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State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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Alabama Adams v. City of Pelham, 651 So. 2d 55, 56 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
The burden of proof with respect to indigency (at least in cases concerning appointment of counsel) is on the defendant A criminal defendant has the burden of proving to the court that he is indigent and, thereby, is entitled to court-appointed counsel. Ability to pay
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Alabama Reese v. State, 717 So. 2d 412, 412 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? No, if it is determined that the imposition of those fees does not impose a hardship
In criminal cases in which the court has appointed counsel for a defendant, the court can order the defendant to pay all or part of the costs of legal services
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provided, if the court finds that the defendant can pay without incurring substantial hardship. Rule 6.4(f), Ala. R.Crim. P.
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. Ability to pay
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Iowa Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) Ability to pay must be determined before imposition.
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2
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authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay.
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
Ability to pay
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Maryland 86 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 183 (2001) (citing Reddick v. State, 608 A.2d 1246 (1992); Smith v. State, 506 A.2d 1165 (1986); Turner v. State, 516 A.2d 579 (1986)).
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
All that is required is that the court must first assess the defendant's ability to pay the fine by inquiring into the defendant's family and financial situation before incarcerating defendant
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for inability to pay. No specific procedural mechanisms have been established.
"State law provides that a court may sentence a convicted defendant who has failed to pay a fine to an additional period of confinement to “work off” the fine. However,
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under both State law and the federal Constitution, the court must first assess the defendant's ability to pay the fine by inquiring into the defendant's family and financial situation. Any additional period of incarceration imposed for failure to pay the fine must be within statutory limits and may not, in any event, exceed 90 days. Finally, the total period of incarceration imposed on an indigent defendant may not exceed the statutory maximum for the underlying offense."
Ability to pay
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Maryland
Md. Const. art. IV, § 18 (granting the Court of Appeals the authority to enacts rules with the force of law); see, e.g., MD R ADR Rule 17-208 (the Court
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of Appeals authorizes its Chief Judge to approve fee schedules)
Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? No. Maryland's Constitution allows the Court of Appeals to impose binding state-wide rules, including fines and fees.
"The Court of Appeals from time to time shall adopt rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration of the appellate courts and in the other
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courts of this State, which shall have the force of law until rescinded, changed or modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law. The power of courts other than the Court of Appeals to make rules of practice and procedure, or administrative rules, shall be subject to the rules and regulations adopted by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law." "Subject to the approval of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, the county administrative judge of each circuit court shall develop and adopt maximum hourly rate fee schedules for court-designated individuals conducting each type of fee-for-service ADR"
Revenue flow
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Maryland
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 7-503; Rucker v. Harford Cty., 558 A.2d 399, 404 (Md. 1989) (citing Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md.
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376, 488 (1860) (Grand, C.J., concurring))
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other
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law enforcement agencies?
Law enforcement officials can collect fees. However, law enforcement officials should not be given any duties which directly conflict with their law enforcement duties.
“[T]he Constitution ... does not specify or describe the powers and duties of the sheriff. These are left to the common law and the Acts of Assembly.... There is nothing
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to prohibit the Legislature from adding to or diminishing his duties, provided those added be not in conflict with his office as sheriff.”
Enforcement
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Maryland Baldwin v. State, 444 A.2d 1058, 1066 (Md. 1982) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? The state may seek reimbursement of any amount which a defendant can reasonably be expected to pay.
"The initial determination, under the law, is to be made by the Public Defender; and to assist him in making it, § 7(b) authorizes him to “make such investigation of
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the financial status of each defendant at such time or times as the circumstances shall warrant....”Obviously cognizant that shifting sands of fortune might subsequently render inaccurate a previous eligibility determination, and also recognizing that time might not always permit a thorough investigation into the financial status of a defendant prior to the rendition of services, the General Assembly provided in art. 27A a comprehensive scheme whereby the Public Defender could obtain reimbursement from defendants later found able to pay for part or all of his services."
Ability to pay
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Maryland Rutherford v. Rutherford, 464 A.2d 228, 237 (Md. 1983) Other applicable case law An indigent defendant in a civil contempt proceeding cannot be sentenced to incarceration unless he or she has been afforded the right to counsel
"Therefore, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, an indigent defendant in a civil contempt proceeding cannot be sentenced
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to incarceration unless he has been afforded the right to appointed counsel. This does not mean that a constitutional right to appointed counsel attaches in every civil contempt proceeding involving an indigent defendant. Rather, we hold only that, under the due process requirements of the federal and state constitutions, an indigent defendant in a civil contempt proceeding cannot be sentenced to actual incarceration unless counsel has been appointed to represent him or he has waived the right to counsel"
Ability to pay
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Maryland McDaniel v. State, 45 A.3d 916, 924 (Md. 2012) Other applicable case law When a defendant is ordered to make restitution to a crime victim, the defendant must timely object or the issue is waived.
"When a court orders a defendant to make restitution to a crime victim, and the defendant believes that the court either fails to inquire into his ability to pay or
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errs in determining his ability to pay, the defendant must make a timely objection to the order, else the issue is waived"
Ability to pay
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Montana State v. Morgan, 198 Mont. 391, 403 (1982)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A court may not sentence a defendant to pay resitution unless the defendant is or will be able to pay it. A court shall take into account the financial
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resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose. When petitioned by the defendant, if it appears to the satisfaction of the court that payment of the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or his immediate family, the court may modify restitution payments.
Unfortunately, the statutes do not set out standards to be applied on restitution awards similar to those on costs which are set out in section 46-18-232, MCA, as follows: “(2) The
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court may not sentence a defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or will be able to pay them. In determining the amount and method of payment of costs, the court shall take into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose. “(3) A defendant who has been sentenced to pay costs and who is not in default in the payment thereof may at any time petition the court that sentenced him for remission of the payment of costs or of any unpaid portion thereof. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that payment of the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or his immediate family, the court may remit all or part of the amount due in costs or modify the method of payment.” We find the foregoing standards are reasonable standards for application to restitution payments. The District Court should apply the foregoing provisions to the present fact situation. In its findings the District Court should include sufficient facts to show compliance with the foregoing paragraphs.
Ability to pay
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Montana State v. Farrell, 207 Mont. 483, 492 (1984) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? A defendant cannot be required to pay fees for counsel without a meaningful inquiry into the defendant's financial status
The judgment cannot stand without a meaningful inquiry into the appellant's financial status and a subsequent finding of the record that he has sufficient resources to repay costs of legal
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counsel. See United States v. Bracewell (2d Cir.1978), 569 F.2d 1194, 1197–98. In conducting an inquiry and reaching a conclusion, the trial court “need not permit a full-fledged adversarial inquiry into the nature and amount of a defendant's assets; nor need he become involved in determining priorities to these assets. [However,] ... any defenses to payment asserted by a defendant ... should be fully considered.” Bracewell, supra, at 1200.
Ability to pay
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Montana State v. Farrell, 207 Mont. 483, 498-99 (1984) Other applicable caselaw An indigent defendant's sentence shall be evaluated under due process analysis; a prison sentence should not be imposed as a punishment for indigency
Thus, we assess the legality of an indigent defendant's sentence in light of fundamental fairness, implicitly recognizing the presumption in favor of individual liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.
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We think it arbitrary and unfair in this case to subject the appellant to the maximum sentence simply because of an apparently unsupported notion that he may not be able to **177 make good on the recoupment and restitution within ten years. Considering the lack of findings regarding appellant's financial resources and his ability to reimburse the proper authorities, we think the judgment of the trial court should be reconsidered. The record indicates that indigency may have been the criterion for imposing the sentence in this particular case, and we therefore view the sentence in this instance as a possible infringement upon fundamental fairness. Due process requires only that indigency or poverty not be used as the touchstone for imposing the maximum allowable punishment.
Enforcement