Below are the cases that meet your search criteria.

14 Results

Export results to Excel

State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Arkansas
Bohannon v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 434; Arkansas Code §5-4-205; Drain v. State, 10 Ark. App. 338, 664 S.W.2d 484 (1984); Cavin v. State, 11 Ark. App. 294, 669 S.W.2d
+ See more
508 (1984); Trial Handbook for Arkansas Lawyers § 99:20 (2016-2017 ed.)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
+ See more
the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
The defendant has to make a good faith attempt to comply with a court order to pay. Otherwise, her probation may be revoked. The State has the burden of proving
+ See more
the failure to pay; the burden of production then shifts to the defendant to show why. The State must then prove that the nonpayment was inexcusable.
"(3) In determining whether to revoke probation or conditional release, the court or releasing authority shall consider: (A) The defendant's employment status; (B) The defendant's earning ability; (C) The defendant's financial
+ See more
resources; (D) The willfulness of the defendant's failure to pay; and (E) Any other special circumstances that may have a bearing on the defendant's ability to pay."
Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Arkansas
Drain v. State, 10 Ark. App. 338, 664 S.W.2d 484 (1984), citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); see also Ark. Code
+ See more
Ann. § 5-4-203(a)(3) and (4) (Supp. 1995).
Imprisonment of an indigent defendant for failure to pay a fine violates the defendant’s equal protection rights.
This statute basically codifies the principles established by the cases of Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971), and Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S.
+ See more
235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), both of which stand *341 for the proposition that a sentence to imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine works an invidious discrimination against indigent defendants in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Enforcement
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Georgia Lawson v. City of Moultrie, 194 Ga. 699 (1942) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue?
No, Statute authorizing counties and municipal corporations to construct revenue producing undertakings, and in anticipation of the collection of revenue therefrom to issue certificates payable solely from such revenue, does
+ See more
not violate constitutional provision limiting the powers of counties and municipalities in relation to contracting debts
neither the act nor the ordinance violates the constitutional provision above referred to. Revenue flow
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Georgia Messenger v. State, 72 S.E.2d 460 (1952) Other applicable caselaw The inhibition of the constitution against imprisonment for debt applies to any and all such imprisonment, irrespective of the period of its duration or the means whereby it is accomplished the Constitution of Georgia forbids imprisonment for debt Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Georgia State v. Higgins, 326 S.E.2d 728, (Ga. 1985) Other applicable caselaw invalidating an income tax law that authorized punishment solely for the nonpayment of income taxes
[A] criminal provision drawn in terms of a ‘wilful failure’ to pay tax would be an entirely different matter, as it would catch the intentional tax evader without at the
+ See more
same time ensnaring the hapless pauper.
Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Georgia Johnson v. State, 707 S.E.2d 373, 374 Other applicable caselaw
Before revoking a defendant's probation based solely on the failure to pay fines, fees, or surchagres costs, the trial court is required to make a finding as to defendant's wilfulness,
+ See more
and if it concluded that defendant was not at fault, the court is required to consider other punishment alternatives.
"Although we do not interfere with a revocation of probation unless the trial court has manifestly abused its discretion, we conclude here that such an abuse occurred. In the instant
+ See more
case, the trial court made no express or written findings as to the reasons for Johnson's failure to pay or as to the inadequacy of alternative punishments. Rather, it inquired only as to Johnson's fitness to work before deciding to revoke Johnson's probation. Therefore, because the trial court made this determination without making the findings required by Bearden, it committed reversible error." Johnson v. State, 707 S.E.2d 373, 374(citing Bearden v. Georgia, 460 U.S. 660 (1983))
Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Iowa State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
+ See more
the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Iowa Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) Ability to pay must be determined before imposition.
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2
+ See more
authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
+ See more
is reasonably able to pay.
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
+ See more
is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Oregon State v. Mickow, 277 Or.App. 497, 502 (2016)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
+ See more
the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
Courts must determine that the defendant is or may be able to pay the fees, and take the financial resources of the defendant into account, as well as the nature
+ See more
of the burden that the fee obligation would place on that person
Among the safeguards that were pivotal to the [Supreme] Court's conclusion [upholding Oregon's ability-to-pay determination post-Gideon] were the statutory requirements that the sentencing court must (1) determine that the defendant
+ See more
is or may be able to pay the fees; and (2) take the financial resources of the defendant into account, as well as the nature of the burden that the fee obligation would place on that person. Id. at 45, 53 n. 12, 94 S.Ct. 2116. State v. Mickow, 277 Or.App. 497, 502 (2016)
Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Oregon Bobo v. Kulongoski, 338 Or. 111, 122 (2005) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue?
Unclear, and answer is unavailable as to courts, but a line of cases suggests that merely having a fund where assessed fees support state functions does not constitute a conflict
+ See more
of interest
Considering the wording of Article IV, section 18, its history, and the case law surrounding it, we conclude that the question whether a bill is a “bill for raising revenue”
+ See more
entails two issues. The first is whether the bill collects or brings money into the treasury. If it does not, that is the end of the inquiry. If a bill does bring money into the treasury, the remaining question is whether the bill possesses the essential features of a bill levying a tax. As Northern Counties Trust makes clear, bills that assess a fee for a specific purpose are not “bills raising revenue” even though they collect or bring money into the treasury.
Revenue flow
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Oregon State v. Fuller, 12 Or.App. 152, 158–59 (1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 40 (1974) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? Yes, but such limits are predicated on the indigency of the defendant
Thus, an indigent defendant is entitled to free counsel immediately (which is when he needs it), but may be later required to repay this cost if he ‘is or will
+ See more
be’ able to do so, that is, if he has ceased or likely will cease to be indigent.  A defendant is not denied counsel while he is indigent, and he is required to repay appointed counsel's fee only if and when he is no longer indigent. If there is no likelihood that a defendant's indigency will end, a judgment for costs cannot be imposed. ORS 161.665(3). State v. Fuller, 12 Or.App. 152, 158–59 (1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 40 (1974)
Fines and fees
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Oregon State v. Goodenow, 251 Or.App. 139, 144–45 (2012) Other applicable caselaw
Courts are not limited by any numerical or proportionality requirement to seize the proceeds of a crime, in this case, all the earnings from a winning lottery ticket purchased using
+ See more
an illegally obtained credit card
Oregon's criminal forfeiture statutes do not limit the amount of property that may be forfeited as the proceeds of prohibited conduct. They do not require courts to determine whether a
+ See more
forfeiture of a defendant's property is proportional to the defendant's crime. ORS 131.585(1) (“The court shall enter judgment to the extent that the property is proceeds of the crime of conviction or of past prohibited conduct that is similar to the crime of conviction.”). (In that respect, the statutes treat the forfeiture of the proceeds of defendants' crimes differently from the forfeiture of instrumentalities of defendants' crimes. The statutes require courts to determine whether the forfeiture of an instrumentality of a defendant's crime, such as a vehicle or building used in the commission of a crime, is proportional to the crime and identify factors to consider in making that determination. ORS 131.585(2)(a)-(g).4) State v. Goodenow, 251 Or.App. 139, 144–45 (2012)
Enforcement