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State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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Idaho Lerajjareanra-o-kel-ly v. Schow, 216 P.3d 154 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009). Is a prisoner denied equal protection of the laws when he is forced to pay some of his fees under statute upon a finding of indigence while non-prisoners are not? No
The difference in treatment pursuant to I.C. §§ 31-3220 and 31-3220A between indigent prisoners and indigent nonprisoners is justified by a legitimate legislative purpose. [***10] Therefore, we conclude that
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Appellant's claim that the statutory scheme at issue in this case violates a prisoner's right to equal protection of the laws fails.
Fines and fees
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Idaho State v. Randles, 712 P.2d 634 (Idaho 1985)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
Burden is on defendant to show indigence, within trial court's discretion to determine indigence based on a variety of factors
Indigence is a relative term, and must be considered and measured in each [***5] case by reference to the need or service to be met or furnished. When
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related to the constitutional rights surrounding the furnishing of a prepaid statement of facts and transcript to a defendant in a nonfrivolous criminal appeal, the term does not and cannot, in keeping with the concept of equal justice to every man, mean absolute destitution or total insolvency. Rather, it connotes a state of impoverishment or lack of resources on the part of a defendant and which, when realistically viewed in the light of every day practicalities, substantially and effectively impairs or prevents his procurement of an adequate statement of facts and transcript necessary to a complete appellate review of his claims of error. Adkins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 335 U.S. 331, 69 S.Ct. 85, 93 L.Ed. 43; Hardy v. United States, 375 U.S. 277, Note 7 (concurrence per Goldberg, J.), 84 S.Ct. 424, 11 L.Ed.2d 331; Report of the Attorney General's Committee on Poverty and the Administration of Federal Criminal Justice (February 25, 1963), pp. 7, 8. In judicially passing upon a contested issue of a given defendant's ability to pay the costs of perfecting an appeal, consideration [***6] must, of necessity, revolve about and be given to the existence, nature, and extent of (a) the defendant's separate and community assets and liabilities; (b) the defendant's past and present occupation and earning capacity; (c) the defendant's credit standing; and (d) any other factors tending to substantially impair or materially enhance the defendant's ability to advance or secure the necessary costs. These factors must, in turn, be viewed and weighed in light of the fact that the defendant stands convicted of a crime, that due process of law entitles him to appellate review without undue delay, that ordinarily the transcription and delivery of a statement of facts is upon a "cash and carry" basis, and that friends of the defendant, however affluent, cannot be involuntarily obligated by him or compelled by the state to advance or secure such costs. At 389 P.2d 895 at 899. The Rutherford court observed that HN6 the initial burden rests upon a defendant to demonstrate to the court's satisfaction his inability to advance or secure the costs to pay for the transcript. Once the defendant makes such a showing, the state must come forward with substantial factual evidence of the [***7] defendant's ability to pay in whole or in part, the necessary costs. The court stated, "Mere innuendo, suspicion, or conjecture that a defendant may be able to secure or advance the cost is insufficient." Id. at 899. It has been said that, "While the determination of reasonableness is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, . . . no single factor should alone be determinative. The court should take into consideration all the factors in the affidavit and, in addition, consider the designation of record -- specifically, [*936] [**637] the degree to which the defendant has attempted to narrow the record to the issues to be presented on appeal." Bruner v. State ex rel. Dist. Court, Okl. Cty., 581 P.2d 1314 at 1316 (Okl.Cr.1978).
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. Ability to pay
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Iowa Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) Ability to pay must be determined before imposition.
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2
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authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay.
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
Ability to pay
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Montana State v. Morgan, 198 Mont. 391, 403 (1982)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A court may not sentence a defendant to pay resitution unless the defendant is or will be able to pay it. A court shall take into account the financial
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resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose. When petitioned by the defendant, if it appears to the satisfaction of the court that payment of the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or his immediate family, the court may modify restitution payments.
Unfortunately, the statutes do not set out standards to be applied on restitution awards similar to those on costs which are set out in section 46-18-232, MCA, as follows: “(2) The
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court may not sentence a defendant to pay costs unless the defendant is or will be able to pay them. In determining the amount and method of payment of costs, the court shall take into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose. “(3) A defendant who has been sentenced to pay costs and who is not in default in the payment thereof may at any time petition the court that sentenced him for remission of the payment of costs or of any unpaid portion thereof. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that payment of the amount due will impose manifest hardship on the defendant or his immediate family, the court may remit all or part of the amount due in costs or modify the method of payment.” We find the foregoing standards are reasonable standards for application to restitution payments. The District Court should apply the foregoing provisions to the present fact situation. In its findings the District Court should include sufficient facts to show compliance with the foregoing paragraphs.
Ability to pay
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Montana State v. Farrell, 207 Mont. 483, 492 (1984) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? A defendant cannot be required to pay fees for counsel without a meaningful inquiry into the defendant's financial status
The judgment cannot stand without a meaningful inquiry into the appellant's financial status and a subsequent finding of the record that he has sufficient resources to repay costs of legal
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counsel. See United States v. Bracewell (2d Cir.1978), 569 F.2d 1194, 1197–98. In conducting an inquiry and reaching a conclusion, the trial court “need not permit a full-fledged adversarial inquiry into the nature and amount of a defendant's assets; nor need he become involved in determining priorities to these assets. [However,] ... any defenses to payment asserted by a defendant ... should be fully considered.” Bracewell, supra, at 1200.
Ability to pay
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Montana State v. Farrell, 207 Mont. 483, 498-99 (1984) Other applicable caselaw An indigent defendant's sentence shall be evaluated under due process analysis; a prison sentence should not be imposed as a punishment for indigency
Thus, we assess the legality of an indigent defendant's sentence in light of fundamental fairness, implicitly recognizing the presumption in favor of individual liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.
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We think it arbitrary and unfair in this case to subject the appellant to the maximum sentence simply because of an apparently unsupported notion that he may not be able to **177 make good on the recoupment and restitution within ten years. Considering the lack of findings regarding appellant's financial resources and his ability to reimburse the proper authorities, we think the judgment of the trial court should be reconsidered. The record indicates that indigency may have been the criterion for imposing the sentence in this particular case, and we therefore view the sentence in this instance as a possible infringement upon fundamental fairness. Due process requires only that indigency or poverty not be used as the touchstone for imposing the maximum allowable punishment.
Enforcement
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Ohio State v. Meyer, 124 Ohio App. 3d 373, 377 (1997)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
An ability-to-pay hearing is not required when a fine is merely imposed. Rather, it is only required when the trial court decides to incarcerate the defendant for failure to pay.
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Defendant is entitled to representation and an opportunity to present evidence.
We hold, therefore, that R.C. 2947.14(A) did not require a hearing in the present case because the trial court merely imposed a fine. Because the trial court has not yet
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sought to enforce the fine with incarceration, the duty to hold a hearing under R.C. 2947.14(A) is not triggered. We note, further, that payment of the fine in this case was technically a condition of Meyer's probation, and therefore, should he be unable to pay and his probation sought to be revoked, he is entitled to a hearing under Crim.R. 32.3. In either case, the hearing requirement is conditioned upon the trial court's decision to incarcerate him.
Ability to pay
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Ohio State ex rel. Hague v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2009-Ohio-6140, ¶ 18, 123 Ohio St. 3d 489, 493 (Ohio 2009) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? No. In fact, one case found that county commissioners violated the separation-of-powers doctrine for not funding courts when the court could not collect enough revenue from cases
"The board and commissioners claim that they have rebutted the presumed reasonableness of the requesting funding because Judge Hague failed to make sufficient operational changes to reduce the courts' budget,
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failed to cooperate with the budget process in a timely manner, and has sufficient money to operate the courts for the remainder of 2009. These claims lack merit. For the board's claim that the judge failed to timely pursue various alternatives for reducing costs, Judge Hague submitted evidence that the majority of juveniles appearing before the juvenile court are indigent and that an increase in court fees and costs would simply increase unpaid sums instead of increasing county revenue."
Revenue flow
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Ohio no
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other
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law enforcement agencies?
Ohio Courts have not addressed this question no
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Ohio State v. Fisher, No. CA98-09-190, 2002 WL 745330 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? Probably not. Courts rest their opinions on statutory law which provides that an indigent defendant may be required to pay attorneys fees only after an ability-to-pay determination is made.
Thus, an indigent defendant may properly be required to pay his attorney fees only after the court makes an affirmative determination on the record that the defendant has, or reasonably
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may be expected to have, the means to pay all or some part of the cost of the legal services rendered to him.
Fines and fees
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Ohio City of Alliance v. Kelly, 548 N.E.2d 952 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) Other applicable caselaw Contempt proceedings may not be used to incarcerate people for non-payment of fines. A person may only be sentenced pursuant to the procedural safeguards provided in Section 2947.14
The appellee in this action urges that we accept the trial court's characterization of these proceedings as contempt for failure to obey an order of the court pursuant to R.C.
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2705.02. However, appellee does not suggest precisely which order appellant was charged with disobeying. We find that the court should have recognized that this case invoked the *134 procedures required under R.C. 2947.14 for committing an offender to jail for failure to pay a fine. This statute and its predecessor1were designed by the legislature to provide a method for collecting a fine from one who is unwilling to pay.
Enforcement
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Ohio Liming v. Damos, 133 Ohio St. 3d 509, 514 (Ohio 2012) The Burden of proving inability to pay is on the party subject to a contempt order
Placing the burden of showing inability to pay on the party charged with contempt is not unreasonable. As we explained in Cook, “[t]he defendant's financial condition and ability to pay
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were peculiarly within his own knowledge. They could not be known with the same certainty to the complainant, nor could she easily produce evidence to maintain the proposition were the burden of proof placed upon her.”
Ability to pay
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Ohio Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St. 2d 95, 95 (1969) Court costs and fees are civil, not criminal, obligations and may be collected only by the methods provided for the collection of civil judgments
The duty to pay court costs is a civil obligation arising from an implied contract. Obligations arising upon implied contracts and judgments *96 thereon are debts, within the purview of
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Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which forbids imprisonment for debt in civil actions. (Paragraph one of the syllabus of Second National Bank of Sandusky v. Becker, 62 Ohio St. 289, 56 N.E. 1025, 51 L.R.A. 860, approved and followed.) Section 2947.20, Revised Code, insofar as it lodges authority in the judge or magistrate to order a defendant committed to jail or to a workhouse for failure to pay court costs, is violative of Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, and is unconstitutional [. . .] An indigent person taxed with costs in a civil action is not jailed to work off this obligation. Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, expressly prohibits imprisonment for civil debt.6 In criminal cases, court costs, assessed *103 to defray the administrative costs of the litigation, are likewise subject to the same prohibition. The purpose of assessing costs in criminal and in civil cases is the same and there is no justification for imprisonment for nonpayment of costs in criminal cases but not in civil cases [. . .] By being involved in court proceedings, any litigant, by implied contract, becomes liable for the payment of court costs if taxed as a part of the court's judgment. A judgment for costs in a criminal case is a civil, not a criminal, obligation, and may be collected only by the methods provided for the collection of civil judgments. To hold otherwise would permit that which is constitutionally prohibited.
Enforcement
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Ohio Strongsville v. Waiwood ,577 N.E.2d 63 (Ohio 1989) A court may not order a person to appear orissue a warrant for unpaid court costs.
An arrest warrant issued after defendant failed to attend a hearing for failure to pay court costs was defective because failure to pay court costs is a civil liability not
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an obligation, such as a fine, that subjects a debtor to arrest.
Enforcement
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Ohio State v. Ellis, 2d Dist., 2008 Ohio 2719. If community service is in lieu of either fines or court costs, contempt may not be imposed for failure to perform Accordingly, the trial court's judgment finding Ellis in criminal contempt for nonperformance of community service work to satisfy his fines and court costs is reversed.  Enforcement
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Ohio Ohio State Bar Assn. v. Goldie, 894 N.E.2d 1226 (2008). Failing to follow the dictates of R.C. 2947.14 and using contempt as a sanction to collect fines can result in disciplinary violations #VALUE! Enforcement
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Ohio In re GMS Mgt. Co., Inc. v. Unpaid Court Costs, Fees and Delinquencies, 932 N.E.2d 405 (2010). The court may not collect fines by refusing to accept filings.
Plaintiff-appellant, GMS Management Company, Inc., appeals a decision of Judge David D'Apolito of Mahoning County Court No. 4, which found that GMS owes over $3,000 for court costs and ordered
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the clerk of that court to refuse to accept any new pleadings even if court costs are advanced until all prior delinquent costs and fees have been paid in full. We agree with appellant's argument that this decision was unconstitutionally entered without notice or an opportunity to be heard and is an unconstitutional denial of access to the courts. For the following reasons, the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case is remanded based upon constitutional violations.
Enforcement