Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law School
50-State Criminal Justice Debt Reform Builder Bringing transparency to areas of significant legal complexity.
50-State Criminal Justice Debt Reform Builder Bringing transparency to areas of significant legal complexity.
Case Law
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When does this apply
| State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Georgia | Lawson v. City of Moultrie, 194 Ga. 699 (1942) | Does the states separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? |
No, Statute authorizing counties and municipal corporations to construct revenue producing undertakings, and in anticipation of the collection of revenue therefrom to issue certificates payable solely from such revenue, does + See morenot violate constitutional provision limiting the powers of counties and municipalities in relation to contracting debts
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neither the act nor the ordinance violates the constitutional provision above referred to. | Revenue flow |
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Georgia | Messenger v. State, 72 S.E.2d 460 (1952) | Other applicable caselaw | The inhibition of the constitution against imprisonment for debt applies to any and all such imprisonment, irrespective of the period of its duration or the means whereby it is accomplished | the Constitution of Georgia forbids imprisonment for debt | Ability to pay |
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Georgia | State v. Higgins, 326 S.E.2d 728, (Ga. 1985) | Other applicable caselaw | invalidating an income tax law that authorized punishment solely for the nonpayment of income taxes |
[A] criminal provision drawn in terms of a wilful failure to pay tax would be an entirely different matter, as it would catch the intentional tax evader without at the + See moresame time ensnaring the hapless pauper.
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Ability to pay |
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Georgia | Johnson v. State, 707 S.E.2d 373, 374 | Other applicable caselaw |
Before revoking a defendant's probation based solely on the failure to pay fines, fees, or surchagres costs, the trial court is required to make a finding as to defendant's wilfulness, + See moreand if it concluded that defendant was not at fault, the court is required to consider other punishment alternatives.
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"Although we do not interfere with a revocation of probation unless the trial court has manifestly abused its discretion, we conclude here that such an abuse occurred. In the instant + See morecase, the trial court made no express or written findings as to the reasons for Johnson's failure to pay or as to the inadequacy of alternative punishments. Rather, it inquired only as to Johnson's fitness to work before deciding to revoke Johnson's probation. Therefore, because the trial court made this determination without making the findings required by Bearden, it committed reversible error." Johnson v. State, 707 S.E.2d 373, 374(citing Bearden v. Georgia, 460 U.S. 660 (1983))
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Ability to pay |
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Texas | Rusk v. State, 440 S.W.3d 694, 702 (Tex. App. 2013) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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Court must inquire into defendant's ability to pay before revoking probation and the burden of proof is on the state to show by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant + See morewillfully refused to pay financial obligation.
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"The Texas ability-to-pay statute imposes an evidentiary burden on the State while Bearden imposes a mandatory judicial directive to inquire into a defendant's ability to pay." | Ability to pay |
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Texas | Peraza v. State, 467 S.W.3d 508, 517–18 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015), reh'g denied (Sept. 16, 2015),, cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1188, 194 L. Ed. 2d 202 (2016) | Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? | Court imposition of costs is not unconstitutional under federal or state constitutional law as long as the money collected will go toward a "criminal justice purpose" |
"[T]he statute under which court costs are assessed (or an interconnected statute) provides for an allocation of such court costs to be expended for legitimate criminal justice purposes, then the + See morestatute allows for a constitutional application that will not render the courts tax gatherers in violation of the separation of powers clause. A criminal justice purpose is one that relates to the administration of our criminal justice system. Whether a criminal justice purpose is “legitimate” is a question to be answered on a statute-by-statute/case-by-case basis."
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Fines and fees |
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Texas | Acosta v. State, 233 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other + See morelaw enforcement agencies?
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There is no case law addressing this question; however, Texas courts have stated that a conflict of interest exists if counsel is required to make a choice between advancing his + See moreclient's interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests. By analogy, then, a conflict of interest may also exist when law enforcement and/or courts are required to to make a choice between advancing justice and fair adjudication or advancing other interests (perhaps their own).
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"An actual conflict of interest exists if counsel is required to make a choice between advancing his client's interest in a fair trial or advancing other interests (perhaps counsel's own) + See moreto the detriment of his client's interest.”
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Revenue flow |
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Texas | Gross v. State, 279 S.W.3d 791, 793–94 (Tex. App. 2007) abrogated for other reasons by Harrell v. State, 286 S.W.3d 315 (Tex. 2009) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | No, so long, as the defendant has the ability to off-set the State's expenses |
"nonindigent defendant is required to pay for counsel. To require an indigent to reimburse the county, to the extent he is able, for the expense of furnished counsel tends to + See moreput indigents and nonindigents on the same basis and is consistent with due process. The State of Texas provides an important service in providing legal services to those indigent citizens who cannot afford to pay for their own defense. Because of this service provided to indigents, the State has a significant interest in assuring that persons with financial resources pay for their own representation and do not take a free ride at the expense of its taxpayers. Thus, it is not an inherent violation of due process for the State to take reasonable steps to collect on expenditures made on behalf of those who have the ability to off-set the State's expenses."
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Fines and fees |