the plea bargain, was apprised of, and understood, the contours of the constitutional right not to be incarcerated because of indigency and the consequences of a waiver of that constitutional right. Such an affirmative showing would require evidence that the petitioner had been advised that: (1) he had a constitutional right not to be incarcerated solely because of his inability to pay a fine; (2) he would waive that right by agreeing to the committed fine; (3) the effect of a waiver would be that he would not be released on parole until the fine was paid, regardless of the reason for its nonpayment;13 (4) to pay off the committed fine, he would earn credits during his incarceration, subsequent to his parole, in accordance with a disclosed rate schedule; and (5) he would retain the right to pay the outstanding balance of the fine at any time during his incarceration and could thereby remove his ineligibility for early release. In the absence of any such showing, the commissioner's categorical claim of waiver cannot be sustained.

with their respective financial situation. In the cases before us there was no determination of immediate ability to meet the mandates that had been imposed, nor was there a showing that a reasonable opportunity had been given to allow the appellants to comply without immediate incarceration. We believe that the Supreme Court has made it plain that a defendant may not be incarcerated merely because he cannot make full payment of a fine. Therefore, we hold that the appellants must be given the opportunity to establish that they are unable to pay the fine. Upon a showing of indigence, the appellants should be allowed to make payments in reasonable installments.

fails to pay the fine. However, before a defendant may be imprisoned for not paying a fine, he must be given an opportunity to establish that he is unable to pay the fine. Commonwealth ex rel. Parrish v. Cliff, 451 Pa. 427, 304 A.2d 158 (1973); Commonwealth v. Shaeffer 228 Pa.Super. 734, 311 A.2d 361 (1973); Pa.R.Crim.P. 1407(a). If a defendant establishes that he is indigent, he will be allowed to make payments in reasonable installments. 451 Pa. at 434, 304 A.2d at 161. Thus, rather than waiting until the defendant is brought before the court for not paying a fine, it is far more rational to determine the defendant's ability to pay at the time the fine is imposed...Here, all the sentencing judge knew about appellant's financial background was that he had sold $980 worth of drugs to the undercover agents the previous year and was currently working with his father in the construction industry, “bringing home approximately $150 per week.” N.T. at 12, 13 (August 28, 1978, Guilty Plea hearing). This was hardly enough information to make an intelligent finding as to appellant's ability to pay the fine.

assigned court-appointed counsel, even though he was not ruled indigent. Notwithstanding the fact that there exists no case law addressing the precise issue presently before this Court, we draw support from those cases which require a finding of statutory authority before the trial court's order of reimbursement to a public defender's office would be upheld. See Commonwealth v. Terry, 470 Pa. 234, 368 A.2d 279 (1977); Commonwealth v. Pride, 252 Pa.Super. 34, 380 A.2d 1267 (1977); Commonwealth v. Opara, 240 Pa.Super. 511, 362 A.2d 305 (1975). Absent an indication by our legislature sanctioning the assessment of counsel fees for court-appointed counsel, we decline to validate orders granting such relief to counties. Parenthetically we note that § 3 of the Act of January 19, 1968, P.L. 984, 19 P.S. § 793, at one time provided for the reimbursement by a criminal defendant or a relative of the defendant to the county “for compensation and expense incurred and paid to court-appointed counsel”. However, this statute has since been repealed, 1984, October 12, P.L. 959, No. 187, § 6.