under the Indigent Defense Act:(1) to which he was not entitled; (2) with respect to which he was not a needy person when he received it; or (3) with respect to which he has failed to make the certificate required by Section 62 B of the Indigent Defense Act and for which he refuses to pay. Suit must be brought within six years after the date on which the aid was received. B. The district attorney may, on behalf of the state, recover payment or reimbursement, as the case may be, from each person other than a person covered by Subsection A who has received legal assistance under the Indigent Defense Act and who, on the date on which suit is brought, is financially able to pay or reimburse the state for it according to the standards of ability to pay applicable under the Indigent Defense Act but refuses to do so. Suit must be brought within three years after the date on which the benefit was received. C. Amounts recovered under this section shall be paid to the state treasurer for credit to the state general fund.

the IDA create the statutory apparatus for providing legal representation to indigent criminal defendants. These statutes and other provisions indicate that the Department will determine under its guidelines whether a particular defendant is indigent and therefore entitled to the legal assistance of a public defender. Courts should give great deference to such determinations by the Department, although they retain the ultimate authority to determine indigence and the discretionary ability to order the appointment of a public defender when it is necessary to protect the defendant's constitutional or statutory rights.

the legal and factual issues, and the defenses that might be presented. We hold that the trial court must make a case-by-case determination, based on articulated reasons, whether fundamental fairness requires the appointment of counsel to assist an indigent defendant in a nonsupport civil contempt proceeding, and may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, appoint counsel in the proper case."

counsel. Depending on the facts, more than one inquiry may be necessary. In Elliott v. District Court In & For City & County of Denver, 402 P.2d 65 (Colo.1965), the defendant informed the court that he had an expectancy of money. When the expectancy failed to materialize, he brought it to attention of the court at a later date. When defendant makes a reasonable showing of indigency in support of his request for court-appointed counsel, the trial court has a duty under s 41—11—2, N.M.S.A. 1953, to inquire into the facts claimed by defendant. This does not require an independent inquiry by the court. It does require sufficient questioning by the court to enable the court either to decide the question of indigency at that time or to direct that defendant is to report further to the court on the question of obtaining counsel.”

simply impose the fee in a perfunctory manner. Rather, the court must give the defendant notice that it is considering imposing the fee, and the defendant must be given the opportunity to present evidence regarding his or her ability to pay and any other relevant circumstances. The hearing must focus on the costs of representation, the defendant's financial circumstances, and the foreseeable ability of the defendant to pay.

of the offense.

see also Ind.Code § 33–37–2–3(a). However, no specific requirement indicates when the hearing must be held as long as the hearing is held before the sentence is completed. Johnson, 27 N.E.3d at 794–95.

or fees related to his conviction.” Banks v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1050, 1051 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. An indigency determination merely prevents the defendant from being imprisoned for his inability to pay. Henderson, 44 N.E.3d at 815. Notwithstanding the indigency hearing requirement contained in Indiana Code sections 33–37–2–3(a) and 35–38–1–18(a), a trial court has the authority to assess fines, costs, and fees against an indigent defendant; “indeed, a different result would amount to inverse discrimination since it would enable an indigent to avoid both the fine and imprisonment for nonpayment whereas other defendants must always suffer one or the other ...” Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970).

the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated. Finally, in determining whether a statute complies with or violates Section 23, courts must exercise substantial deference to legislative discretion."

the governor, but only the power of exercising it pursuant to legislative direction. If the remission ought to be made in this case, the statutory requirement can yet be complied with, and the remission granted. The sense in which the governor may be authorized to “remit fines and forfeitures” is that he may release or absolve the person against whom a fine or forfeiture has been adjudged from its payment after judgment.

laws of the State; and from all forfeitures which may accrue;…

of the offense.

order the person to pay an amount of not more than the cost of the defense services rendered on behalf of the person. The clerk shall deposit the amount paid by a convicted person under this subsection in the county's supplemental public defender services fund established under Ind. Code § 33-40-3-1. Eliseo argues the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed a public defender fee of more than $100.00. He cites Ind.Code § 35–33–7–6, which sets a $100.00 cap for the public defender fee following a felony conviction. But the trial court “can order reimbursement [of fees] under any [of the statutes] or a combination thereof.” Jackson v. State, 968 N.E.2d 328, 333 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). Two other statutes, Ind.Code § 33–40–3–65 and Ind.Code § 33–37–2–36 give the trial court discretion in determining the public defender fee imposed. As stated above, because the trial court ordered payment after incarceration, it most likely relied on Ind.Code § 33–37–2–3 in determining the amount of the public defender fee, which does not have a cap on the amount. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Eliseo pay a public defender fee of $300.00. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 638 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (holding the requirement to pay a $500.00 public defender fee was not an abuse of discretion).

pursuant to statute. Consistent with the principles of Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), and *650 **872 Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983), however, while there is no prohibition against the imposition of the maximum penalty prescribed by law, indigent defendants may not be incarcerated solely because of their inability to pay court-ordered fines or costs." State v. Murrell, 201 W. Va. 648, 649–50, 499 S.E.2d 870, 871–72 (1997).

and procedure, which shall have the force and effect of law.”

the proceedings, of the costs of representation provided under this article:(1) In every case in which services are provided to an indigent person and an adverse judgment has been rendered against such person, the court may require that person, and in juvenile cases, may require the juvenile's parents or custodian, to pay as costs the compensation of appointed counsel, the expenses of the defense and such other fees and costs as authorized by statute. (2) The court shall not order a person to pay costs unless the person is able to pay without undue hardship. In determining the amount and method of repayment of costs, the court shall take account of the financial resources of the person, the person's ability to pay and the nature of the burden that payment of costs will impose. The fact that the court initially determines, at the time of a case's conclusion, that it is not proper to order the repayment of costs does not preclude the court from subsequently ordering repayment should the person's financial circumstances change. (3) When a person is ordered to repay costs, the court may order payment to be made forthwith or within a specified period of time or in specified installments. If a person is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, an order for repayment of costs is not enforceable during the period of imprisonment unless the court expressly finds, at the time of sentencing, that the person has sufficient assets to pay the amounts ordered to be paid or finds there is a reasonable likelihood the person will acquire the necessary assets in the foreseeable future. (4) A person who has been ordered to repay costs, and who is not in contumacious default in the payment thereof, may at any time petition the sentencing court for modification of the repayment order. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court that continued payment of the amount ordered will impose undue hardship on the person or the person's dependents, the court may modify the method or amount of payment. (5) When a person ordered to pay costs is also placed on probation or imposition or execution of sentence is suspended, the court may make the repayment of costs a condition of probation or suspension of sentence.

case [here, defendant's reasonable ability to provide was an element in 61-5-29(2), but reasonable ability to provide was also an affirmative defense in 61-5-29(3)], in violation of the due process clauses found in Article III, Section 10, of the Constitution of West Virginia, and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, that individual provision, severed from the remainder of W. Va. Code § 61-5-29, is unconstitutional and unenforceable."