Below are the cases that meet your search criteria.

9 Results

Export results to Excel

State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Illinois People v. Love, 177 Ill.2d 550,563 Other applicable case law Enforcement
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Illinois N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-16-7
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
+ See more
the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
No, but statutory law does. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-16-7 allows the district attorney to recover payment only from those who were not entitled indigent legal assistance when they received.
A. The district attorney may, on behalf of the state, recover payment or reimbursement, as the case may be, from each person who has received legal assistance or another benefit
+ See more
under the Indigent Defense Act:(1) to which he was not entitled; (2) with respect to which he was not a needy person when he received it; or (3) with respect to which he has failed to make the certificate required by Section 62 B of the Indigent Defense Act and for which he refuses to pay. Suit must be brought within six years after the date on which the aid was received. B. The district attorney may, on behalf of the state, recover payment or reimbursement, as the case may be, from each person other than a person covered by Subsection A who has received legal assistance under the Indigent Defense Act and who, on the date on which suit is brought, is financially able to pay or reimburse the state for it according to the standards of ability to pay applicable under the Indigent Defense Act but refuses to do so. Suit must be brought within three years after the date on which the benefit was received. C. Amounts recovered under this section shall be paid to the state treasurer for credit to the state general fund.
Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Illinois State ex rel. Quintana v. Schnedar, 855 P.2d 562, 568 (N.M. 1993)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
+ See more
the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
Courts should give great deference to the determination of indigency made by the public defender's office when deciding whether a defendant is indigent.
The inherent power of the judiciary to appoint counsel for indigent defendants is within the unique province of the courts to ensure the constitutionality of criminal prosecutions. The PDA and
+ See more
the IDA create the statutory apparatus for providing legal representation to indigent criminal defendants. These statutes and other provisions indicate that the Department will determine under its guidelines whether a particular defendant is indigent and therefore entitled to the legal assistance of a public defender. Courts should give great deference to such determinations by the Department, although they retain the ultimate authority to determine indigence and the discretionary ability to order the appointment of a public defender when it is necessary to protect the defendant's constitutional or statutory rights.
Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Illinois State ex rel. Dept. of Human Services v. Rael, 642 P.2d 1099, 1104 (N.M. 1982)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
+ See more
the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
The New Mexico Supreme Court has recognized that in a civil contempt proceeding, defendants are not entitled to court-appointed counsel.
"The trial court is the proper evaluator of the need for counsel on a case-by-case basis, considering factors such as the indigent's ability to understand the proceeding, the complexity of
+ See more
the legal and factual issues, and the defenses that might be presented. We hold that the trial court must make a case-by-case determination, based on articulated reasons, whether fundamental fairness requires the appointment of counsel to assist an indigent defendant in a nonsupport civil contempt proceeding, and may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, appoint counsel in the proper case."
Enforcement
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Illinois State v. Anaya, 76 N.M. 572, 577 (1966)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
+ See more
the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
The defendant must make a reasonable showing that he is unable to pay, then the court must inquire into the showing made.
"The burden of proceeding rests first upon the defendant. It is proper for the trial court to require defendant to make a reasonable showing that he is unable to employ
+ See more
counsel. Depending on the facts, more than one inquiry may be necessary. In Elliott v. District Court In & For City & County of Denver, 402 P.2d 65 (Colo.1965), the defendant informed the court that he had an expectancy of money. When the expectancy failed to materialize, he brought it to attention of the court at a later date. When defendant makes a reasonable showing of indigency in support of his request for court-appointed counsel, the trial court has a duty under s 41—11—2, N.M.S.A. 1953, to inquire into the facts claimed by defendant. This does not require an independent inquiry by the court. It does require sufficient questioning by the court to enable the court either to decide the question of indigency at that time or to direct that defendant is to report further to the court on the question of obtaining counsel.”
Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Illinois People v. Somers, 984 N.E. 2d 471 (2013)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
+ See more
the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
notice, meaningful opportunity to present evidence on the costs of representation, the defendant's financial circumstances, and foreseeability to pay
Both this court and the appellate court have been very clear about what a trial court must do . . . To comply with the statute, the court may not
+ See more
simply impose the fee in a perfunctory manner. Rather, the court must give the defendant notice that it is considering imposing the fee, and the defendant must be given the opportunity to present evidence regarding his or her ability to pay and any other relevant circumstances. The hearing must focus on the costs of representation, the defendant's financial circumstances, and the foreseeable ability of the defendant to pay.
Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

Illinois People v. Aguirre-Alarcon, 2016 IL App (4th) 140455, ¶ 12, 59 N.E.3d 229, 232 Other applicable case law Ability to pay determinations must consider foreseeable and present ability to pay The hearing must focus on the foreseeable ability of the defendant to pay reimbursement and the costs of the representation provided. Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

South Dakota State v. Webb, 856 N.W.2d 171, 174 (S.D. 2014)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
+ See more
the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
This is the first instance in which we have addressed the Excessive Fines Clause as it applies to a criminal fine. . . “First, the claimant must make a prima
+ See more
facie showing of gross disproportionality; and, second, if the claimant can make such a showing, the court considers whether the disproportionality reaches such a level of excessiveness that in justice the punishment is more criminal than the crime. ...One of the primary considerations for assessing gross disproportionality should necessarily be the Legislature's judgment about the appropriate punishment for the offense. ...
Ability to pay
BS-+-Light-Rounded-Square
Add to Dashboard

+ Create New

South Dakota State v. Huth, 334 NW 2d 485 (1983); White Eagle v. State, 280 NW 2d 659 (1979). Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
To a very limited extent. The South Dakota Supreme Court has upheld (at least twice) the state's law requiring repayment of indigent counsel fees. The Court held in both instances
+ See more
that, because of language statung that a failure to pay by the defendant because of inability to pay would not be considered a violation of probation, that revocation for non-payment would not be tantamount to imprisonment for debt but rather a sanction imposed for an intentional refusal to obey a court order.
Appellant's first contention is that imposing the repayment of attorney fees as a condition of probation is a violation of his right to equal protection of the law because, as
+ See more
a result of such a condition, an indigent defendant is treated differently than a non-indigent defendant. Appellant argues that an indigent defendant can be imprisoned, by revocation of probation, for nonpayment of a debt whereas a nonindigent defendant who does not pay his attorney fees cannot be imprisoned for his failure to pay a debt. We do not agree with appellant's analysis. Appellant's right to equal protection of the law requires that the law be applied equally. That was done in this case. He was given the same choice that any other defendant in this situation, indigent or not, would have been given: probation with conditions or imprisonment. He was made fully aware of all the conditions being imposed and he accepted them. The conditions imposed need not be the same for every defendant and the fact that they are not is not a denial of equal protection. Conditions of probation may be tailored to suit the needs, practicalities and realities of each case to better serve the defendant and the public. The decision whether or not to accept the conditions was given to appellant just as it is to any defendant in a similar situation. Appellant's equal protection rights were not violated. See State v. Gerard, 57 Wis.2d 611, 205 N.W.2d 374 (1973). Closely related to his equal protection argument is appellant's contention that imposition of repayment of attorney fees as a condition of probation is unconstitutional in that any revocation of probation for failure to pay said fees would be imprisonment for debt, which is prohibited by Article VI, § 15, of the South Dakota Constitution. Again, we disagree with appellant. In Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 94 S.Ct. 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d 642 (1974), the United States Supreme Court ruled that repayment of attorney fees as a condition of probation, as provided by Oregon statutes, was not a violation of Mr. Fuller's constitutional rights. Oregon's statutes required that a probatee not be required to pay said fees unless he is or will be able to do so, that the probatee may petition to have the unpaid portion "forgiven"; and that no probatee may have his probation revoked due to nonpayment if he shows that his failure to repay was not attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the order or a lack of a good faith effort to make the payments. The Court approved the statutory scheme as being within constitutional guidelines pointing out that any probatee who truly is unable to make such payments due to hardship or other disability will not lose his freedom because of his failure to do so. Although the issue of imprisonment for debt was not brought before the Court in Fuller and was only discussed in a footnote, we agree with the majority's observation that, since no probatee who is truly unable to make repayment will have his probation revoked for such failure, the condition, if enforced, is not imprisonment for debt, but is rather "a sanction imposed for `an intentional refusal to obey the order of the court[.]'"
Ability to pay