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State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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California People v. Castellanos, 175 Cal. App. 4th 1524, 1532 (2009)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A material part of the ability to pay is an evaluation of the totality of the accused's financial responsibility. Note, most of the statutes imposing fines have ability to pay
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provisions, so most of the court cases addressing ability to pay look at the text of the cited statute and do not ask more broadly what "ability to pay" means in the abstract.
Although the Legislature has chosen to direct trial courts to take into account other fines and restitution, the controlling question is the ability to pay which includes, in material part,
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an evaluation of the totality of an accused's financial responsibilities. People v. Castellanos, 175 Cal. App. 4th 1524, 1532, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 7 (2009)."Government Code section 29550.2 places on the People the burden of proving a defendant's ability to pay a booking fee. Because the fee is not “punishment” for constitutional purposes (see People v. Alford, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 756–759, 68 Cal.Rptr.3d 310, 171 P.3d 32), the People's burden of proof is by preponderance of evidence . . ." People v. McCullough, 56 Cal. 4th 589, 598, 298 P.3d 860, 866 (2013). "The California Legislature has made inability to pay—which encompasses both present financial inability and inability to obtain remunerative employment in order to pay—an affirmative defense." Moss v. Superior Court (Ortiz), 17 Cal. 4th 396, 426, 950 P.2d 59, 78 (1998). "In any event, equal protection does not require a trial judge make an express finding of ability to pay before ordering restitution." People v. Goulart, 224 Cal. App. 3d 71, 84 (Ct. App. 1990), modified (Oct. 1, 1990).
Ability to pay
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California People v. Walz, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1364, 1369, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494, 497–98 (2008); People v. Martinez, 65 Cal. App. 4th 1511, 1521 (1998) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue?
When the Legislature intends to grant courts discretion to set a fine amount within a range, it will use language to show this. Otherwise, the trial court is obliged to
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impose penalties set out by the legislature and not use its discretion if not directed to.
Unless the Legislature has otherwise provided, such as in section 1202.4, subdivision (e), or Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.6, subdivision (f), penalty assessments under sections 1464, and Government Code
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section 76000 are mandatory. (People v. Sierra (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1690, 1694–1695, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 575; People v. Heisler (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 504, 506–507, 237 Cal.Rptr. 452; Penalty Assessments and Court Costs, 62 Ops.Cal.Atty.Gen. 13, 17 (1979).) As explained in People v. Sierra, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at page 1695, 44 Cal.Rptr.2d 575: “Trial courts are given discretion under subdivision (d) of section 1464 not to impose the penalty assessment where an inmate remains in prison [until the fine is satisfied] and the payment of the assessment ‘would work a hardship on the person convicted or his or her immediate family.’ Otherwise, the trial court has an obligation to impose a penalty assessment. People v. Martinez, 65 Cal. App. 4th 1511, 1521 (1998).We conclude that the $200 fine imposed by the trial court was unauthorized. “[A] sentence is generally ‘unauthorized’ where it could not lawfully be imposed under any circumstance in the particular case.” (People v. Scott, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 354, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 627, 885 P.2d 1040.) Section 290.3, subdivision (a) states that a defendant convicted of a qualifying sex offense “shall ... be punished by a fine of three hundred dollars ($300) upon the first conviction or a fine of five hundred dollars ($500) upon the second and each subsequent conviction ..., unless the court determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay the fine.” (Italics added.) The statute does not authorize a fine of $200, and the language of section 290.3, subdivision (a) is **498 not amenable to an interpretation granting a trial court discretion to impose a fine of less than the prescribed amount if it determines that the defendant does not have the ability to pay the full amount of the fine. When the Legislature has granted trial courts discretion to set the amount of a fine within a range, it has used language that so indicates. People v. Walz, 160 Cal. App. 4th 1364, 1369, 73 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494, 497–98 (2008).
Revenue flow
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California People v. Honig, 48 Cal. App. 4th 289, 314 (1996).
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other
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law enforcement agencies?
No direct case law on this topic, but cases discuss the purpose of conflict of interest statutes that are designed to remove or limit possibility of personal influence.
The duties of public office demand the absolute loyalty and undivided, uncompromised allegiance of the individual that holds the office. (Thomson v. Call, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 648, 214
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Cal.Rptr. 139, 699 P.2d 316; Stigall v. City of Taft (1962) 58 Cal.2d 565, 569, 25 Cal.Rptr. 441, 375 P.2d 289.) Yet it is recognized “ ‘that an impairment of impartial judgment can occur in even the most well-meaning men when their personal economic interests are affected by the business they transact on behalf of the Government.’ ” (Stigall v. City of Taft, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 570, 25 Cal.Rptr. 441, 375 P.2d 289, quoting United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co. (1961) 364 U.S. 520, 549, 81 S.Ct. 294, 309, 5 L.Ed.2d 268, 288.) Consequently, our conflict-of-interest statutes are concerned with what might have happened rather than merely what actually happened. (Ibid.) They are aimed at eliminating temptation, avoiding the appearance of impropriety, and assuring the government of the officer's undivided and uncompromised allegiance. (Thomson v. Call, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 648, 214 Cal.Rptr. 139, 699 P.2d 316.) Their objective “is to remove or limit the possibility of any personal influence, either directly or indirectly which might bear on an official's decision....” (Stigall v. City of Taft, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 569, 25 Cal.Rptr. 441, 375 P.2d 289, emphasis in original; see also People v. Vallerga (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 847, 865, 136 Cal.Rptr. 429; People v. Watson (1971) 15 Cal.App.3d 28, 39, 92 Cal.Rptr. 860.). People v. Honig, 48 Cal. App. 4th 289, 314 (1996).
Revenue flow
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California People v. Amor, 12 Cal. 3d 20, 25–26, 523 P.2d 1173, 1175–76 (1974) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The Court is able to forewarn a defendant that she might be held liable for payment of her appointed counsel and order her to pay what she has the financial
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ability to pay. However, it cannot condition probation on a requirement that the defendant reimburse the court for costs of appointed counsel or hold her liable without a finding of financial ability or warning.
Questions: First. Does section 987.8 of the Penal Code place an unconstitutional burden on the right to counsel in criminal proceedings? No. Defendant contends that section 987.8 is unconstitutional, on
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the ground that it has a chilling effect upon an accused's right to counsel. She argues that a deprivation of the trial to counsel may result, because the possibility under the statute that a defendant will be ordered to pay all or part of his counsel fees may cause him to decline counsel rather than run the risk of being required to pay counsel fees in an unknown amount. Under this theory, however, any defendant, indigent or not indigent, who elected to enter a guilty plea in order to save counsel fees would have been deprived of his right to counsel. If such a theory were sound, it would result in the practical elimination of the fee system with respect to the defense of criminal prosecutions. In urging her contention, defendant relies principally upon In re Allen, 71 Cal.2d 388, 78 Cal.Rptr. 207, 455 P.2d 143. In Allen, this court held that probation may not be conditioned on a requirement that the defendant reimburse the county for the services of court—appointed counsel. Allen, however, is distinguishable from the present case. In Allen, there is justification for concluding that the petitioner would have been penalized for exercising a constitutional right, because not only would she have been liable for payment of the entire fee paid to counsel for representing her, without a finding that she had the financial ability to make payment and with no warning that she might be held so liable, but she could have been imprisoned if she failed to pay the fee, payment thereof being one of the conditions of her probation. Here, on the other hand, the defendant, who had been forewarned that she might be held liable for payment of the fee for her appointed counsel, or part of it, was ordered to pay only that part which the court determined she had the financial ability to pay; and under the statute, since execution was issuable only as on a judgment in a civil action, she could not have been imprisoned for nonpayment. (Cal.Const., art. I, s 15.). People v. Amor, 12 Cal. 3d 20, 25–26, 523 P.2d 1173, 1175–76 (1974)
Revenue flow
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Iowa State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. Ability to pay
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Iowa Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) Ability to pay must be determined before imposition.
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2
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authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay.
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
Ability to pay
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Ohio State v. Meyer, 124 Ohio App. 3d 373, 377 (1997)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
An ability-to-pay hearing is not required when a fine is merely imposed. Rather, it is only required when the trial court decides to incarcerate the defendant for failure to pay.
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Defendant is entitled to representation and an opportunity to present evidence.
We hold, therefore, that R.C. 2947.14(A) did not require a hearing in the present case because the trial court merely imposed a fine. Because the trial court has not yet
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sought to enforce the fine with incarceration, the duty to hold a hearing under R.C. 2947.14(A) is not triggered. We note, further, that payment of the fine in this case was technically a condition of Meyer's probation, and therefore, should he be unable to pay and his probation sought to be revoked, he is entitled to a hearing under Crim.R. 32.3. In either case, the hearing requirement is conditioned upon the trial court's decision to incarcerate him.
Ability to pay
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Ohio State ex rel. Hague v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2009-Ohio-6140, ¶ 18, 123 Ohio St. 3d 489, 493 (Ohio 2009) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? No. In fact, one case found that county commissioners violated the separation-of-powers doctrine for not funding courts when the court could not collect enough revenue from cases
"The board and commissioners claim that they have rebutted the presumed reasonableness of the requesting funding because Judge Hague failed to make sufficient operational changes to reduce the courts' budget,
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failed to cooperate with the budget process in a timely manner, and has sufficient money to operate the courts for the remainder of 2009. These claims lack merit. For the board's claim that the judge failed to timely pursue various alternatives for reducing costs, Judge Hague submitted evidence that the majority of juveniles appearing before the juvenile court are indigent and that an increase in court fees and costs would simply increase unpaid sums instead of increasing county revenue."
Revenue flow
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Ohio no
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other
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law enforcement agencies?
Ohio Courts have not addressed this question no
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Ohio State v. Fisher, No. CA98-09-190, 2002 WL 745330 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? Probably not. Courts rest their opinions on statutory law which provides that an indigent defendant may be required to pay attorneys fees only after an ability-to-pay determination is made.
Thus, an indigent defendant may properly be required to pay his attorney fees only after the court makes an affirmative determination on the record that the defendant has, or reasonably
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may be expected to have, the means to pay all or some part of the cost of the legal services rendered to him.
Fines and fees
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Ohio City of Alliance v. Kelly, 548 N.E.2d 952 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) Other applicable caselaw Contempt proceedings may not be used to incarcerate people for non-payment of fines. A person may only be sentenced pursuant to the procedural safeguards provided in Section 2947.14
The appellee in this action urges that we accept the trial court's characterization of these proceedings as contempt for failure to obey an order of the court pursuant to R.C.
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2705.02. However, appellee does not suggest precisely which order appellant was charged with disobeying. We find that the court should have recognized that this case invoked the *134 procedures required under R.C. 2947.14 for committing an offender to jail for failure to pay a fine. This statute and its predecessor1were designed by the legislature to provide a method for collecting a fine from one who is unwilling to pay.
Enforcement
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Ohio Liming v. Damos, 133 Ohio St. 3d 509, 514 (Ohio 2012) The Burden of proving inability to pay is on the party subject to a contempt order
Placing the burden of showing inability to pay on the party charged with contempt is not unreasonable. As we explained in Cook, “[t]he defendant's financial condition and ability to pay
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were peculiarly within his own knowledge. They could not be known with the same certainty to the complainant, nor could she easily produce evidence to maintain the proposition were the burden of proof placed upon her.”
Ability to pay
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Ohio Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St. 2d 95, 95 (1969) Court costs and fees are civil, not criminal, obligations and may be collected only by the methods provided for the collection of civil judgments
The duty to pay court costs is a civil obligation arising from an implied contract. Obligations arising upon implied contracts and judgments *96 thereon are debts, within the purview of
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Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which forbids imprisonment for debt in civil actions. (Paragraph one of the syllabus of Second National Bank of Sandusky v. Becker, 62 Ohio St. 289, 56 N.E. 1025, 51 L.R.A. 860, approved and followed.) Section 2947.20, Revised Code, insofar as it lodges authority in the judge or magistrate to order a defendant committed to jail or to a workhouse for failure to pay court costs, is violative of Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, and is unconstitutional [. . .] An indigent person taxed with costs in a civil action is not jailed to work off this obligation. Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, expressly prohibits imprisonment for civil debt.6 In criminal cases, court costs, assessed *103 to defray the administrative costs of the litigation, are likewise subject to the same prohibition. The purpose of assessing costs in criminal and in civil cases is the same and there is no justification for imprisonment for nonpayment of costs in criminal cases but not in civil cases [. . .] By being involved in court proceedings, any litigant, by implied contract, becomes liable for the payment of court costs if taxed as a part of the court's judgment. A judgment for costs in a criminal case is a civil, not a criminal, obligation, and may be collected only by the methods provided for the collection of civil judgments. To hold otherwise would permit that which is constitutionally prohibited.
Enforcement
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Ohio Strongsville v. Waiwood ,577 N.E.2d 63 (Ohio 1989) A court may not order a person to appear orissue a warrant for unpaid court costs.
An arrest warrant issued after defendant failed to attend a hearing for failure to pay court costs was defective because failure to pay court costs is a civil liability not
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an obligation, such as a fine, that subjects a debtor to arrest.
Enforcement
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Ohio State v. Ellis, 2d Dist., 2008 Ohio 2719. If community service is in lieu of either fines or court costs, contempt may not be imposed for failure to perform Accordingly, the trial court's judgment finding Ellis in criminal contempt for nonperformance of community service work to satisfy his fines and court costs is reversed.  Enforcement
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Ohio Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Goldie, 894 N.E.2d 1226 (2008). Failing to follow the dictates of R.C. 2947.14 and using contempt as a sanction to collect fines can result in disciplinary violations #VALUE! Enforcement
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Ohio In re GMS Mgt. Co., Inc. v. Unpaid Court Costs, Fees and Delinquencies, 932 N.E.2d 405 (2010). The court may not collect fines by refusing to accept filings.
Plaintiff-appellant, GMS Management Company, Inc., appeals a decision of Judge David D'Apolito of Mahoning County Court No. 4, which found that GMS owes over $3,000 for court costs and ordered
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the clerk of that court to refuse to accept any new pleadings even if court costs are advanced until all prior delinquent costs and fees have been paid in full. We agree with appellant's argument that this decision was unconstitutionally entered without notice or an opportunity to be heard and is an unconstitutional denial of access to the courts. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded based upon constitutional violations.
Enforcement
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Ohio State v. Short, 2nd Dist. Darke No. 2011 CA 16, 2012-Ohio-2546. The court may not order the forfeiture of a driver's license as a means of collecting costs.
We agree that the municipal court lacked authority to order the forfeiture of Short's license for his failure to pay court costs. Accordingly, the court's order of forfeiture of Short's driver's
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license is vacated.
Enforcement