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State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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Georgia Lawson v. City of Moultrie, 194 Ga. 699 (1942) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue?
No, Statute authorizing counties and municipal corporations to construct revenue producing undertakings, and in anticipation of the collection of revenue therefrom to issue certificates payable solely from such revenue, does
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not violate constitutional provision limiting the powers of counties and municipalities in relation to contracting debts
neither the act nor the ordinance violates the constitutional provision above referred to. Revenue flow
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Georgia Messenger v. State, 72 S.E.2d 460 (1952) Other applicable caselaw The inhibition of the constitution against imprisonment for debt applies to any and all such imprisonment, irrespective of the period of its duration or the means whereby it is accomplished the Constitution of Georgia forbids imprisonment for debt Ability to pay
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Georgia State v. Higgins, 326 S.E.2d 728, (Ga. 1985) Other applicable caselaw invalidating an income tax law that authorized punishment solely for the nonpayment of income taxes
[A] criminal provision drawn in terms of a ‘wilful failure’ to pay tax would be an entirely different matter, as it would catch the intentional tax evader without at the
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same time ensnaring the hapless pauper.
Ability to pay
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Georgia Johnson v. State, 707 S.E.2d 373, 374 Other applicable caselaw
Before revoking a defendant's probation based solely on the failure to pay fines, fees, or surchagres costs, the trial court is required to make a finding as to defendant's wilfulness,
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and if it concluded that defendant was not at fault, the court is required to consider other punishment alternatives.
"Although we do not interfere with a revocation of probation unless the trial court has manifestly abused its discretion, we conclude here that such an abuse occurred. In the instant
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case, the trial court made no express or written findings as to the reasons for Johnson's failure to pay or as to the inadequacy of alternative punishments. Rather, it inquired only as to Johnson's fitness to work before deciding to revoke Johnson's probation. Therefore, because the trial court made this determination without making the findings required by Bearden, it committed reversible error." Johnson v. State, 707 S.E.2d 373, 374(citing Bearden v. Georgia, 460 U.S. 660 (1983))
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. Ability to pay
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Iowa Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) Ability to pay must be determined before imposition.
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2
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authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay.
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
Ability to pay
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Pennsylvania Com. Ex Rel. Benedict Et Al. v. Cliff, 451 Pa. 427, 433-34 (Pa. 1973)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
The state supreme court has held that it is a violation of the U.S. Constitution and the PA state constitution's equal protection provisions to subject a defendant to jail time
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simply because he is unable to pay a fine without first making a determination of the defendant's ability to pay. There appears to be no specific minimum requirements for ability-to-pay determinations. Apparently, however, the burden is on the defendant to inform and show the court that he is indigent.
It is nonetheless apparent that a state is prohibited from committing its citizens for fines without a reasonable opportunity being afforded to allow them to meet the court's directive consistent
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with their respective financial situation. In the cases before us there was no determination of immediate ability to meet the mandates that had been imposed, nor was there a showing that a reasonable opportunity had been given to allow the appellants to comply without immediate incarceration. We believe that the Supreme Court has made it plain that a defendant may not be incarcerated merely because he cannot make full payment of a fine. Therefore, we hold that the appellants must be given the opportunity to establish that they are unable to pay the fine. Upon a showing of indigence, the appellants should be allowed to make payments in reasonable installments.
Ability to pay
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Pennsylvania Com. v. Schwartz, 418 A.2d 637, 640 (1980) When is the determination of Defendant's ability-to-pay made? It is more rational to determine ability to pay before imposition of a fine.
If the judge does not at the outset determine the defendant's ability to pay a fine, he will often be forced to imprison him at some later point, when he
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fails to pay the fine. However, before a defendant may be imprisoned for not paying a fine, he must be given an opportunity to establish that he is unable to pay the fine. Commonwealth ex rel. Parrish v. Cliff, 451 Pa. 427, 304 A.2d 158 (1973); Commonwealth v. Shaeffer 228 Pa.Super. 734, 311 A.2d 361 (1973); Pa.R.Crim.P. 1407(a). If a defendant establishes that he is indigent, he will be allowed to make payments in reasonable installments. 451 Pa. at 434, 304 A.2d at 161. Thus, rather than waiting until the defendant is brought before the court for not paying a fine, it is far more rational to determine the defendant's ability to pay at the time the fine is imposed...Here, all the sentencing judge knew about appellant's financial background was that he had sold $980 worth of drugs to the undercover agents the previous year and was currently working with his father in the construction industry, “bringing home approximately $150 per week.” N.T. at 12, 13 (August 28, 1978, Guilty Plea hearing). This was hardly enough information to make an intelligent finding as to appellant's ability to pay the fine.
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Pennsylvania
Com. v. Verilla, 526 A.2d 398, 403 (1987). See also: Com. v. Opara, 362 A.2d 305, 312 (1976); Com. v. Pride, 380 A.2d 1267, 1270 (1977); Com. v. Johnson, 187
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A.2d 761 (1963); Com. v. Terry, 368 A.2d 279, 280 (1977)
Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? Legislature must act for fees for counsel to be recouped from defendant
Clearly, Damario (In re Estate of Damario, 488 Pa. 434, 412 A.2d 842(1980)) cannot be construed to permit assessment of counsel fees by a trial court simply because Appellant was
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assigned court-appointed counsel, even though he was not ruled indigent. Notwithstanding the fact that there exists no case law addressing the precise issue presently before this Court, we draw support from those cases which require a finding of statutory authority before the trial court's order of reimbursement to a public defender's office would be upheld. See Commonwealth v. Terry, 470 Pa. 234, 368 A.2d 279 (1977); Commonwealth v. Pride, 252 Pa.Super. 34, 380 A.2d 1267 (1977); Commonwealth v. Opara, 240 Pa.Super. 511, 362 A.2d 305 (1975). Absent an indication by our legislature sanctioning the assessment of counsel fees for court-appointed counsel, we decline to validate orders granting such relief to counties. Parenthetically we note that § 3 of the Act of January 19, 1968, P.L. 984, 19 P.S. § 793, at one time provided for the reimbursement by a criminal defendant or a relative of the defendant to the county “for compensation and expense incurred and paid to court-appointed counsel”. However, this statute has since been repealed, 1984, October 12, P.L. 959, No. 187, § 6.
Fines and fees