ability to pay when imposing a fine or its payment schedule" “Both the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and Article 2, Section 15 of the Arizona Constitution prohibit the imposition of excessive fines. ‘An excessive fine is one that exceeds reasonable, usual, proper, or just punishment’ or ‘one so disproportionate to the offense that it shocks public sentiment and affronts the judgment of reasonable people.’ The ability to pay, however, is only one factor in the determination of whether a fine is excessive, and that factor is not dispositive” "Except as provided by law or by Rule 33.2, a person shall not be found in criminal contempt without a hearing held after notice of the charge. The hearing shall be set so as to allow a reasonable time for the preparation of the defense; the notice shall state the time and place of the hearing, and the essential facts constituting the contempt charged, the notice may be given orally by the judge in open court in the presence of the person charged, or by an order to show cause. The defendant is entitled to subpoena witnesses on his or her behalf and to release under Rule 7."

of payment rather than setting the manner of payment itself."

disclose potential conflicts and, in most instances, to then refrain from acting on issues on which the conflict exists"

is not allowed under the rule. Rule 6.7(d) requires the court itself to balance financial resources against substantial hardship at the time the fee is imposed. Thus, based on the purpose of A.R.S. § 11–584(C) and Rule 6.7(d) as explained by the Arizona Supreme Court in Espinoza, the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute and rule, and the language used in the opinions quoted above, we hold that a court may only consider the defendant's present financial resources when making a determination pursuant to A.R.S. § 11–584(C) and Rule 6.7(d)."

Appellant's claim that the statutory scheme at issue in this case violates a prisoner's right to equal protection of the laws fails.

related to the constitutional rights surrounding the furnishing of a prepaid statement of facts and transcript to a defendant in a nonfrivolous criminal appeal, the term does not and cannot, in keeping with the concept of equal justice to every man, mean absolute destitution or total insolvency. Rather, it connotes a state of impoverishment or lack of resources on the part of a defendant and which, when realistically viewed in the light of every day practicalities, substantially and effectively impairs or prevents his procurement of an adequate statement of facts and transcript necessary to a complete appellate review of his claims of error. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 69 S.Ct. 85, 93 L.Ed. 43; Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, Note 7 (concurrence per Goldberg, J.), 84 S.Ct. 424, 11 L.Ed.2d 331; Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice (February 25, 1963), pp. 7, 8. In judicially passing upon a contested issue of a given defendant's ability to pay the costs of perfecting an appeal, consideration [***6] must, of necessity, revolve about and be given to the existence, nature, and extent of (a) the defendant's separate and community assets and liabilities; (b) the defendant's past and present occupation and earning capacity; (c) the defendant's credit standing; and (d) any other factors tending to substantially impair or materially enhance the defendant's ability to advance or secure the necessary costs. These factors must, in turn, be viewed and weighed in light of the fact that the defendant stands convicted of a crime, that due process of law entitles him to appellate review without undue delay, that ordinarily the transcription and delivery of a statement of facts is upon a "cash and carry" basis, and that friends of the defendant, however affluent, cannot be involuntarily obligated by him or compelled by the state to advance or secure such costs. At 389 P.2d 895 at 899. The Rutherford court observed that HN6 the initial burden rests upon a defendant to demonstrate to the court's satisfaction his inability to advance or secure the costs to pay for the transcript. Once the defendant makes such a showing, the state must come forward with substantial factual evidence of the [***7] defendant's ability to pay in whole or in part, the necessary costs. The court stated, "Mere innuendo, suspicion, or conjecture that a defendant may be able to secure or advance the cost is insufficient." Id. at 899. It has been said that, "While the determination of reasonableness is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, . . . no single factor should alone be determinative. The court should take into consideration all the factors in the affidavit and, in addition, consider the designation of record -- specifically, [*936] [**637] the degree to which the defendant has attempted to narrow the record to the issues to be presented on appeal." Bruner v. State ex rel. Dist. Court, Okl. Cty., 581 P.2d 1314 at 1316 (Okl.Cr.1978).

authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.

is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.

Lark, 482 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. banc 1972). This is not to suggest that those who neglect or refuse to pay a fine may not be incarcerated for their refusal so to do within the constitutional standards described in Hendrix.

shall not stay the payment of any fine and calling for its execution, i.e., immediate imprisonment in lieu of payment, *429 is unconstitutional under the above decisions.

as such, but a penalty by contempt of court for the failure to obey—either intentionally or by want of good-faith effort to comply—the sentence of the court.