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State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Arkansas |
Bohannon v. State, 2014 Ark. App. 434; Arkansas Code §5-4-205; Drain v. State, 10 Ark. App. 338, 664 S.W.2d 484 (1984); Cavin v. State, 11 Ark. App. 294, 669 S.W.2d + See more508 (1984); Trial Handbook for Arkansas Lawyers § 99:20 (2016-2017 ed.)
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Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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The defendant has to make a good faith attempt to comply with a court order to pay. Otherwise, her probation may be revoked. The State has the burden of proving + See morethe failure to pay; the burden of production then shifts to the defendant to show why. The State must then prove that the nonpayment was inexcusable.
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"(3) In determining whether to revoke probation or conditional release, the court or releasing authority shall consider: (A) The defendant's employment status; (B) The defendant's earning ability; (C) The defendant's financial + See moreresources; (D) The willfulness of the defendant's failure to pay; and (E) Any other special circumstances that may have a bearing on the defendant's ability to pay."
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Ability to pay |
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Arkansas |
Drain v. State, 10 Ark. App. 338, 664 S.W.2d 484 (1984), citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); see also Ark. Code + See moreAnn. § 5-4-203(a)(3) and (4) (Supp. 1995).
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Imprisonment of an indigent defendant for failure to pay a fine violates the defendants equal protection rights. |
This statute basically codifies the principles established by the cases of Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971), and Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. + See more235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), both of which stand *341 for the proposition that a sentence to imprisonment for nonpayment of a fine works an invidious discrimination against indigent defendants in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Enforcement | |
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Iowa | State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | Ability to pay |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) | Ability to pay must be determined before imposition. |
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2 + See moreauthorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
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Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? |
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay.
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The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
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Ability to pay |
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Kentucky | Maynes v. Com., 361 S.W.3d 922, 929 (Ky. 2012) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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The court may consider not only current ability to pay but future ability to pay as well |
Having carefully considered the applicable statutes, we conclude that the trial court was authorized under Kentucky law to impose court costs despite Maynes's status as an indigent defendant entitled to + See morethe services of a public defender. While the directive in KRS 31.110(1) that the court shall waive all costs for such defendants seems mandatory at first blush, a full reading of the 1972 legislation and the current DPA Act belies that conclusion. From its inception through the present, the DPA Act has allowed for imposition of costs against those DPA-represented defendants who can afford to pay. Moreover, a person may qualify as needy under KRS 31.110 because he cannot afford the services of an attorney yet not be poor under KRS 23A.205 as it has existed since 2002 unless he is also unable to pay court costs without depriving himself or his dependents of the necessities of life, including food, shelter or clothing. Finally, the KRS 23A.205 directive to consider not only the defendant's present ability to pay court costs but also his ability in the foreseeable future cannot be overlooked. The trial court's determination here that Maynes would be able to earn enough within the six months following his sentencing to afford the costs required by KRS 23A.205 is not clearly erroneous and, thus, the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the portion of Maynes's sentence imposing those costs.
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Ability to pay |
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Kentucky | McEntire v. Com., 344 S.W.3d 125, 128 (Ky. Ct. App. 2010) | Are there limits to the states ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | Yes, the state court must first hold a nonadversarial hearing to determine an individual's ability to pay a public defender fee before imposing the fee | On remand, the trial court shall hold a nonadversarial hearing to determine whether McEntire has the ability to pay the assessed costs and fees as required by KRS 31.211(1). | Ability to pay |
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Vermont | State v. Sausville, 151 Vt. 120, 121, 557 A.2d 502, 503 (1989) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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The state is required to establish defendant's ability to pay restitution even if defendant does not take the stand on their own behalf. |
Defendant's failure to take the stand does not obviate the court's duty to determine if the restitution award is within defendant's ability to pay. If defendant does not take the + See morestand on his own behalf, it will be necessary for the State to establish in some other manner defendant's ability to pay restitution.
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Ability to pay |
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Vermont | Vermont State Constitution Ch. II § 40 | Other applicable case law | Imprisonment for debt is unconstitutional. | No person shall be imprisoned for debt. | Ability to pay |