled reason why an indigent facing loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in municipal court, termination of parental rights in family court, or tier classification in a Megan's Law proceeding would be entitled to counsel under state law but an indigent facing jail for allegedly willfully refusing to pay a child support judgment would not. Moreover, the indigent subject to incarceration for failure to pay support can hardly be distinguished from the indigent conferred with the right to counsel in an involuntary civil commitment hearing. We are persuaded that the due process guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution compels the assignment of counsel to indigent parents who are at risk of incarceration at child support enforcement hearings.
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Ability to pay |
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New Jersey | State v. De Bonis, 58 N.J. 182, 190 (1971) | Other applicable caselaw | defendants are allowed to pay fines in installments |
As we have said, there has been no bar to installment payments. The matter has rested in the court's discretion. The question now before us is whether the Federal Constitution + See morerequires an opportunity to pay a fine in installments.
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Ability to pay |
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Oregon | State v. Mickow, 277 Or.App. 497, 502 (2016) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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Courts must determine that the defendant is or may be able to pay the fees, and take the financial resources of the defendant into account, as well as the nature + See moreof the burden that the fee obligation would place on that person
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Among the safeguards that were pivotal to the [Supreme] Court's conclusion [upholding Oregon's ability-to-pay determination post-Gideon] were the statutory requirements that the sentencing court must (1) determine that the defendant + See moreis or may be able to pay the fees; and (2) take the financial resources of the defendant into account, as well as the nature of the burden that the fee obligation would place on that person. Id. at 45, 53 n. 12, 94 S.Ct. 2116.
State v. Mickow, 277 Or.App. 497, 502 (2016)
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Ability to pay |
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Oregon | Bobo v. Kulongoski, 338 Or. 111, 122 (2005) | Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? |
Unclear, and answer is unavailable as to courts, but a line of cases suggests that merely having a fund where assessed fees support state functions does not constitute a conflict + See moreof interest
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Considering the wording of Article IV, section 18, its history, and the case law surrounding it, we conclude that the question whether a bill is a “bill for raising revenue” + See moreentails two issues. The first is whether the bill collects or brings money into the treasury. If it does not, that is the end of the inquiry. If a bill does bring money into the treasury, the remaining question is whether the bill possesses the essential features of a bill levying a tax. As Northern Counties Trust makes clear, bills that assess a fee for a specific purpose are not “bills raising revenue” even though they collect or bring money into the treasury.
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Revenue flow |
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Oregon | State v. Fuller, 12 Or.App. 152, 158–59 (1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 40 (1974) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | Yes, but such limits are predicated on the indigency of the defendant |
Thus, an indigent defendant is entitled to free counsel immediately (which is when he needs it), but may be later required to repay this cost if he ‘is or will + See morebe’ able to do so, that is, if he has ceased or likely will cease to be indigent. A defendant is not denied counsel while he is indigent, and he is required to repay appointed counsel's fee only if and when he is no longer indigent. If there is no likelihood that a defendant's indigency will end, a judgment for costs cannot be imposed. ORS 161.665(3).
State v. Fuller, 12 Or.App. 152, 158–59 (1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 40 (1974)
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Fines and fees |
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Oregon | State v. Goodenow, 251 Or.App. 139, 144–45 (2012) | Other applicable caselaw |
Courts are not limited by any numerical or proportionality requirement to seize the proceeds of a crime, in this case, all the earnings from a winning lottery ticket purchased using + See morean illegally obtained credit card
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Oregon's criminal forfeiture statutes do not limit the amount of property that may be forfeited as the proceeds of prohibited conduct. They do not require courts to determine whether a + See moreforfeiture of a defendant's property is proportional to the defendant's crime. ORS 131.585(1) (“The court shall enter judgment to the extent that the property is proceeds of the crime of conviction or of past prohibited conduct that is similar to the crime of conviction.”). (In that respect, the statutes treat the forfeiture of the proceeds of defendants' crimes differently from the forfeiture of instrumentalities of defendants' crimes. The statutes require courts to determine whether the forfeiture of an instrumentality of a defendant's crime, such as a vehicle or building used in the commission of a crime, is proportional to the crime and identify factors to consider in making that determination. ORS 131.585(2)(a)-(g).4)
State v. Goodenow, 251 Or.App. 139, 144–45 (2012)
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Enforcement |