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State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Hawaii | State v. Gaylord, 78 Haw. 127, 155, 890 P.2d 1167, 1195 (1995) holding modified by State v. Hussein, 122 Haw. 495, 229 P.3d 313 (2010) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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Must determine make finding that defendant can afford to pay and prescribe manner of payment |
In addition, we hold that the sentencing court's restitution order failed to comply with Haw. Rev. Stat. § 706605(1)(d) and was illegally imposed. In disregard of Johnson, 68 Haw. at + See more29798, 711 P.2d at 1299, the sentencing court failed to make any finding that $122,248.95 was an amount that Gaylord could afford to pay in restitution (indeed, as noted, the sentencing court viewed Gaylord's sources of restitution as highly unlikely and highly speculative and unreliable) and to prescribe the manner of payment. To compound the error, in its December 13, 1991 judgment of conviction, the sentencing court expressly and improperly delegated the judicial function of determining the manner of payment to an administrative bodythe Hawaii Paroling Authority. Johnson, 68 Haw. at 297, 711 P.2d at 1299; Murray, 63 Haw. at 25, 621 P.2d at 343.
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Hawaii | Hawaii Insurers Council v. Lingle, 120 Haw. 51, 59, 201 P.3d 564, 572 (2008) | Does the states separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? | Legislature allowed to delegate collection power to judiciary |
The legislature may delegate the state's police power to state authorities to allow them to assess fees. Medeiros, 89 Hawaii at 366, 973 P.2d at 741. Generally, a fee is + See moreexchanged for a service rendered or a benefit conferred, and the amount of the fee normally bears a relationship to the value of the service or benefit. Bolt v. City of Lansing, 459 Mich. 152, 587 N.W.2d 264, 269 (1998).
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Hawaii | State v. Medeiros, 89 Haw. 361, 367 (1999) | Other applicable caselaw |
Accordingly, we hereby adopt a modified Emerson College test for determining whether a charge is a fee or a tax, in which we analyze whether the charge (1) applies to + See morethe direct beneficiary of a particular service, (2) is allocated directly to defraying the costs of providing the service, and (3) is reasonably proportionate to the benefit received.
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Indiana | IN Const. Art. 1, § 16 |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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There is a constitutional limitation on excessive fines in the criminal context. |
Section 16. Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature + See moreof the offense.
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Ability to pay |
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Indiana |
Ind. Code § 33-37-2-3; Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1.7 Coleman v. State, 61 N.E.3d 390, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) |
Trial court must conduct an indigency hearing when it imposes fines or costs as part of a defendant's sentence; however, no specific requirement indicates when the hearing must be held + See moreas long as the hearing is held before the sentence is completed.
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Further, the trial court must conduct an indigency hearing when it imposes fines or costs as part of a defendant's sentence. Johnson v. State, 27 N.E.3d 793, 794-95 (Ind.Ct.App.2015), + See moresee also Ind.Code § 33–37–2–3(a). However, no specific requirement indicates when the hearing must be held as long as the hearing is held before the sentence is completed. Johnson, 27 N.E.3d at 794–95.
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Ability to pay | |
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Indiana | Meunier-Short v. State, 52 N.E.3d 927, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) |
An indigency determination merely prevents the defendant from being imprisoned for his inability to pay costs or fines.
A trial court has the authority to assess fines, costs, and fees + See moreagainst an indigent defendant; a different result would amount to inverse discrimination since it would enable an indigent to avoid both the fine and imprisonment for nonpayment whereas other defendants must always suffer one or the other.
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Meunier–Short contends a trial court may not impose costs or fines upon an indigent defendant. But we have previously held, “A defendant's indigency does not shield him from all costs + See moreor fees related to his conviction.” Banks v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1050, 1051 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. An indigency determination merely prevents the defendant from being imprisoned for his inability to pay. Henderson, 44 N.E.3d at 815.
Notwithstanding the indigency hearing requirement contained in Indiana Code sections 33–37–2–3(a) and 35–38–1–18(a), a trial court has the authority to assess fines, costs, and fees against an indigent defendant; “indeed, a different result would amount to inverse discrimination since it would enable an indigent to avoid both the fine and imprisonment for nonpayment whereas other defendants must always suffer one or the other ...” Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970).
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Ability to pay | |
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Indiana | Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind. 1994) | Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? | The power of the Legislature to impose and regulate fines, exercised within constitutional limits, is not subject to review by the courts |
"To summarize, we hold that Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution imposes two requirements upon statutes that grant unequal privileges or immunities to differing classes of persons. First, + See morethe disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated. Finally, in determining whether a statute complies with or violates Section 23, courts must exercise substantial deference to legislative discretion."
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Indiana |
IN Const. Art. 5, § 17 State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 20, 24 (1857) State v. Rowe, 103 Ind. 118, 2 N.E. 294, 295 (1885) |
The provision of the Indiana Constitution that the governor shall have power to remit fines under such regulations as may be prescribed by law has been held only to authorize + See morethe remission of fines by the governor in pursuance of provisions of law. The power of the governor in this respect is not absolute, but can only be exercised pursuant to legislative direction.
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...The Governor may remit fines and forfeitures, under such regulations as may be provided by law…
It is plain, we think, that the power of remission is not granted absolutely to + See morethe governor, but only the power of exercising it pursuant to legislative direction. If the remission ought to be made in this case, the statutory requirement can yet be complied with, and the remission granted.
The sense in which the governor may be authorized to “remit fines and forfeitures” is that he may release or absolve the person against whom a fine or forfeiture has been adjudged from its payment after judgment.
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Enforcement | |
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Indiana | IN Const. Art. 8, § 2 | Under the Indiana Constitution all fines assessed for breaches of the penal laws of the state belong to the common school fund of the state. |
...The fund to be derived from the sale of County Seminaries, and the moneys and property heretofore held for such Seminaries; from the fines assessed for breaches of the penal + See morelaws of the State; and from all forfeitures which may accrue;…
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Revenue flow | |
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Indiana | IN Const. Art. 1, § 16 | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | There is a constitutional limitation on excessive fines in the criminal context. |
Section 16. Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature + See moreof the offense.
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Ability to pay |
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Indiana |
Ind. Code § 33-37-2-3 Eliseo v. State, 14 N.E.3d 778, 780 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) |
(e) If, after a hearing under subsection (a) or (b), the court determines that a convicted person is able to pay part of the costs of representation, the court shall + See moreorder the person to pay an amount of not more than the cost of the defense services rendered on behalf of the person. The clerk shall deposit the amount paid by a convicted person under this subsection in the county's supplemental public defender services fund established under Ind. Code § 33-40-3-1.
Eliseo argues the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed a public defender fee of more than $100.00. He cites Ind.Code § 35–33–7–6, which sets a $100.00 cap for the public defender fee following a felony conviction. But the trial court “can order reimbursement [of fees] under any [of the statutes] or a combination thereof.” Jackson v. State, 968 N.E.2d 328, 333 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). Two other statutes, Ind.Code § 33–40–3–65 and Ind.Code § 33–37–2–36 give the trial court discretion in determining the public defender fee imposed. As stated above, because the trial court ordered payment after incarceration, it most likely relied on Ind.Code § 33–37–2–3 in determining the amount of the public defender fee, which does not have a cap on the amount. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Eliseo pay a public defender fee of $300.00. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 638 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (holding the requirement to pay a $500.00 public defender fee was not an abuse of discretion).
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Ability to pay | ||
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Iowa | State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | Ability to pay |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) | Ability to pay must be determined before imposition. |
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2 + See moreauthorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
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Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? |
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay.
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The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
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Ability to pay |
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New Jersey | State v. Bolvito, 86 A.3d 131, 139 |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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Less about protections for ability-to-pay determination, the case law has considered courts to broadly consider ability to pay |
When it assesses a defendant's ability to pay, the sentencing court should look beyond the defendant's current assets and anticipated income during the period of incarceration. The Legislature did not + See moreimpose time constraints on an SCVTF penalty. N.J.S.A. 2C:14–10. If unpaid, the penalty does not evaporate at the conclusion of the defendant's custodial sentence or his or her period of parole supervision. To the extent that a defendant's educational background and employment history may affect his or her potential to achieve post-incarceration employment and a steady income, such factors may be relevant to the inquiry. For purposes of the sentencing court's determination, a defendant's ability to pay should not be measured only by current circumstances, but assessed over the long term
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Ability to pay |
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New Jersey | Pasqua v. Council, 186 N.J. 127, 148, (NJ 2006) abrogated by Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431 (2011) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | an indigent facing loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in municipal court is entitled to counsel |
In addition, without referencing our State Constitution, we held in Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt that “as a matter of simple justice, no indigent defendant should be subjected to a conviction entailing + See moreimprisonment in fact or other consequence of magnitude without first having had due and fair opportunity to have counsel assigned without cost.” 58 N.J. 281, 295, 277 A.2d 216 (1971); see also R. 7:3–2(b) (“If the court is satisfied that the defendant is indigent and that the defendant faces a consequence of magnitude ..., the court shall assign the municipal public defender to represent the defendant.”). In Rodriguez, we considered “the substantial loss of driving privileges” as one type of “serious consequence” that would warrant assigning counsel to an indigent defendant. 58 N.J. at 295, 277 A.2d 216. We acknowledged “[t]he importance of counsel in an accusatorial system,” underscoring that in a case with “any complexities[,] the untrained defendant is in no position to defend himself,” and that in a case without “complexities, his lack of legal representation may place him at a disadvantage.” ...We can find no principled reason why an indigent facing loss of motor vehicle privileges or a substantial fine in municipal court, termination of parental rights in family court, or tier classification in a Megan's Law proceeding would be entitled to counsel under state law but an indigent facing jail for allegedly willfully refusing to pay a child support judgment would not. Moreover, the indigent subject to incarceration for failure to pay support can hardly be distinguished from the indigent conferred with the right to counsel in an involuntary civil commitment hearing. We are persuaded that the due process guarantee of the New Jersey Constitution compels the assignment of counsel to indigent parents who are at risk of incarceration at child support enforcement hearings.
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Ability to pay |
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New Jersey | State v. De Bonis, 58 N.J. 182, 190 (1971) | Other applicable caselaw | defendants are allowed to pay fines in installments |
As we have said, there has been no bar to installment payments. The matter has rested in the court's discretion. The question now before us is whether the Federal Constitution + See morerequires an opportunity to pay a fine in installments.
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Ability to pay |