297–98, 711 P.2d at 1299, the sentencing court failed to make any finding that $122,248.95 was an amount that Gaylord could afford to pay in restitution (indeed, as noted, the sentencing court viewed Gaylord's “sources of restitution” as “highly unlikely and highly speculative and unreliable”) and to prescribe the manner of payment. To compound the error, in its December 13, 1991 judgment of conviction, the sentencing court expressly and improperly delegated the judicial function of determining the manner of payment to an administrative body—the Hawai‘i Paroling Authority. Johnson, 68 Haw. at 297, 711 P.2d at 1299; Murray, 63 Haw. at 25, 621 P.2d at 343.

exchanged for a service rendered or a benefit conferred, and the amount of the fee normally bears a relationship to the value of the service or benefit. Bolt v. City of Lansing, 459 Mich. 152, 587 N.W.2d 264, 269 (1998).

the direct beneficiary of a particular service, (2) is allocated directly to defraying the costs of providing the service, and (3) is reasonably proportionate to the benefit received.

the custody of the secretary of corrections and a fine is to be imposed, the judge must make specific findings pursuant to 21–4607(2) before imposing a fine. The judge must also state on the record that he or she has taken into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of the fine will impose, as required by 21–4607(3)."

on the record how those factors have been weighed in the court's decision. Without an adequate record on these points, meaningful appellate review of whether the court abused its discretion **941 in setting the amount and method of payment of the fees would be impossible. See State v. Moncla, 269 Kan. 61, 65, 4 P.3d 618 (2000) (noting difficulty of reviewing case in which district court failed to state findings, conclusions). Second, a sentencing court's failure to include such explicit consideration of the defendant's financial circumstances in the record does not render the sentence associated with the resulting assessment *547 “illegal,” as that term is used in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22–3504. As we have already said, the assessment itself is not punitive; it is not a punishment or part of the sentence at all. Its connection to a sentence does not convert that sentence to one fitting the narrow definition of “illegal,” i.e., a sentence imposed by a court without jurisdiction; a sentence that does not conform to the statutory provision, either in the character or the term of the punishment authorized; or a sentence that is ambiguous with respect to the time and means in which it is to be served. See State v. Gayden, 281 Kan. 290, Syl. ¶ 1, 130 P.3d 108 (2006).

court shall state on the record in detail the reasons therefor.” The design of this provision makes clear that restitution is the rule and a finding that restitution is unworkable the exception. It also leads us to conclude that it is a defendant's burden to come forward with evidence of his or her inability to pay.

has considered) the financial resources of the defendant when determining either the discretionary amount of a fine or the discretionary method of payment. Moreover, a remand from an appellate court to a district court pursuant to these authorities to correct this error is, in substance, not a remand for resentencing. As such, the Tafoya I panel was substantively correct when it limited its mandate to vacating the fine and instructing the district court to reconsider “the method of payment of the fine.”