“serious” and should include an analysis of any assets that the defendant presently owns, as well as his past and future earning capacity. A determination of a defendant's future earning capacity necessarily requires the court to make:preliminary findings of fact regarding [the defendant's] mental and physical health, [his] education, [his] job skills if any, the kinds of jobs which [he] has held in the past and is capable of performing in the future and the availability of such jobs in the communities in which [the defendant] will likely reside. Once these findings are made, the court is in a position to determine [the defendant's] likely future earnings and the extent to which those earnings will cover [his] likely future expenses for food, clothing and shelter and leave [him] a surplus out of which to pay restitution. The court must fix the amount of the fine and the terms of payment to fall within the realistic limits of the defendant's earning capacity. Failure to make the appropriate inquiry and findings requires automatic reversal and remand." " If, at a hearing under this subsection, the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant will be unable through good faith efforts to satisfy the order requiring payment of the fine or restitution, the court shall modify the order so that the defendant can pay the fine or restitution through good faith efforts. The court may reduce the fine ordered, change the payment schedule, or otherwise modify the order. The court may not reduce an order of restitution but may change the payment schedule."

all courts. These rules may be changed by the legislature by two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house." "The supreme court may prescribe by rule the fees to be charged by all courts for judicial services." "The supreme court shall determine by rule or order those motor vehicle and traffic offenses, except for offenses subject to a scheduled municipal fine, that are amenable to disposition without court appearance and shall establish a scheduled amount of bail, not to exceed fines prescribed by law, for each offense. A municipality shall determine by ordinance the municipal motor vehicle and traffic offenses that may be disposed of without court appearance and shall establish a fine schedule for each offense. "The supreme court shall determine by rule or order those motor vehicle and traffic offenses, except for offenses subject to a scheduled municipal fine, that are amenable to disposition without court appearance and shall establish a scheduled amount of bail, not to exceed fines prescribed by law, for each offense. A municipality shall determine by ordinance the municipal motor vehicle and traffic offenses that may be disposed of without court appearance and shall establish a fine schedule for each offense."

or business with which the official is associated or in which the official owns stock. A public official other than an elected or appointed municipal official may not use the official's position or office for the primary purpose of obtaining financial gain for the official's domestic partner."

to repay. The liability automatically attaches in the form of a civil judgment entered without a prior request or demand for payment. Upon a defendant's conviction, the trial court must issue in all cases, sua sponte, a notice of judgment. . . . Criminal Rule 39 does not violate the equal protection guarantee of the Alaska Constitution."

as representing the opinion of a coequal branch of the government, should be given effect as a matter of comity unless they fetter the efficient operation of the courts or impair their ability to uphold their dignity and authority."

defendant's background, the seriousness of the current offense, or both."

authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.

is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.

into consideration the resources of the defendant, her ability to earn, her obligation to support dependents, and such other matters as shall pertain to her ability to make restitution or reparation. This record clearly shows that these matters were considered by Judge Allsbrook in his judgment ordering restitution. He knew defendant's age, her relationship to the victim, that she resided with her mother, that she was indigent for legal purposes, and that the victim's family had insurance of an uncertain amount in scope at the time of the sentencing hearing. The court's action in remitting the original fine and delegating the determination and scheduling of payments in restitution to the probation officer evidenced the trial judge's full recognition of the matters to be considered pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A–1343(d).

reasonably necessary for “the orderly and efficient exercise of the administration of justice.” Beard v. N.C. State Bar, 320 N.C. at 129, 357 S.E.2d at 696. Article V prohibits the judiciary from taking public monies without statutory authorization. But our statutes obligate counties and cities to provide physical facilities for the judicial system operating within their boundaries. N.C.G.S. § 7A–300(a)(11) (1989); N.C.G.S. § 7A–302 (1989). These facilities must be adequate to serve the functioning of the judiciary within the borders of those political subdivisions. Such adequacy necessarily includes safeguarding the constitutional rights of parties and ascertaining that parties' statutory rights—such as handicap access—are similarly protected. Although the statutes do not expressly pass the duty of providing adequate judicial facilities to the court in case of default of local authorities, the court has the inherent authority to direct local authorities to perform that duty.

proscribes turning the prosecution completely over to private counsel for interested parties, but it certainly did not proscribe all participation by such counsel. . . . The limits of such allowable assistance were also suggested: assistance may not extend to the point that “counsel for the private party [is] ... in control of the prosecution.” Id.8 We therefore read Young at least implicitly to approve (or certainly not to forbid) the practice of allowing private counsel for interested parties to participate formally with government counsel in the prosecution of contempt citations so long as that participation (1) has been approved by government counsel; (2) consists solely of rendering assistance in a subordinate role to government counsel; and (3) does not rise in practice to the level of effective control of the prosecution. As indicated, we find authority for this rule of limited participation at least implicit in Young and we think it wholly conformable to Young 's underlying principles. Accordingly, we adopt it as the appropriate rule governing the participation of private counsel for interested parties in contempt prosecutions.

840 (1974). Costs are imposed only at sentencing, so any convicted indigent defendant is given notice of the *102 appointment fee at the sentencing hearing and is also given an opportunity to be heard and object to the imposition of this cost. Therefore, the constitutional requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard are satisfied. Accordingly, the imposition of the appointment fee on convicted indigent defendants passes federal constitutional muster.

operating costs. It would be reasonable, for example, to require a defendant to pay the state for expenses incurred to provide him with court appointed counsel should he ever become financially able to pay. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). It would not however be reasonable to require the defendant to pay the state's overhead attributable to the normal costs of prosecuting him. People v. Baker, 37 Cal.App.3d 117, 112 Cal.Rptr. 137 (1974); State v. Mulvaney, 61 N.J. 202, 293 A.2d 668 (1972); Cf. People v. Teasdale, 335 Mich. 1, 55 N.W.2d 149 (1952).

sought to enforce the fine with incarceration, the duty to hold a hearing under R.C. 2947.14(A) is not triggered. We note, further, that payment of the fine in this case was technically a condition of Meyer's probation, and therefore, should he be unable to pay and his probation sought to be revoked, he is entitled to a hearing under Crim.R. 32.3. In either case, the hearing requirement is conditioned upon the trial court's decision to incarcerate him.

failed to cooperate with the budget process in a timely manner, and has sufficient money to operate the courts for the remainder of 2009. These claims lack merit. For the board's claim that the judge failed to timely pursue various alternatives for reducing costs, Judge Hague submitted evidence that the majority of juveniles appearing before the juvenile court are indigent and that an increase in court fees and costs would simply increase unpaid sums instead of increasing county revenue."

may be expected to have, the means to pay all or some part of the cost of the legal services rendered to him.

2705.02. However, appellee does not suggest precisely which order appellant was charged with disobeying. We find that the court should have recognized that this case invoked the *134 procedures required under R.C. 2947.14 for committing an offender to jail for failure to pay a fine. This statute and its predecessor1were designed by the legislature to provide a method for collecting a fine from one who is unwilling to pay.