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State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Connecticut | Molinas v. Comm'r of Correction, 231 Conn. 514, 52425 (1994) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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To establish a valid waiver of the petitioner's claim of indigency, the commissioner would have had to have made an affirmative showing that the petitioner, at the time of + See morethe plea bargain, was apprised of, and understood, the contours of the constitutional right not to be incarcerated because of indigency and the consequences of a waiver of that constitutional right. Such an affirmative showing would require evidence that the petitioner had been advised that: (1) he had a constitutional right not to be incarcerated solely because of his inability to pay a fine; (2) he would waive that right by agreeing to the committed fine; (3) the effect of a waiver would be that he would not be released on parole until the fine was paid, regardless of the reason for its nonpayment;13 (4) to pay off the committed fine, he would earn credits during his incarceration, subsequent to his parole, in accordance with a disclosed rate schedule; and (5) he would retain the right to pay the outstanding balance of the fine at any time during his incarceration and could thereby remove his ineligibility for early release. In the absence of any such showing, the commissioner's categorical claim of waiver cannot be sustained.
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Ability to pay | |
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Maine | State v. Davenport, 138 A.3d 1205, 1208 (Me. 2016) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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Defendant's ability to pay must be considered for restitution costs, but defendant has burden of proof on showing inability to pay |
In addition to establishing the offender's burden at sentencing, the Legislature supplied the burden that applies on appeal: On appeal of a restitution order, the offender has the burden of + See moredemonstrating that the incapacity was proven as a matter of law. 17A M.R.S. § 1325(4) (enacted by P.L. 1997, ch. 413, § 3).
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Ability to pay |
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Maine | State v. Lane, 649 A.2d 1112, 1115 (Me. 1994) | Does the states separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? | Yes. However, Legislative branch may give the judicial branch authority to impose additional fines, fees, and surcharges, which is the case with some Maine statutes. |
All revenue received We have previously upheld mandatory minimum sentences and fines set by the Legislature to be imposed by the judiciary. See State v. Thibeault, 621 A.2d 418, 419 + See more(Me.1993) (mandatory minimum sentencing scheme set forth in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1251 does not impermissibly limit judicial discretion in sentencing); State v. Briggs, 388 A.2d 507, 509 (Me.1978) (mandatory fine provided for night hunting did not violate separation of powers provision in Constitution); State v. Farmer, 324 A.2d 739, 746 (Me.1974) (minimum mandatory sentence does not violate separation of powers mandate). State v. Lane, 649 A.2d 1112, 1115 (Me. 1994)
In the instant case, the Legislature directed that the judiciary add a mandatory 10% surcharge to any fine imposed. We find the judicial imposition of the surcharge was made pursuant to valid legislative authority and, therefore, is not an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers. Id.
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Fines and fees |
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Maine | State v. Drewry, 946 A.2d 981, 991 (Me. 2008) | Are there limits to the states ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | None besides indigency; court may take from offenders' funds earned while in prison |
The court ordered Drewry to reimburse it in the amount of $2500 toward fees paid to Drewry's court-appointed counsel after finding that Drewry had $4265.42 in his jail account, which + See morefunds were obtained as a result of a settlement of Drewry's claim in the United States District Court against the Cumberland County Jail and Jail personnel for injuries he sustained from having been assaulted by another inmate while awaiting his trial. The trial court has the authority to reconsider a defendant's indigency status at any time during the course of criminal proceedings whenever convincing evidence of non-indigence comes to [the court's] attention. State v. Perry, 486 A.2d 154, 15859 (Me.1985); see also M.R.Crim. P. 44. Drewry's alleged injuries, although sustained while in jail on the present indictment, were not the result of any misconduct on the part the State, the police, the court, or any witnesses. We decline to extend Drewry's invitation to expand our holding in Perry to these circumstances, and determine that the court committed no error in ordering Drewry to reimburse the State for a portion of his court-appointed legal fees.
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Fines and fees |