“serious” and should include an analysis of any assets that the defendant presently owns, as well as his past and future earning capacity. A determination of a defendant's future earning capacity necessarily requires the court to make:preliminary findings of fact regarding [the defendant's] mental and physical health, [his] education, [his] job skills if any, the kinds of jobs which [he] has held in the past and is capable of performing in the future and the availability of such jobs in the communities in which [the defendant] will likely reside. Once these findings are made, the court is in a position to determine [the defendant's] likely future earnings and the extent to which those earnings will cover [his] likely future expenses for food, clothing and shelter and leave [him] a surplus out of which to pay restitution. The court must fix the amount of the fine and the terms of payment to fall within the realistic limits of the defendant's earning capacity. Failure to make the appropriate inquiry and findings requires automatic reversal and remand." " If, at a hearing under this subsection, the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant will be unable through good faith efforts to satisfy the order requiring payment of the fine or restitution, the court shall modify the order so that the defendant can pay the fine or restitution through good faith efforts. The court may reduce the fine ordered, change the payment schedule, or otherwise modify the order. The court may not reduce an order of restitution but may change the payment schedule."

to repay. The liability automatically attaches in the form of a civil judgment entered without a prior request or demand for payment. Upon a defendant's conviction, the trial court must issue in all cases, sua sponte, a notice of judgment. . . . Criminal Rule 39 does not violate the equal protection guarantee of the Alaska Constitution."

authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.

is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.

the services of a public defender. While the directive in KRS 31.110(1) that the court “shall waive all costs” for such defendants seems mandatory at first blush, a full reading of the 1972 legislation and the current DPA Act belies that conclusion. From its inception through the present, the DPA Act has allowed for imposition of costs against those DPA-represented defendants who can afford to pay. Moreover, a person may qualify as “needy” under KRS 31.110 because he cannot afford the services of an attorney yet not be “poor” under KRS 23A.205 as it has existed since 2002 unless he is also unable to pay court costs without “depriving himself or his dependents of the necessities of life, including food, shelter or clothing.” Finally, the KRS 23A.205 directive to consider not only the defendant's present ability to pay court costs but also his ability “in the foreseeable future” cannot be overlooked. The trial court's determination here that Maynes would be able to earn enough within the six months following his sentencing to afford the costs required by KRS 23A.205 is not clearly erroneous and, thus, the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the portion of Maynes's sentence imposing those costs.