Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law School
50-State Criminal Justice Debt Reform Builder Bringing transparency to areas of significant legal complexity.
50-State Criminal Justice Debt Reform Builder Bringing transparency to areas of significant legal complexity.
Case Law
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When does this apply
| State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Hawaii | State v. Gaylord, 78 Haw. 127, 155, 890 P.2d 1167, 1195 (1995) holding modified by State v. Hussein, 122 Haw. 495, 229 P.3d 313 (2010) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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Must determine make finding that defendant can afford to pay and prescribe manner of payment |
In addition, we hold that the sentencing court's restitution order failed to comply with Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706605(1)(d) and was illegally imposed. In disregard of Johnson, 68 Haw. at + See more29798, 711 P.2d at 1299, the sentencing court failed to make any finding that $122,248.95 was an amount that Gaylord could afford to pay in restitution (indeed, as noted, the sentencing court viewed Gaylord's sources of restitution as highly unlikely and highly speculative and unreliable) and to prescribe the manner of payment. To compound the error, in its December 13, 1991 judgment of conviction, the sentencing court expressly and improperly delegated the judicial function of determining the manner of payment to an administrative bodythe Hawaii Paroling Authority. Johnson, 68 Haw. at 297, 711 P.2d at 1299; Murray, 63 Haw. at 25, 621 P.2d at 343.
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Hawaii | Hawaii Insurers Council v. Lingle, 120 Haw. 51, 59, 201 P.3d 564, 572 (2008) | Does the states separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? | Legislature allowed to delegate collection power to judiciary |
The legislature may delegate the state's police power to state authorities to allow them to assess fees. Medeiros, 89 Hawaii at 366, 973 P.2d at 741. Generally, a fee is + See moreexchanged for a service rendered or a benefit conferred, and the amount of the fee normally bears a relationship to the value of the service or benefit. Bolt v. City of Lansing, 459 Mich. 152, 587 N.W.2d 264, 269 (1998).
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Hawaii | State v. Medeiros, 89 Haw. 361, 367 (1999) | Other applicable caselaw |
Accordingly, we hereby adopt a modified Emerson College test for determining whether a charge is a fee or a tax, in which we analyze whether the charge (1) applies to + See morethe direct beneficiary of a particular service, (2) is allocated directly to defraying the costs of providing the service, and (3) is reasonably proportionate to the benefit received.
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Michigan | People v. Jackson, 483 Mich. 271, 769 N.W.2d 630 (2009) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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Defendant is not entitled to an assessment of ability to pay fee for court-appointed attorney until the imposition of the fee is enforced |
Indeed, whenever a trial court attempts to enforce its imposition of a fee for a court-appointed attorney under MCL 769.1k, the defendant must be advised of this enforcement action and + See morebe given an opportunity to contest the enforcement on the basis of his indigency. Thus, trial courts should not entertain defendants' ability-to-pay-based challenges to the imposition of fees until enforcement of that imposition has begun. . . . The operative question for any such evaluation will be whether a defendant **643 is indigent and unable to pay at that time or whether forced payment would work a manifest hardship on the defendant at that time.
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Ability to pay |
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Michigan | People v. Cunningham, 496 Mich. 145, 147, 852 N.W.2d 118, 120 (2014) | Imposing costs beyond those specified in statute |
The authority to impose criminal costs is statutory. Statute stating that if defendant is guilty, court may impose any cost in addition to the minimum state cost, does not provide + See morecourts with the independent authority to impose any costs upon defendants, and instead, statute provides courts with authority to impose only those costs that the Legislature has separately authorized by statute.
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“The right of the court to impose costs in a criminal case is statutory.” . . . . Thus, courts may impose costs in criminal cases only where such costs + See moreare authorized by statute. In a variety of circumstances, the Legislature has chosen to provide courts with the authority to impose costs. For instance, with regard to certain offenses, courts may require criminal defendants to pay the “costs of prosecution.” . . . we conclude that MCL 769.1k (1)(b)(ii ) does not provide courts with the independent authority to impose “any cost.” Instead, we hold that MCL 769.1k(1)(b)(ii ) provides courts with the authority to impose only those costs that the Legislature has separately authorized by statute.
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