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State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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Idaho Lerajjareanra-o-kel-ly v. Schow, 216 P.3d 154 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009). Is a prisoner denied equal protection of the laws when he is forced to pay some of his fees under statute upon a finding of indigence while non-prisoners are not? No
The difference in treatment pursuant to I.C. §§ 31-3220 and 31-3220A between indigent prisoners and indigent nonprisoners is justified by a legitimate legislative purpose. [***10] Therefore, we conclude that
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Appellant's claim that the statutory scheme at issue in this case violates a prisoner's right to equal protection of the laws fails.
Fines and fees
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Idaho State v. Randles, 712 P.2d 634 (Idaho 1985)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
Burden is on defendant to show indigence, within trial court's discretion to determine indigence based on a variety of factors
Indigence is a relative term, and must be considered and measured in each [***5] case by reference to the need or service to be met or furnished. When
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related to the constitutional rights surrounding the furnishing of a prepaid statement of facts and transcript to a defendant in a nonfrivolous criminal appeal, the term does not and cannot, in keeping with the concept of equal justice to every man, mean absolute destitution or total insolvency. Rather, it connotes a state of impoverishment or lack of resources on the part of a defendant and which, when realistically viewed in the light of every day practicalities, substantially and effectively impairs or prevents his procurement of an adequate statement of facts and transcript necessary to a complete appellate review of his claims of error. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 69 S.Ct. 85, 93 L.Ed. 43; Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, Note 7 (concurrence per Goldberg, J.), 84 S.Ct. 424, 11 L.Ed.2d 331; Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice (February 25, 1963), pp. 7, 8. In judicially passing upon a contested issue of a given defendant's ability to pay the costs of perfecting an appeal, consideration [***6] must, of necessity, revolve about and be given to the existence, nature, and extent of (a) the defendant's separate and community assets and liabilities; (b) the defendant's past and present occupation and earning capacity; (c) the defendant's credit standing; and (d) any other factors tending to substantially impair or materially enhance the defendant's ability to advance or secure the necessary costs. These factors must, in turn, be viewed and weighed in light of the fact that the defendant stands convicted of a crime, that due process of law entitles him to appellate review without undue delay, that ordinarily the transcription and delivery of a statement of facts is upon a "cash and carry" basis, and that friends of the defendant, however affluent, cannot be involuntarily obligated by him or compelled by the state to advance or secure such costs. At 389 P.2d 895 at 899. The Rutherford court observed that HN6 the initial burden rests upon a defendant to demonstrate to the court's satisfaction his inability to advance or secure the costs to pay for the transcript. Once the defendant makes such a showing, the state must come forward with substantial factual evidence of the [***7] defendant's ability to pay in whole or in part, the necessary costs. The court stated, "Mere innuendo, suspicion, or conjecture that a defendant may be able to secure or advance the cost is insufficient." Id. at 899. It has been said that, "While the determination of reasonableness is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, . . . no single factor should alone be determinative. The court should take into consideration all the factors in the affidavit and, in addition, consider the designation of record -- specifically, [*936] [**637] the degree to which the defendant has attempted to narrow the record to the issues to be presented on appeal." Bruner v. State ex rel. Dist. Court, Okl. Cty., 581 P.2d 1314 at 1316 (Okl.Cr.1978).
Ability to pay
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Illinois People v. Love, 177 Ill.2d 550,563 Other applicable case law Enforcement
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Illinois N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-16-7
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
No, but statutory law does. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-16-7 allows the district attorney to recover payment only from those who were not entitled indigent legal assistance when they received.
A. The district attorney may, on behalf of the state, recover payment or reimbursement, as the case may be, from each person who has received legal assistance or another benefit
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under the Indigent Defense Act:(1) to which he was not entitled; (2) with respect to which he was not a needy person when he received it; or (3) with respect to which he has failed to make the certificate required by Section 62 B of the Indigent Defense Act and for which he refuses to pay. Suit must be brought within six years after the date on which the aid was received. B. The district attorney may, on behalf of the state, recover payment or reimbursement, as the case may be, from each person other than a person covered by Subsection A who has received legal assistance under the Indigent Defense Act and who, on the date on which suit is brought, is financially able to pay or reimburse the state for it according to the standards of ability to pay applicable under the Indigent Defense Act but refuses to do so. Suit must be brought within three years after the date on which the benefit was received. C. Amounts recovered under this section shall be paid to the state treasurer for credit to the state general fund.
Ability to pay
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Illinois State ex rel. Quintana v. Schnedar, 855 P.2d 562, 568 (N.M. 1993)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
Courts should give great deference to the determination of indigency made by the public defender's office when deciding whether a defendant is indigent.
The inherent power of the judiciary to appoint counsel for indigent defendants is within the unique province of the courts to ensure the constitutionality of criminal prosecutions. The PDA and
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the IDA create the statutory apparatus for providing legal representation to indigent criminal defendants. These statutes and other provisions indicate that the Department will determine under its guidelines whether a particular defendant is indigent and therefore entitled to the legal assistance of a public defender. Courts should give great deference to such determinations by the Department, although they retain the ultimate authority to determine indigence and the discretionary ability to order the appointment of a public defender when it is necessary to protect the defendant's constitutional or statutory rights.
Ability to pay
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Illinois State ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v. Rael, 642 P.2d 1099, 1104 (N.M. 1982)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
The New Mexico Supreme Court has recognized that in a civil contempt proceeding, defendants are not entitled to court-appointed counsel.
"The trial court is the proper evaluator of the need for counsel on a case-by-case basis, considering factors such as the indigent's ability to understand the proceeding, the complexity of
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the legal and factual issues, and the defenses that might be presented. We hold that the trial court must make a case-by-case determination, based on articulated reasons, whether fundamental fairness requires the appointment of counsel to assist an indigent defendant in a nonsupport civil contempt proceeding, and may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, appoint counsel in the proper case."
Enforcement
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Illinois State v. Anaya, 76 N.M. 572, 577 (1966)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
The defendant must make a reasonable showing that he is unable to pay, then the court must inquire into the showing made.
"The burden of proceeding rests first upon the defendant. It is proper for the trial court to require defendant to make a reasonable showing that he is unable to employ
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counsel. Depending on the facts, more than one inquiry may be necessary. In Elliott v. District Court In & For City & County of Denver, 402 P.2d 65 (Colo.1965), the defendant informed the court that he had an expectancy of money. When the expectancy failed to materialize, he brought it to attention of the court at a later date. When defendant makes a reasonable showing of indigency in support of his request for court-appointed counsel, the trial court has a duty under s 41—11—2, N.M.S.A. 1953, to inquire into the facts claimed by defendant. This does not require an independent inquiry by the court. It does require sufficient questioning by the court to enable the court either to decide the question of indigency at that time or to direct that defendant is to report further to the court on the question of obtaining counsel.”
Ability to pay
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Illinois People v. Somers, 984 N.E. 2d 471 (2013)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
notice, meaningful opportunity to present evidence on the costs of representation, the defendant's financial circumstances, and foreseeability to pay
Both this court and the appellate court have been very clear about what a trial court must do . . . To comply with the statute, the court may not
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simply impose the fee in a perfunctory manner. Rather, the court must give the defendant notice that it is considering imposing the fee, and the defendant must be given the opportunity to present evidence regarding his or her ability to pay and any other relevant circumstances. The hearing must focus on the costs of representation, the defendant's financial circumstances, and the foreseeable ability of the defendant to pay.
Ability to pay
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Illinois People v. Aguirre-Alarcon, 2016 IL App (4th) 140455, ¶ 12, 59 N.E.3d 229, 232 Other applicable case law Ability to pay determinations must consider foreseeable and present ability to pay The hearing must focus on the foreseeable ability of the defendant to pay reimbursement and the costs of the representation provided. Ability to pay
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North Carolina State v. Hunter, 315 N.C. 371, 376 (1986)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
State law requires that NC courts "take into consideration the resources of the defendant, her ability to earn, her obligation to support dependents, and such other matters as shall pertain
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to her ability to make restitution or reparation" when ordering restitution.
We do not interpret N.C.G.S. § 15A–1343 to require the trial judge to find and enter facts when imposing a judgment of probation. Rather it requires the court to take
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into consideration the resources of the defendant, her ability to earn, her obligation to support dependents, and such other matters as shall pertain to her ability to make restitution or reparation. This record clearly shows that these matters were considered by Judge Allsbrook in his judgment ordering restitution. He knew defendant's age, her relationship to the victim, that she resided with her mother, that she was indigent for legal purposes, and that the victim's family had insurance of an uncertain amount in scope at the time of the sentencing hearing. The court's action in remitting the original fine and delegating the determination and scheduling of payments in restitution to the probation officer evidenced the trial judge's full recognition of the matters to be considered pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 15A–1343(d).
Ability to pay
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North Carolina Matter of Alamance Cty. Court Facilities, 329 N.C. 84, 99 (1991) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? Not explicitly, but it may be limited on a case-by-case basis
We hold that when inaction by those exercising legislative authority threatens fiscally to undermine the integrity of the judiciary, a court may invoke its inherent power to do what is
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reasonably necessary for “the orderly and efficient exercise of the administration of justice.” Beard v. N.C. State Bar, 320 N.C. at 129, 357 S.E.2d at 696. Article V prohibits the judiciary from taking public monies without statutory authorization. But our statutes obligate counties and cities to provide physical facilities for the judicial system operating within their boundaries. N.C.G.S. § 7A–300(a)(11) (1989); N.C.G.S. § 7A–302 (1989). These facilities must be adequate to serve the functioning of the judiciary within the borders of those political subdivisions. Such adequacy necessarily includes safeguarding the constitutional rights of parties and ascertaining that parties' statutory rights—such as handicap access—are similarly protected. Although the statutes do not expressly pass the duty of providing adequate judicial facilities to the court in case of default of local authorities, the court has the inherent authority to direct local authorities to perform that duty.
Revenue flow
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North Carolina Pers. v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 662–63 (4th Cir. 1988)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other
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law enforcement agencies?
Private counsel for interested parties may co-prosecute cases with government counsel when such participation "(1) has been approved by government counsel; (2) consists solely of rendering assistance in a subordinate
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role to government counsel; and (3) does not rise in practice to the level of effective control of the prosecution."
The issue here is whether and, if so, to what extent, private counsel for interested parties may be authorized to participate with government counsel in such a prosecution. Young flatly
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proscribes turning the prosecution completely over to private counsel for interested parties, but it certainly did not proscribe all participation by such counsel. . . . The limits of such allowable assistance were also suggested: assistance may not extend to the point that “counsel for the private party [is] ... in control of the prosecution.” Id.8 We therefore read Young at least implicitly to approve (or certainly not to forbid) the practice of allowing private counsel for interested parties to participate formally with government counsel in the prosecution of contempt citations so long as that participation (1) has been approved by government counsel; (2) consists solely of rendering assistance in a subordinate role to government counsel; and (3) does not rise in practice to the level of effective control of the prosecution. As indicated, we find authority for this rule of limited participation at least implicit in Young and we think it wholly conformable to Young 's underlying principles. Accordingly, we adopt it as the appropriate rule governing the participation of private counsel for interested parties in contempt prosecutions.
Transparency
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North Carolina State v. Webb, 358 N.C. 92, 101–02 (2004) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? Yes, a defendant may only be held liable for counsel fees in criminal trials if the defendant is convicted.
A convicted defendant is entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before a valid judgment for costs can be entered. State v. Crews, 284 N.C. 427, 201 S.E.2d
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840 (1974). Costs are imposed only at sentencing, so any convicted indigent defendant is given notice of the *102 appointment fee at the sentencing hearing and is also given an opportunity to be heard and object to the imposition of this cost. Therefore, the constitutional requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard are satisfied. Accordingly, the imposition of the appointment fee on convicted indigent defendants passes federal constitutional muster.
Fines and fees
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North Carolina Shore v. Edmisten, 290 N.C. 628, 633–34 (1976) Other applicable case law Though a defendant may not be held liable for the fees of court appointed counsel after a conviction, he may be held liable for restitution for high costs.
A state or a local agency can be the recipient of restitution where the offense charged results in particular damages or loss to it over and above its normal
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operating costs. It would be reasonable, for example, to require a defendant to pay the state for expenses incurred to provide him with court appointed counsel should he ever become financially able to pay. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974). It would not however be reasonable to require the defendant to pay the state's overhead attributable to the normal costs of prosecuting him. People v. Baker, 37 Cal.App.3d 117, 112 Cal.Rptr. 137 (1974); State v. Mulvaney, 61 N.J. 202, 293 A.2d 668 (1972); Cf. People v. Teasdale, 335 Mich. 1, 55 N.W.2d 149 (1952).
Fines and fees