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State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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Idaho Lerajjareanra-o-kel-ly v. Schow, 216 P.3d 154 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009). Is a prisoner denied equal protection of the laws when he is forced to pay some of his fees under statute upon a finding of indigence while non-prisoners are not? No
The difference in treatment pursuant to I.C. §§ 31-3220 and 31-3220A between indigent prisoners and indigent nonprisoners is justified by a legitimate legislative purpose. [***10] Therefore, we conclude that
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Appellant's claim that the statutory scheme at issue in this case violates a prisoner's right to equal protection of the laws fails.
Fines and fees
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Iowa State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. Ability to pay
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Iowa Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) Ability to pay must be determined before imposition.
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2
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authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay.
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
Ability to pay
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Indiana IN Const. Art. 1, § 16
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
There is a constitutional limitation on excessive fines in the criminal context.
Section 16. Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature
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of the offense.
Ability to pay
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Indiana Ind. Code § 33-37-2-3; Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1.7
Coleman v. State, 61 N.E.3d 390, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)
Trial court must conduct an indigency hearing when it imposes fines or costs as part of a defendant's sentence; however, no specific requirement indicates when the hearing must be held
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as long as the hearing is held before the sentence is completed.
Further, the trial court must conduct an indigency hearing when it imposes fines or costs as part of a defendant's sentence. Johnson v. State, 27 N.E.3d 793, 794-95 (Ind.Ct.App.2015),
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see also Ind.Code § 33–37–2–3(a). However, no specific requirement indicates when the hearing must be held as long as the hearing is held before the sentence is completed. Johnson, 27 N.E.3d at 794–95.
Ability to pay
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Indiana Meunier-Short v. State, 52 N.E.3d 927, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)
An indigency determination merely prevents the defendant from being imprisoned for his inability to pay costs or fines. A trial court has the authority to assess fines, costs, and fees
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against an indigent defendant; a different result would amount to inverse discrimination since it would enable an indigent to avoid both the fine and imprisonment for nonpayment whereas other defendants must always suffer one or the other.
Meunier–Short contends a trial court may not impose costs or fines upon an indigent defendant. But we have previously held, “A defendant's indigency does not shield him from all costs
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or fees related to his conviction.” Banks v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1050, 1051 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. An indigency determination merely prevents the defendant from being imprisoned for his inability to pay. Henderson, 44 N.E.3d at 815. Notwithstanding the indigency hearing requirement contained in Indiana Code sections 33–37–2–3(a) and 35–38–1–18(a), a trial court has the authority to assess fines, costs, and fees against an indigent defendant; “indeed, a different result would amount to inverse discrimination since it would enable an indigent to avoid both the fine and imprisonment for nonpayment whereas other defendants must always suffer one or the other ...” Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970).
Ability to pay
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Indiana Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind. 1994) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? The power of the Legislature to impose and regulate fines, exercised within constitutional limits, is not subject to review by the courts
"To summarize, we hold that Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution imposes two requirements upon statutes that grant unequal privileges or immunities to differing classes of persons. First,
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the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated. Finally, in determining whether a statute complies with or violates Section 23, courts must exercise substantial deference to legislative discretion."
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Indiana IN Const. Art. 5, § 17
State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 20, 24 (1857)

State v. Rowe, 103 Ind. 118, 2 N.E. 294, 295 (1885)
The provision of the Indiana Constitution that the governor shall have power to remit fines under such regulations as may be prescribed by law has been held only to authorize
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the remission of fines by the governor in pursuance of provisions of law. The power of the governor in this respect is not absolute, but can only be exercised pursuant to legislative direction.
...The Governor may remit fines and forfeitures, under such regulations as may be provided by law… It is plain, we think, that the power of remission is not granted absolutely to
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the governor, but only the power of exercising it pursuant to legislative direction. If the remission ought to be made in this case, the statutory requirement can yet be complied with, and the remission granted. The sense in which the governor may be authorized to “remit fines and forfeitures” is that he may release or absolve the person against whom a fine or forfeiture has been adjudged from its payment after judgment.
Enforcement
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Indiana IN Const. Art. 8, § 2 Under the Indiana Constitution all fines assessed for breaches of the penal laws of the state belong to the common school fund of the state.
...The fund to be derived from the sale of County Seminaries, and the moneys and property heretofore held for such Seminaries; from the fines assessed for breaches of the penal
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laws of the State; and from all forfeitures which may accrue;…
Revenue flow
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Indiana IN Const. Art. 1, § 16 Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? There is a constitutional limitation on excessive fines in the criminal context.
Section 16. Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature
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of the offense.
Ability to pay
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Indiana Ind. Code § 33-37-2-3
Eliseo v. State, 14 N.E.3d 778, 780 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)
(e) If, after a hearing under subsection (a) or (b), the court determines that a convicted person is able to pay part of the costs of representation, the court shall
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order the person to pay an amount of not more than the cost of the defense services rendered on behalf of the person. The clerk shall deposit the amount paid by a convicted person under this subsection in the county's supplemental public defender services fund established under Ind. Code § 33-40-3-1. Eliseo argues the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed a public defender fee of more than $100.00. He cites Ind.Code § 35–33–7–6, which sets a $100.00 cap for the public defender fee following a felony conviction. But the trial court “can order reimbursement [of fees] under any [of the statutes] or a combination thereof.” Jackson v. State, 968 N.E.2d 328, 333 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). Two other statutes, Ind.Code § 33–40–3–65 and Ind.Code § 33–37–2–36 give the trial court discretion in determining the public defender fee imposed. As stated above, because the trial court ordered payment after incarceration, it most likely relied on Ind.Code § 33–37–2–3 in determining the amount of the public defender fee, which does not have a cap on the amount. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Eliseo pay a public defender fee of $300.00. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 638 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (holding the requirement to pay a $500.00 public defender fee was not an abuse of discretion).
Ability to pay
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Idaho State v. Randles, 712 P.2d 634 (Idaho 1985)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
Burden is on defendant to show indigence, within trial court's discretion to determine indigence based on a variety of factors
Indigence is a relative term, and must be considered and measured in each [***5] case by reference to the need or service to be met or furnished. When
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related to the constitutional rights surrounding the furnishing of a prepaid statement of facts and transcript to a defendant in a nonfrivolous criminal appeal, the term does not and cannot, in keeping with the concept of equal justice to every man, mean absolute destitution or total insolvency. Rather, it connotes a state of impoverishment or lack of resources on the part of a defendant and which, when realistically viewed in the light of every day practicalities, substantially and effectively impairs or prevents his procurement of an adequate statement of facts and transcript necessary to a complete appellate review of his claims of error. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 69 S.Ct. 85, 93 L.Ed. 43; Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, Note 7 (concurrence per Goldberg, J.), 84 S.Ct. 424, 11 L.Ed.2d 331; Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice (February 25, 1963), pp. 7, 8. In judicially passing upon a contested issue of a given defendant's ability to pay the costs of perfecting an appeal, consideration [***6] must, of necessity, revolve about and be given to the existence, nature, and extent of (a) the defendant's separate and community assets and liabilities; (b) the defendant's past and present occupation and earning capacity; (c) the defendant's credit standing; and (d) any other factors tending to substantially impair or materially enhance the defendant's ability to advance or secure the necessary costs. These factors must, in turn, be viewed and weighed in light of the fact that the defendant stands convicted of a crime, that due process of law entitles him to appellate review without undue delay, that ordinarily the transcription and delivery of a statement of facts is upon a "cash and carry" basis, and that friends of the defendant, however affluent, cannot be involuntarily obligated by him or compelled by the state to advance or secure such costs. At 389 P.2d 895 at 899. The Rutherford court observed that HN6 the initial burden rests upon a defendant to demonstrate to the court's satisfaction his inability to advance or secure the costs to pay for the transcript. Once the defendant makes such a showing, the state must come forward with substantial factual evidence of the [***7] defendant's ability to pay in whole or in part, the necessary costs. The court stated, "Mere innuendo, suspicion, or conjecture that a defendant may be able to secure or advance the cost is insufficient." Id. at 899. It has been said that, "While the determination of reasonableness is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, . . . no single factor should alone be determinative. The court should take into consideration all the factors in the affidavit and, in addition, consider the designation of record -- specifically, [*936] [**637] the degree to which the defendant has attempted to narrow the record to the issues to be presented on appeal." Bruner v. State ex rel. Dist. Court, Okl. Cty., 581 P.2d 1314 at 1316 (Okl.Cr.1978).
Ability to pay
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Wisconsin State v. Ramel, 743 N.W.2d 502, 510 (Wis. Ct. App. 2007).
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
None. Case law instructs courts to look to the guidelines listed in the American Bar Association's Standards on Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures.
The court "require[s] that the court, by reference to the relevant facts and factors, explain how the sentence's component parts promote the sentencing objectives. By stating this linkage on the
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record, courts will produce sentences that can be more easily reviewed for a proper exercise of discretion." Id. at 507. “In further reliance on its earlier holding in Pedersen, the Will court noted: In Pedersen, we set out the following procedure to be followed in cases where the defendant claims he is unable to pay a fine: (1) We encouraged trial courts to follow a practice of ascertaining the defendant's ability to pay a fine at the time of sentencing. At this time the court should determine an amount and payment schedule in keeping with the defendant's means. (2) If, thereafter, the defendant is unable to pay the fine imposed, he has the burden to apply to the court for relief. Will, 84 Wis.2d at 403–04, 267 N.W.2d 357." "Kuechler was remanded to the trial court because the defendant's ability to pay the fine imposed *671 had not been determined, although he raised the issue in his post conviction motion, id., ¶ 13, and the court characterized as “unsatisfactory” the evidence in the record of inability to pay, id., ¶ 14. On remand, the trial court was reminded of the supreme court's instructions in Pedersen and Iglesias, which instructions relied upon the American Bar Association Standards on Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures: (c) In determining whether to impose a fine and its amount, the court should consider: (i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of a fine will impose, with due regard to his other obligations; (ii) the ability of the defendant to pay a fine on an installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; (iii) the extent to which payment of a fine will interfere with the ability of the defendant to make any ordered restitution or reparation to the victim of the crime; and (iv) whether there are particular reasons which make a fine appropriate as a deterrent to the offense involved or appropriate as a corrective measure for the defendant." State v. Ramel, 743 N.W.2d 502, 510
Ability to pay
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Wisconsin City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 517 N.W.2d 689, 697-98 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? Collections of fines and fees by the court are permitted so long as their collection is not "clearly illegal."
By enacting §§ 800.09 and 800.095, STATS., the legislature explicitly granted municipal courts the authority to suspend drivers' licenses. Whether that constitutes a lawful exercise of police power depends on
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whether it is rationally related to furthering a proper public purpose. See State v. McManus, 152 Wis.2d 113, 130, 447 N.W.2d 654, 660 (Ct.App.1989). That is determined by a two-step analysis. First, we consider whether the statutes promote a proper public purpose. Id. Second, we determine whether the statutory scheme is reasonably related to the accomplishment of that purpose.” City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore, 517 N.W.2d at 696-97. “Courts must not interfere with the municipal exercise of police power unless the exercise is clearly illegal. J & N Corp. v. City of Green Bay, 28 Wis.2d 583, 585, 137 N.W.2d 434, 436 (1965). As the supreme court explained: Municipalities glean their powers from the state constitution and statutes. Under sec. 62.11(5), STATS., municipal legislative bodies are granted the power to act for the government and good order of the city, for its commercial benefit, and for the health, safety, and welfare of the public, and may carry out [their] powers by license, regulation, suppression, borrowing of money, tax levy, appropriation, fine, imprisonment, confiscation, and other necessary or convenient means. The powers hereby conferred shall be in addition to all other grants, and shall be limited only by express language.” City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore at 697. Conceivably, this rule is applicable to all state and local courts in the state of Wisconsin.
Revenue flow
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Wisconsin Will v. State, 267 N.W.2d 357, 359 (Wis. S. Ct. 1978). Other applicable case law
“[T]he Court held that the equal protection clause restricts the state's power to collect a fine from a defendant without the means to pay. We have previously held that: “What
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these cases (Williams, Morris, and Tate ) teach is that one who has been convicted of a crime and fined is not to be imprisoned in satisfaction of the fine or in lieu thereof if he is unable to pay the fine.” State ex rel. Pedersen v. Blessinger, 56 Wis.2d 286, 289, 201 N.W.2d 778, 780 (1972). Under the Williams, Morris, and Tate rationale, no equal protection violation occurs when an indigent offender is originally sentenced to confinement; for when he is originally sentenced to confinement, he is being punished for the crime. But once a sentencing judge has determined a fine to be the appropriate penalty, a defendant who is incarcerated merely because he is without the means to pay the fine is being incarcerated not for the crime but for his poverty, and such incarceration is illegal. On the other hand, when an indigent defender upon whom a fine has been imposed lacks the diligence to meet a reasonable payment schedule, his refusal to pay the fine results from contumacy and not indigence, and incarceration is permissible to punish the refusal to pay.” “But once the sentencing court determines that a fine is an appropriate sanction under the circumstances and that the defendant has the ability to pay it, an indigent offender should be accorded a fair method of paying his fine. Though in Pedersen this court declined to require the trial court to use the installment method when dealing with indigent offenders holding that a future date for total payment in lieu of payment in installments is acceptable, some commentators on sentencing have observed that in almost every case imprisonment can be avoided by allowing the indigent to pay his fine over time. We encourage trial courts to use the installment method, since a simple installment checkoff system at the trial court level would not be difficult to establish.” Id. at 360. “[W]e find no authority, either in the statutes or our cases, for the permanent suspension of a sentence. As long as the defendant is afforded a reasonable payment schedule and as long as he is not imprisoned for his inability to pay the fine, we find no constitutional bar to the state's attempting to collect a fine for an indeterminate period of time.” Id. at 361.
Enforcement