Keyword search across all of the laws in the states. Subject-area tabs above allow you to narrow results. Click the advanced search for further refinement.
Every law can be saved to the Reform Builder
State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Add to Dashboard
|
New York | People v. Knapp, 132 A.D.3d 1290, 1290, 17 N.Y.S.3d 231, 231 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015); People v. Travis, 64 A.D.3d 808, 809, 882 N.Y.S.2d 530, 532 (2009) | Other applicable case law | Consideration of ability to pay is not required when restitution order is nonprobationary | "Consideration of defendant's ability to pay was not required because restitution was ordered as part of a nonprobationary sentence that included a period of incarceration as a significant component | Ability to pay |
Add to Dashboard
|
New York | People v. Aloma, 92 A.D.2d 572, 57273, 459 N.Y.S.2d 327, 328 (1983) | Defendant must raise issue of ability to pay to preserve claim on appeal |
"At sentencing, defense counsel merely noted that it was appropriate for the court 'to consider the defendant's ability to pay a fine' and stated in conclusory terms his belief that + See moredefendant did not have a 'substantial amount of money'. At no point, either before or after the imposition of sentence, was a request made by defendant or his counsel that a hearing be held on his ability to pay a fine"
|
Ability to pay | |
Add to Dashboard
|
New York | People v. Ryan, 83 A.D.3d 1128, 1130, 920 N.Y.S.2d 806, 809 (2011) | Failure to inform defendant of applicable surcharges prior to defendant's guilty plea, does not deprive defendant of opportunity to voluntarily weight available option and accept a plea. |
Defendant's plea was not rendered involuntary by County Court's failure to mention, prior to the plea, the mandatory surcharge, crime victim's assistance fee and Vehicle and Traffic Law fee associated + See morewith his conviction. The Court of Appeals has held that such administrative fees are not components of a defendant's sentence (People v. Hoti, 12 N.Y.3d 742, 743, 878 N.Y.S.2d 645, 906 N.E.2d 373 [2009] ). Accordingly, the court's failure to pronounce these charges prior to the plea does not deprive a person of the opportunity to voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently weigh the available options and accept a plea
|
Fines and fees | |
Add to Dashboard
|
New York | Cty. of Nassau v. Canavan, 1 N.Y.3d 134, 13940, 802 N.E.2d 616, 62122 (2003) | Grossly disproportionate fines are unconstitutional. Disproportionality is determined by looking to the seriousness of the crime, available penalties, and resources of the defendant |
The Excessive Fines Clause thus limits the government's power to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind, as punishment for some offense Forfeiturespayments in kindare fines if they + See moreconstitute punishment for an offense (see United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 328, 118 S.Ct. 2028, 141 L.Ed.2d 314 [1998] ) . . . Inasmuch as a punitive forfeiture of an instrumentality of a crime violates the Excessive Fines Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a defendant's offense . . . In determining gross disproportionality, we consider such factors as the seriousness of the offense, the severity of the harm caused and of the potential harm had the defendant not been caught, the relative value of the forfeited property and the maximum punishment to which defendant could have been subject for the crimes charged, and the economic circumstances of the defendant.
|
Fines and fees | |
Add to Dashboard
|
Iowa | State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
|
A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | Ability to pay |
Add to Dashboard
|
Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | Ability to pay | |
Add to Dashboard
|
Iowa | Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) | Ability to pay must be determined before imposition. |
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2 + See moreauthorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
|
Ability to pay | |
Add to Dashboard
|
Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? |
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay.
|
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
|
Ability to pay |
Add to Dashboard
|
North Dakota | State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465 (N.D. 1982) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
|
While the North Dakota Supreme Court has not expressly delineated what the ND constitution requires for an ability to pay hearing, it applied Fuller in holding that the current recoupment + See morestatute is valid.
|
Kottenbroch's fourth argument is that the recoupment statute violates due process because it does not provide the defendant with any type of hearing. Before probation may be revoked, however, the + See moredefendant must be given a hearing pursuant to Rule 32(f), N.D.R.Crim.P. At the hearing, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. In this case the prosecution would have to prove that Kottenbroch was capable of, but unwilling to, repay the costs of his court-appointed counsel. Such a construction will prevent invidious discrimination between a probationer capable of repaying the costs of his attorney and one incapable of such repayment. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 48, fn. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 2122, fn. 9.
|
Ability to pay |
Add to Dashboard
|
North Dakota | State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465 (N.D. 1982) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | As noted above, Kottenbroch indicates that a hearing is required. |
Kottenbroch's fourth argument is that the recoupment statute violates due process because it does not provide the defendant with any type of hearing. Before probation may be revoked, however, the + See moredefendant must be given a hearing pursuant to Rule 32(f), N.D.R.Crim.P. At the hearing, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. In this case the prosecution would have to prove that Kottenbroch was capable of, but unwilling to, repay the costs of his court-appointed counsel. Such a construction will prevent invidious discrimination between a probationer capable of repaying the costs of his attorney and one incapable of such repayment. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 48, fn. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 2122, fn. 9.
|
Fines and fees |
Add to Dashboard
|
North Dakota | State v. Thorstad, 261 N.W.2d 899 (N.D. 1978) | Other applicable case law | Defendant who agrees to pay restitution in plea bargain has no right to ability to pay determination under N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-08. |
After serious deliberation, we conclude that the provisions of s 12.1-32-08, NDCC, apply in situations where the defendant either is found guilty or pleaded guilty to a criminal charge and + See morethe amounts or the issues of restitution or reparation are uncertain or are in dispute. However, we do not believe it applies where restitution or reparation was resolved by agreement with the defendant through plea-bargaining procedures even though the specific amount is not known and is to be determined later. When a defendant agrees to pay for the damage he caused and has a general idea of the amount, but not the specific amount in dollars and cents, which is to be determined later, he cannot later claim in the absence of fraud, that he was not made aware of the amount or that he did not agree to the amount. After a voluntary agreement has been reached on the issues of restitution and reparation it would be a useless gesture to proceed under s 12.1-32-08, NDCC. We do not believe that justice requires the performance of an idle act (s 31-11-05(23), NDCC), which it would be to require a restitution or reparation hearing after the defendant has agreed to make restitution or reparation, as the case may be.
|
Ability to pay |
Add to Dashboard
|
North Dakota | State v. Nordahl, 680 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 2004) | Other applicable case law | Where defendant agrees to pay restitution in plea bargain, probation can be revoked for failure to pay restitution, even if defendant was genuinely unable to pay |
Nordahl's situation is sufficiently distinguishable from the Bearden case. In Bearden, the defendant did not agree to the restitution as part of a plea agreement; rather, restitution was imposed by + See morethe court as a part of Bearden's sentence. Id. at 662, 103 S.Ct. 2064. . . . The crux of the decision in Bearden rested on good faith. Id. Unlike Bearden, but similar to the defendant in Mitchell, Nordahl knew his financial situation before he entered into the plea agreement with the State's Attorney. Nordahl was in a position to know the nature and extent of his finances and to evaluate his ability to pay the restitution obligation. Prior to entering the plea agreement, Nordahl knew of the encumbrances on his farm and other property. In his affidavit, Nordahl stated it was his intention to sell the bus to satisfy a portion of the restitution and to sell part of his farm property to satisfy the rest of the obligation. Presumably, Nordahl was aware that the outstanding obligations to the bank would go unfulfilled if he paid the restitution obligation in full or, in the alternative, the bank would lose its collateral.
|
Ability to pay |
Add to Dashboard
|
West Virginia |
State v. Murrell, 201 W. Va. 648, 649–50, 499 S.E.2d 870, 871–72 (1997). Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Haught, 179 W.Va. 557, 371 S.E.2d 54 (1988). |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
|
(1) While there is no prohibition against the imposition of the maximum penalty prescribed by law, indigent defendants may not be incarcerated solely because of their inability to pay court-ordered + See morefines or costs. (2) The court may impose of a statutory fine without determination of ability to pay, but before a trial court conditions its recommendation for a defendant's parole upon the defendant's payment of statutory fines, costs and attorney's fees, the trial court must consider the financial resources of the defendant, the defendant's ability to pay and the nature of the burden that the payment of such costs will impose upon the defendant.
|
"An individual is not excused from the imposition of the maximum sentence allowed under a statute simply because he is indigent, even if that sentence includes the imposition of fines + See morepursuant to statute. Consistent with the principles of Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), and *650 **872 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983), however, while there is no prohibition against the imposition of the maximum penalty prescribed by law, indigent defendants may not be incarcerated solely because of their inability to pay court-ordered fines or costs." State v. Murrell, 201 W. Va. 648, 649–50, 499 S.E.2d 870, 871–72 (1997).
|
Ability to pay |
Add to Dashboard
|
West Virginia | W. Va. Const. art. VIII, § 3 | Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? | No. West Virginia's Constitution allows the Court of Appeals to impose binding state-wide rules. |
“The court shall have power to promulgate rules for all cases and proceedings, civil and criminal, for all of the courts of the State relating to writs, warrants, process, practice + See moreand procedure, which shall have the force and effect of law.”
|
Enforcement |
Add to Dashboard
|
West Virginia | See generally §59-1-1 to §59-1-39. W. Va. Code §59-1-14. |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other + See morelaw enforcement agencies?
|
The Court, Clerk of Court, Sheriff and Probation Dept can collect fines. Most fines and fees go into the general revenue fund (either state or county), but the West + See moreVirginia Deputy Sheriff Retirement Fundt fund receives a small amount from certain collections (see §59-1-14).
|
Revenue flow | |
Add to Dashboard
|
West Virginia | W. Va. Code § 29-21-16 | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? |
No, not under the state constitution. However, state statutory law provides that "court shall not order a person to pay costs unless the person is able to pay without + See moreundue hardship."
|
(g) In the circumstances and manner set forth below, circuit judges may order repayment to the state, through the office of the clerk of the circuit court having jurisdiction over + See morethe proceedings, of the costs of representation provided under this article:(1) In every case in which services are provided to an indigent person and an adverse judgment has been rendered against such person, the court may require that person, and in juvenile cases, may require the juvenile's parents or custodian, to pay as costs the compensation of appointed counsel, the expenses of the defense and such other fees and costs as authorized by statute.
(2) The court shall not order a person to pay costs unless the person is able to pay without undue hardship. In determining the amount and method of repayment of costs, the court shall take account of the financial resources of the person, the person's ability to pay and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose. The fact that the court initially determines, at the time of a case's conclusion, that it is not proper to order the repayment of costs does not preclude the court from subsequently ordering repayment should the person's financial circumstances change.
(3) When a person is ordered to repay costs, the court may order payment to be made forthwith or within a specified period of time or in specified installments. If a person is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, an order for repayment of costs is not enforceable during the period of imprisonment unless the court expressly finds, at the time of sentencing, that the person has sufficient assets to pay the amounts ordered to be paid or finds there is a reasonable likelihood the person will acquire the necessary assets in the foreseeable future.
(4) A person who has been ordered to repay costs, and who is not in contumacious default in the payment thereof, may at any time petition the sentencing court for modification of the repayment order. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that continued payment of the amount ordered will impose undue hardship on the person or the person's dependents, the court may modify the method or amount of payment.
(5) When a person ordered to pay costs is also placed on probation or imposition or execution of sentence is suspended, the court may make the repayment of costs a condition of probation or suspension of sentence.
|
Ability to pay |
Add to Dashboard
|
West Virginia | State v. Stamm, 222 W. Va. 276, 281, 664 S.E.2d 161, 166 (2008) | Other applicable case law | In criminal failure to pay support cases, burden of reasonable ability to pay remains with the state. |
"Accordingly, we now hold that, insofar as W. Va. Code § 61-5-29(3) (1999) (Repl. Vol. 2005) shifts to a defendant the burden of disproving a material element of the State's + See morecase [here, defendant's reasonable ability to provide was an element in 61-5-29(2), but reasonable ability to provide was also an affirmative defense in 61-5-29(3)], in violation of the due process clauses found in Article III, Section 10, of the Constitution of West Virginia, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, that individual provision, severed from the remainder of W. Va. Code § 61-5-29, is unconstitutional and unenforceable."
|