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State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Georgia | Lawson v. City of Moultrie, 194 Ga. 699 (1942) | Does the states separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? |
No, Statute authorizing counties and municipal corporations to construct revenue producing undertakings, and in anticipation of the collection of revenue therefrom to issue certificates payable solely from such revenue, does + See morenot violate constitutional provision limiting the powers of counties and municipalities in relation to contracting debts
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neither the act nor the ordinance violates the constitutional provision above referred to. | Revenue flow |
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Georgia | Messenger v. State, 72 S.E.2d 460 (1952) | Other applicable caselaw | The inhibition of the constitution against imprisonment for debt applies to any and all such imprisonment, irrespective of the period of its duration or the means whereby it is accomplished | the Constitution of Georgia forbids imprisonment for debt | Ability to pay |
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Georgia | State v. Higgins, 326 S.E.2d 728, (Ga. 1985) | Other applicable caselaw | invalidating an income tax law that authorized punishment solely for the nonpayment of income taxes |
[A] criminal provision drawn in terms of a wilful failure to pay tax would be an entirely different matter, as it would catch the intentional tax evader without at the + See moresame time ensnaring the hapless pauper.
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Ability to pay |
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Georgia | Johnson v. State, 707 S.E.2d 373, 374 | Other applicable caselaw |
Before revoking a defendant's probation based solely on the failure to pay fines, fees, or surchagres costs, the trial court is required to make a finding as to defendant's wilfulness, + See moreand if it concluded that defendant was not at fault, the court is required to consider other punishment alternatives.
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"Although we do not interfere with a revocation of probation unless the trial court has manifestly abused its discretion, we conclude here that such an abuse occurred. In the instant + See morecase, the trial court made no express or written findings as to the reasons for Johnson's failure to pay or as to the inadequacy of alternative punishments. Rather, it inquired only as to Johnson's fitness to work before deciding to revoke Johnson's probation. Therefore, because the trial court made this determination without making the findings required by Bearden, it committed reversible error." Johnson v. State, 707 S.E.2d 373, 374(citing Bearden v. Georgia, 460 U.S. 660 (1983))
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Ability to pay |
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Idaho | Lerajjareanra-o-kel-ly v. Schow, 216 P.3d 154 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009). | Is a prisoner denied equal protection of the laws when he is forced to pay some of his fees under statute upon a finding of indigence while non-prisoners are not? | No |
The difference in treatment pursuant to I.C. §§ 31-3220 and 31-3220A between indigent prisoners and indigent nonprisoners is justified by a legitimate legislative purpose. [***10] Therefore, we conclude that + See moreAppellant's claim that the statutory scheme at issue in this case violates a prisoner's right to equal protection of the laws fails.
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Fines and fees |
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Idaho | State v. Randles, 712 P.2d 634 (Idaho 1985) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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Burden is on defendant to show indigence, within trial court's discretion to determine indigence based on a variety of factors |
Indigence is a relative term, and must be considered and measured in each [***5] case by reference to the need or service to be met or furnished. When + See morerelated to the constitutional rights surrounding the furnishing of a prepaid statement of facts and transcript to a defendant in a nonfrivolous criminal appeal, the term does not and cannot, in keeping with the concept of equal justice to every man, mean absolute destitution or total insolvency. Rather, it connotes a state of impoverishment or lack of resources on the part of a defendant and which, when realistically viewed in the light of every day practicalities, substantially and effectively impairs or prevents his procurement of an adequate statement of facts and transcript necessary to a complete appellate review of his claims of error. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 69 S.Ct. 85, 93 L.Ed. 43; Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, Note 7 (concurrence per Goldberg, J.), 84 S.Ct. 424, 11 L.Ed.2d 331; Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice (February 25, 1963), pp. 7, 8.
In judicially passing upon a contested issue of a given defendant's ability to pay the costs of perfecting an appeal, consideration [***6] must, of necessity, revolve about and be given to the existence, nature, and extent of (a) the defendant's separate and community assets and liabilities; (b) the defendant's past and present occupation and earning capacity; (c) the defendant's credit standing; and (d) any other factors tending to substantially impair or materially enhance the defendant's ability to advance or secure the necessary costs. These factors must, in turn, be viewed and weighed in light of the fact that the defendant stands convicted of a crime, that due process of law entitles him to appellate review without undue delay, that ordinarily the transcription and delivery of a statement of facts is upon a "cash and carry" basis, and that friends of the defendant, however affluent, cannot be involuntarily obligated by him or compelled by the state to advance or secure such costs. At 389 P.2d 895 at 899.
The Rutherford court observed that HN6 the initial burden rests upon a defendant to demonstrate to the court's satisfaction his inability to advance or secure the costs to pay for the transcript. Once the defendant makes such a showing, the state must come forward with substantial factual evidence of the [***7] defendant's ability to pay in whole or in part, the necessary costs. The court stated, "Mere innuendo, suspicion, or conjecture that a defendant may be able to secure or advance the cost is insufficient." Id. at 899.
It has been said that, "While the determination of reasonableness is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, . . . no single factor should alone be determinative. The court should take into consideration all the factors in the affidavit and, in addition, consider the designation of record -- specifically, [*936] [**637] the degree to which the defendant has attempted to narrow the record to the issues to be presented on appeal." Bruner v. State ex rel. Dist. Court, Okl. Cty., 581 P.2d 1314 at 1316 (Okl.Cr.1978).
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Ability to pay |