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State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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Idaho Lerajjareanra-o-kel-ly v. Schow, 216 P.3d 154 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009). Is a prisoner denied equal protection of the laws when he is forced to pay some of his fees under statute upon a finding of indigence while non-prisoners are not? No
The difference in treatment pursuant to I.C. §§ 31-3220 and 31-3220A between indigent prisoners and indigent nonprisoners is justified by a legitimate legislative purpose. [***10] Therefore, we conclude that
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Appellant's claim that the statutory scheme at issue in this case violates a prisoner's right to equal protection of the laws fails.
Fines and fees
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Idaho State v. Randles, 712 P.2d 634 (Idaho 1985)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
Burden is on defendant to show indigence, within trial court's discretion to determine indigence based on a variety of factors
Indigence is a relative term, and must be considered and measured in each [***5] case by reference to the need or service to be met or furnished. When
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related to the constitutional rights surrounding the furnishing of a prepaid statement of facts and transcript to a defendant in a nonfrivolous criminal appeal, the term does not and cannot, in keeping with the concept of equal justice to every man, mean absolute destitution or total insolvency. Rather, it connotes a state of impoverishment or lack of resources on the part of a defendant and which, when realistically viewed in the light of every day practicalities, substantially and effectively impairs or prevents his procurement of an adequate statement of facts and transcript necessary to a complete appellate review of his claims of error. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 69 S.Ct. 85, 93 L.Ed. 43; Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, Note 7 (concurrence per Goldberg, J.), 84 S.Ct. 424, 11 L.Ed.2d 331; Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice (February 25, 1963), pp. 7, 8. In judicially passing upon a contested issue of a given defendant's ability to pay the costs of perfecting an appeal, consideration [***6] must, of necessity, revolve about and be given to the existence, nature, and extent of (a) the defendant's separate and community assets and liabilities; (b) the defendant's past and present occupation and earning capacity; (c) the defendant's credit standing; and (d) any other factors tending to substantially impair or materially enhance the defendant's ability to advance or secure the necessary costs. These factors must, in turn, be viewed and weighed in light of the fact that the defendant stands convicted of a crime, that due process of law entitles him to appellate review without undue delay, that ordinarily the transcription and delivery of a statement of facts is upon a "cash and carry" basis, and that friends of the defendant, however affluent, cannot be involuntarily obligated by him or compelled by the state to advance or secure such costs. At 389 P.2d 895 at 899. The Rutherford court observed that HN6 the initial burden rests upon a defendant to demonstrate to the court's satisfaction his inability to advance or secure the costs to pay for the transcript. Once the defendant makes such a showing, the state must come forward with substantial factual evidence of the [***7] defendant's ability to pay in whole or in part, the necessary costs. The court stated, "Mere innuendo, suspicion, or conjecture that a defendant may be able to secure or advance the cost is insufficient." Id. at 899. It has been said that, "While the determination of reasonableness is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, . . . no single factor should alone be determinative. The court should take into consideration all the factors in the affidavit and, in addition, consider the designation of record -- specifically, [*936] [**637] the degree to which the defendant has attempted to narrow the record to the issues to be presented on appeal." Bruner v. State ex rel. Dist. Court, Okl. Cty., 581 P.2d 1314 at 1316 (Okl.Cr.1978).
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. Ability to pay
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Iowa Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) Ability to pay must be determined before imposition.
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2
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authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay.
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
Ability to pay
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Maryland 86 Md. Op. Att'y Gen. 183 (2001) (citing Reddick v. State, 608 A.2d 1246 (1992); Smith v. State, 506 A.2d 1165 (1986); Turner v. State, 516 A.2d 579 (1986)).
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
All that is required is that the court must first assess the defendant's ability to pay the fine by inquiring into the defendant's family and financial situation before incarcerating defendant
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for inability to pay. No specific procedural mechanisms have been established.
"State law provides that a court may sentence a convicted defendant who has failed to pay a fine to an additional period of confinement to “work off” the fine. However,
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under both State law and the federal Constitution, the court must first assess the defendant's ability to pay the fine by inquiring into the defendant's family and financial situation. Any additional period of incarceration imposed for failure to pay the fine must be within statutory limits and may not, in any event, exceed 90 days. Finally, the total period of incarceration imposed on an indigent defendant may not exceed the statutory maximum for the underlying offense."
Ability to pay
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Maryland
Md. Const. art. IV, § 18 (granting the Court of Appeals the authority to enacts rules with the force of law); see, e.g., MD R ADR Rule 17-208 (the Court
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of Appeals authorizes its Chief Judge to approve fee schedules)
Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? No. Maryland's Constitution allows the Court of Appeals to impose binding state-wide rules, including fines and fees.
"The Court of Appeals from time to time shall adopt rules and regulations concerning the practice and procedure in and the administration of the appellate courts and in the other
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courts of this State, which shall have the force of law until rescinded, changed or modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law. The power of courts other than the Court of Appeals to make rules of practice and procedure, or administrative rules, shall be subject to the rules and regulations adopted by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law." "Subject to the approval of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, the county administrative judge of each circuit court shall develop and adopt maximum hourly rate fee schedules for court-designated individuals conducting each type of fee-for-service ADR"
Revenue flow
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Maryland
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 7-503; Rucker v. Harford Cty., 558 A.2d 399, 404 (Md. 1989) (citing Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md.
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376, 488 (1860) (Grand, C.J., concurring))
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other
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law enforcement agencies?
Law enforcement officials can collect fees. However, law enforcement officials should not be given any duties which directly conflict with their law enforcement duties.
“[T]he Constitution ... does not specify or describe the powers and duties of the sheriff. These are left to the common law and the Acts of Assembly.... There is nothing
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to prohibit the Legislature from adding to or diminishing his duties, provided those added be not in conflict with his office as sheriff.”
Enforcement
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Maryland Baldwin v. State, 444 A.2d 1058, 1066 (Md. 1982) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? The state may seek reimbursement of any amount which a defendant can reasonably be expected to pay.
"The initial determination, under the law, is to be made by the Public Defender; and to assist him in making it, § 7(b) authorizes him to “make such investigation of
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the financial status of each defendant at such time or times as the circumstances shall warrant....”Obviously cognizant that shifting sands of fortune might subsequently render inaccurate a previous eligibility determination, and also recognizing that time might not always permit a thorough investigation into the financial status of a defendant prior to the rendition of services, the General Assembly provided in art. 27A a comprehensive scheme whereby the Public Defender could obtain reimbursement from defendants later found able to pay for part or all of his services."
Ability to pay
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Maryland Rutherford v. Rutherford, 464 A.2d 228, 237 (Md. 1983) Other applicable case law An indigent defendant in a civil contempt proceeding cannot be sentenced to incarceration unless he or she has been afforded the right to counsel
"Therefore, under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 24 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, an indigent defendant in a civil contempt proceeding cannot be sentenced
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to incarceration unless he has been afforded the right to appointed counsel. This does not mean that a constitutional right to appointed counsel attaches in every civil contempt proceeding involving an indigent defendant. Rather, we hold only that, under the due process requirements of the federal and state constitutions, an indigent defendant in a civil contempt proceeding cannot be sentenced to actual incarceration unless counsel has been appointed to represent him or he has waived the right to counsel"
Ability to pay
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Maryland McDaniel v. State, 45 A.3d 916, 924 (Md. 2012) Other applicable case law When a defendant is ordered to make restitution to a crime victim, the defendant must timely object or the issue is waived.
"When a court orders a defendant to make restitution to a crime victim, and the defendant believes that the court either fails to inquire into his ability to pay or
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errs in determining his ability to pay, the defendant must make a timely objection to the order, else the issue is waived"
Ability to pay
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New Hampshire State v. Haas, 155 N.H. 612, 613–14, 927 A.2d 1209, 1210 (2007) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? Statute requiring defendant to reimburse State for costs of his legal representation did not violate constitutional right to substantive due process
The purpose of the statute is to require that those who are financially able to do so, pay for a service that they received from the State. There is nothing
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illegitimate in the governmental interest in recouping costs expended for public defense whether or not the defendant is convicted. Moreover, the statutory scheme under RSA 604-A:9 is rationally related to this purpose in that it inquires into a defendant's *614 ability to pay and outlines procedures for recoupment orders, collection and appeal of such orders.
Fines and fees
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New Hampshire State v. Fowlie, 138 N.H. 234, 236–37, 636 A.2d 1037, 1039 (1994) Other applicable case law If the defendant then demonstrates sufficient bona fide efforts to repay his debt, alternatives to imprisonment must be considered by the court before probation may be revoked and imprisonment ordered
We held in Wallace that in a criminal contempt proceeding where a defendant introduces evidence of inability to pay, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant's intentional
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noncompliance with the court's order. Probation violation, however, is not a criminal offense, and revocation requires only a finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, of misplaced trust. . . The State's initial burden when, as here, it brings a petition, is to show that the defendant did not meet a condition of his sentence, in this case, the payment of restitution. The court then “must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay.” Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672, 103 S.Ct. at 2072. If the defendant then “demonstrate[s] sufficient bona fide efforts to repay his debt,” id. at 671, 103 S.Ct. at 2072, alternatives to imprisonment must be considered by the court before probation may be revoked and imprisonment ordered. Id. at 672, 103 S.Ct. at 2072.
Ability to pay