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State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Alabama | Adams v. City of Pelham, 651 So. 2d 55, 56 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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The burden of proof with respect to indigency (at least in cases concerning appointment of counsel) is on the defendant | A criminal defendant has the burden of proving to the court that he is indigent and, thereby, is entitled to court-appointed counsel. | Ability to pay |
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Alabama | Reese v. State, 717 So. 2d 412, 412 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | No, if it is determined that the imposition of those fees does not impose a hardship |
In criminal cases in which the court has appointed counsel for a defendant, the court can order the defendant to pay all or part of the costs of legal services + See moreprovided, if the court finds that the defendant can pay without incurring substantial hardship. Rule 6.4(f), Ala. R.Crim. P.
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Ability to pay |
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Illinois | People v. Love, 177 Ill.2d 550,563 | Other applicable case law | Enforcement | ||
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Illinois | N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-16-7 |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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No, but statutory law does. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-16-7 allows the district attorney to recover payment only from those who were not entitled indigent legal assistance when they received. |
A. The district attorney may, on behalf of the state, recover payment or reimbursement, as the case may be, from each person who has received legal assistance or another benefit + See moreunder the Indigent Defense Act:(1) to which he was not entitled;
(2) with respect to which he was not a needy person when he received it; or
(3) with respect to which he has failed to make the certificate required by Section 62 B of the Indigent Defense Act and for which he refuses to pay. Suit must be brought within six years after the date on which the aid was received.
B. The district attorney may, on behalf of the state, recover payment or reimbursement, as the case may be, from each person other than a person covered by Subsection A who has received legal assistance under the Indigent Defense Act and who, on the date on which suit is brought, is financially able to pay or reimburse the state for it according to the standards of ability to pay applicable under the Indigent Defense Act but refuses to do so. Suit must be brought within three years after the date on which the benefit was received.
C. Amounts recovered under this section shall be paid to the state treasurer for credit to the state general fund.
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Ability to pay |
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Illinois | State ex rel. Quintana v. Schnedar, 855 P.2d 562, 568 (N.M. 1993) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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Courts should give great deference to the determination of indigency made by the public defender's office when deciding whether a defendant is indigent. |
The inherent power of the judiciary to appoint counsel for indigent defendants is within the unique province of the courts to ensure the constitutionality of criminal prosecutions. The PDA and + See morethe IDA create the statutory apparatus for providing legal representation to indigent criminal defendants. These statutes and other provisions indicate that the Department will determine under its guidelines whether a particular defendant is indigent and therefore entitled to the legal assistance of a public defender. Courts should give great deference to such determinations by the Department, although they retain the ultimate authority to determine indigence and the discretionary ability to order the appointment of a public defender when it is necessary to protect the defendant's constitutional or statutory rights.
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Ability to pay |
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Illinois | State ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v. Rael, 642 P.2d 1099, 1104 (N.M. 1982) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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The New Mexico Supreme Court has recognized that in a civil contempt proceeding, defendants are not entitled to court-appointed counsel. |
"The trial court is the proper evaluator of the need for counsel on a case-by-case basis, considering factors such as the indigent's ability to understand the proceeding, the complexity of + See morethe legal and factual issues, and the defenses that might be presented. We hold that the trial court must make a case-by-case determination, based on articulated reasons, whether fundamental fairness requires the appointment of counsel to assist an indigent defendant in a nonsupport civil contempt proceeding, and may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, appoint counsel in the proper case."
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Enforcement |
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Illinois | State v. Anaya, 76 N.M. 572, 577 (1966) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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The defendant must make a reasonable showing that he is unable to pay, then the court must inquire into the showing made. |
"The burden of proceeding rests first upon the defendant. It is proper for the trial court to require defendant to make a reasonable showing that he is unable to employ + See morecounsel. Depending on the facts, more than one inquiry may be necessary. In Elliott v. District Court In & For City & County of Denver, 402 P.2d 65 (Colo.1965), the defendant informed the court that he had an expectancy of money. When the expectancy failed to materialize, he brought it to attention of the court at a later date. When defendant makes a reasonable showing of indigency in support of his request for court-appointed counsel, the trial court has a duty under s 41—11—2, N.M.S.A. 1953, to inquire into the facts claimed by defendant. This does not require an independent inquiry by the court. It does require sufficient questioning by the court to enable the court either to decide the question of indigency at that time or to direct that defendant is to report further to the court on the question of obtaining counsel.”
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Ability to pay |
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Illinois | People v. Somers, 984 N.E. 2d 471 (2013) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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notice, meaningful opportunity to present evidence on the costs of representation, the defendant's financial circumstances, and foreseeability to pay |
Both this court and the appellate court have been very clear about what a trial court must do . . . To comply with the statute, the court may not + See moresimply impose the fee in a perfunctory manner. Rather, the court must give the defendant notice that it is considering imposing the fee, and the defendant must be given the opportunity to present evidence regarding his or her ability to pay and any other relevant circumstances. The hearing must focus on the costs of representation, the defendant's financial circumstances, and the foreseeable ability of the defendant to pay.
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Ability to pay |
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Illinois | People v. Aguirre-Alarcon, 2016 IL App (4th) 140455, ¶ 12, 59 N.E.3d 229, 232 | Other applicable case law | Ability to pay determinations must consider foreseeable and present ability to pay | The hearing must focus on the foreseeable ability of the defendant to pay reimbursement and the costs of the representation provided. | Ability to pay |
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North Dakota | State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465 (N.D. 1982) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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While the North Dakota Supreme Court has not expressly delineated what the ND constitution requires for an ability to pay hearing, it applied Fuller in holding that the current recoupment + See morestatute is valid.
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Kottenbroch's fourth argument is that the recoupment statute violates due process because it does not provide the defendant with any type of hearing. Before probation may be revoked, however, the + See moredefendant must be given a hearing pursuant to Rule 32(f), N.D.R.Crim.P. At the hearing, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. In this case the prosecution would have to prove that Kottenbroch was capable of, but unwilling to, repay the costs of his court-appointed counsel. Such a construction will prevent invidious discrimination between a probationer capable of repaying the costs of his attorney and one incapable of such repayment. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 48, fn. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 2122, fn. 9.
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Ability to pay |
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North Dakota | State v. Kottenbroch, 319 N.W.2d 465 (N.D. 1982) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | As noted above, Kottenbroch indicates that a hearing is required. |
Kottenbroch's fourth argument is that the recoupment statute violates due process because it does not provide the defendant with any type of hearing. Before probation may be revoked, however, the + See moredefendant must be given a hearing pursuant to Rule 32(f), N.D.R.Crim.P. At the hearing, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. In this case the prosecution would have to prove that Kottenbroch was capable of, but unwilling to, repay the costs of his court-appointed counsel. Such a construction will prevent invidious discrimination between a probationer capable of repaying the costs of his attorney and one incapable of such repayment. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 48, fn. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 2122, fn. 9.
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Fines and fees |
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North Dakota | State v. Thorstad, 261 N.W.2d 899 (N.D. 1978) | Other applicable case law | Defendant who agrees to pay restitution in plea bargain has no right to ability to pay determination under N.D. Cent. Code § 12.1-32-08. |
After serious deliberation, we conclude that the provisions of s 12.1-32-08, NDCC, apply in situations where the defendant either is found guilty or pleaded guilty to a criminal charge and + See morethe amounts or the issues of restitution or reparation are uncertain or are in dispute. However, we do not believe it applies where restitution or reparation was resolved by agreement with the defendant through plea-bargaining procedures even though the specific amount is not known and is to be determined later. When a defendant agrees to pay for the damage he caused and has a general idea of the amount, but not the specific amount in dollars and cents, which is to be determined later, he cannot later claim in the absence of fraud, that he was not made aware of the amount or that he did not agree to the amount. After a voluntary agreement has been reached on the issues of restitution and reparation it would be a useless gesture to proceed under s 12.1-32-08, NDCC. We do not believe that justice requires the performance of an idle act (s 31-11-05(23), NDCC), which it would be to require a restitution or reparation hearing after the defendant has agreed to make restitution or reparation, as the case may be.
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Ability to pay |
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North Dakota | State v. Nordahl, 680 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 2004) | Other applicable case law | Where defendant agrees to pay restitution in plea bargain, probation can be revoked for failure to pay restitution, even if defendant was genuinely unable to pay |
Nordahl's situation is sufficiently distinguishable from the Bearden case. In Bearden, the defendant did not agree to the restitution as part of a plea agreement; rather, restitution was imposed by + See morethe court as a part of Bearden's sentence. Id. at 662, 103 S.Ct. 2064. . . . The crux of the decision in Bearden rested on good faith. Id. Unlike Bearden, but similar to the defendant in Mitchell, Nordahl knew his financial situation before he entered into the plea agreement with the State's Attorney. Nordahl was in a position to know the nature and extent of his finances and to evaluate his ability to pay the restitution obligation. Prior to entering the plea agreement, Nordahl knew of the encumbrances on his farm and other property. In his affidavit, Nordahl stated it was his intention to sell the bus to satisfy a portion of the restitution and to sell part of his farm property to satisfy the rest of the obligation. Presumably, Nordahl was aware that the outstanding obligations to the bank would go unfulfilled if he paid the restitution obligation in full or, in the alternative, the bank would lose its collateral.
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Ability to pay |