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State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Indiana | IN Const. Art. 1, § 16 |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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There is a constitutional limitation on excessive fines in the criminal context. |
Section 16. Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature + See moreof the offense.
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Ability to pay |
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Indiana |
Ind. Code § 33-37-2-3; Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1.7 Coleman v. State, 61 N.E.3d 390, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) |
Trial court must conduct an indigency hearing when it imposes fines or costs as part of a defendant's sentence; however, no specific requirement indicates when the hearing must be held + See moreas long as the hearing is held before the sentence is completed.
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Further, the trial court must conduct an indigency hearing when it imposes fines or costs as part of a defendant's sentence. Johnson v. State, 27 N.E.3d 793, 794-95 (Ind.Ct.App.2015), + See moresee also Ind.Code § 33–37–2–3(a). However, no specific requirement indicates when the hearing must be held as long as the hearing is held before the sentence is completed. Johnson, 27 N.E.3d at 794–95.
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Ability to pay | |
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Indiana | Meunier-Short v. State, 52 N.E.3d 927, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) |
An indigency determination merely prevents the defendant from being imprisoned for his inability to pay costs or fines.
A trial court has the authority to assess fines, costs, and fees + See moreagainst an indigent defendant; a different result would amount to inverse discrimination since it would enable an indigent to avoid both the fine and imprisonment for nonpayment whereas other defendants must always suffer one or the other.
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Meunier–Short contends a trial court may not impose costs or fines upon an indigent defendant. But we have previously held, “A defendant's indigency does not shield him from all costs + See moreor fees related to his conviction.” Banks v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1050, 1051 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. An indigency determination merely prevents the defendant from being imprisoned for his inability to pay. Henderson, 44 N.E.3d at 815.
Notwithstanding the indigency hearing requirement contained in Indiana Code sections 33–37–2–3(a) and 35–38–1–18(a), a trial court has the authority to assess fines, costs, and fees against an indigent defendant; “indeed, a different result would amount to inverse discrimination since it would enable an indigent to avoid both the fine and imprisonment for nonpayment whereas other defendants must always suffer one or the other ...” Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970).
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Ability to pay | |
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Indiana | Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind. 1994) | Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? | The power of the Legislature to impose and regulate fines, exercised within constitutional limits, is not subject to review by the courts |
"To summarize, we hold that Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution imposes two requirements upon statutes that grant unequal privileges or immunities to differing classes of persons. First, + See morethe disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated. Finally, in determining whether a statute complies with or violates Section 23, courts must exercise substantial deference to legislative discretion."
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Indiana |
IN Const. Art. 5, § 17 State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 20, 24 (1857) State v. Rowe, 103 Ind. 118, 2 N.E. 294, 295 (1885) |
The provision of the Indiana Constitution that the governor shall have power to remit fines under such regulations as may be prescribed by law has been held only to authorize + See morethe remission of fines by the governor in pursuance of provisions of law. The power of the governor in this respect is not absolute, but can only be exercised pursuant to legislative direction.
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...The Governor may remit fines and forfeitures, under such regulations as may be provided by law…
It is plain, we think, that the power of remission is not granted absolutely to + See morethe governor, but only the power of exercising it pursuant to legislative direction. If the remission ought to be made in this case, the statutory requirement can yet be complied with, and the remission granted.
The sense in which the governor may be authorized to “remit fines and forfeitures” is that he may release or absolve the person against whom a fine or forfeiture has been adjudged from its payment after judgment.
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Enforcement | |
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Indiana | IN Const. Art. 8, § 2 | Under the Indiana Constitution all fines assessed for breaches of the penal laws of the state belong to the common school fund of the state. |
...The fund to be derived from the sale of County Seminaries, and the moneys and property heretofore held for such Seminaries; from the fines assessed for breaches of the penal + See morelaws of the State; and from all forfeitures which may accrue;…
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Revenue flow | |
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Indiana | IN Const. Art. 1, § 16 | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | There is a constitutional limitation on excessive fines in the criminal context. |
Section 16. Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature + See moreof the offense.
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Ability to pay |
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Indiana |
Ind. Code § 33-37-2-3 Eliseo v. State, 14 N.E.3d 778, 780 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) |
(e) If, after a hearing under subsection (a) or (b), the court determines that a convicted person is able to pay part of the costs of representation, the court shall + See moreorder the person to pay an amount of not more than the cost of the defense services rendered on behalf of the person. The clerk shall deposit the amount paid by a convicted person under this subsection in the county's supplemental public defender services fund established under Ind. Code § 33-40-3-1.
Eliseo argues the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed a public defender fee of more than $100.00. He cites Ind.Code § 35–33–7–6, which sets a $100.00 cap for the public defender fee following a felony conviction. But the trial court “can order reimbursement [of fees] under any [of the statutes] or a combination thereof.” Jackson v. State, 968 N.E.2d 328, 333 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). Two other statutes, Ind.Code § 33–40–3–65 and Ind.Code § 33–37–2–36 give the trial court discretion in determining the public defender fee imposed. As stated above, because the trial court ordered payment after incarceration, it most likely relied on Ind.Code § 33–37–2–3 in determining the amount of the public defender fee, which does not have a cap on the amount. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Eliseo pay a public defender fee of $300.00. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 638 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (holding the requirement to pay a $500.00 public defender fee was not an abuse of discretion).
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Ability to pay | ||
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Iowa | State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. | Ability to pay |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. | Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) | Ability to pay must be determined before imposition. |
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2 + See moreauthorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
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Ability to pay | |
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Iowa | State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? |
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay.
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The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant + See moreis reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
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Ability to pay |
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Ohio | State v. Meyer, 124 Ohio App. 3d 373, 377 (1997) |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof, + See morethe sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
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An ability-to-pay hearing is not required when a fine is merely imposed. Rather, it is only required when the trial court decides to incarcerate the defendant for failure to pay. + See moreDefendant is entitled to representation and an opportunity to present evidence.
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We hold, therefore, that R.C. 2947.14(A) did not require a hearing in the present case because the trial court merely imposed a fine. Because the trial court has not yet + See moresought to enforce the fine with incarceration, the duty to hold a hearing under R.C. 2947.14(A) is not triggered. We note, further, that payment of the fine in this case was technically a condition of Meyer's probation, and therefore, should he be unable to pay and his probation sought to be revoked, he is entitled to a hearing under Crim.R. 32.3. In either case, the hearing requirement is conditioned upon the trial court's decision to incarcerate him.
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Ability to pay |
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Ohio | State ex rel. Hague v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 2009-Ohio-6140, ¶ 18, 123 Ohio St. 3d 489, 493 (Ohio 2009) | Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? | No. In fact, one case found that county commissioners violated the separation-of-powers doctrine for not funding courts when the court could not collect enough revenue from cases |
"The board and commissioners claim that they have rebutted the presumed reasonableness of the requesting funding because Judge Hague failed to make sufficient operational changes to reduce the courts' budget, + See morefailed to cooperate with the budget process in a timely manner, and has sufficient money to operate the courts for the remainder of 2009. These claims lack merit. For the board's claim that the judge failed to timely pursue various alternatives for reducing costs, Judge Hague submitted evidence that the majority of juveniles appearing before the juvenile court are indigent and that an increase in court fees and costs would simply increase unpaid sums instead of increasing county revenue."
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Revenue flow |
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Ohio | no |
Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other + See morelaw enforcement agencies?
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Ohio Courts have not addressed this question | no | |
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Ohio | State v. Fisher, No. CA98-09-190, 2002 WL 745330 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) | Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? | Probably not. Courts rest their opinions on statutory law which provides that an indigent defendant may be required to pay attorneys fees only after an ability-to-pay determination is made. |
Thus, an indigent defendant may properly be required to pay his attorney fees only after the court makes an affirmative determination on the record that the defendant has, or reasonably + See moremay be expected to have, the means to pay all or some part of the cost of the legal services rendered to him.
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Fines and fees |
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Ohio | City of Alliance v. Kelly, 548 N.E.2d 952 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) | Other applicable caselaw | Contempt proceedings may not be used to incarcerate people for non-payment of fines. A person may only be sentenced pursuant to the procedural safeguards provided in Section 2947.14 |
The appellee in this action urges that we accept the trial court's characterization of these proceedings as contempt for failure to obey an order of the court pursuant to R.C. + See more2705.02. However, appellee does not suggest precisely which order appellant was charged with disobeying. We find that the court should have recognized that this case invoked the *134 procedures required under R.C. 2947.14 for committing an offender to jail for failure to pay a fine. This statute and its predecessor1were designed by the legislature to provide a method for collecting a fine from one who is unwilling to pay.
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Enforcement |
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Ohio | Liming v. Damos, 133 Ohio St. 3d 509, 514 (Ohio 2012) | The Burden of proving inability to pay is on the party subject to a contempt order |
Placing the burden of showing inability to pay on the party charged with contempt is not unreasonable. As we explained in Cook, “[t]he defendant's financial condition and ability to pay + See morewere peculiarly within his own knowledge. They could not be known with the same certainty to the complainant, nor could she easily produce evidence to maintain the proposition were the burden of proof placed upon her.”
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Ability to pay | |
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Ohio | Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St. 2d 95, 95 (1969) | Court costs and fees are civil, not criminal, obligations and may be collected only by the methods provided for the collection of civil judgments |
The duty to pay court costs is a civil obligation arising from an implied contract. Obligations arising upon implied contracts and judgments *96 thereon are debts, within the purview of + See moreSection 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, which forbids imprisonment for debt in civil actions. (Paragraph one of the syllabus of Second National Bank of Sandusky v. Becker, 62 Ohio St. 289, 56 N.E. 1025, 51 L.R.A. 860, approved and followed.) Section 2947.20, Revised Code, insofar as it lodges authority in the judge or magistrate to order a defendant committed to jail or to a workhouse for failure to pay court costs, is violative of Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, and is unconstitutional [. . .] An indigent person taxed with costs in a civil action is not jailed to work off this obligation. Section 15, Article I of the Ohio Constitution, expressly prohibits imprisonment for civil debt.6 In criminal cases, court costs, assessed *103 to defray the administrative costs of the litigation, are likewise subject to the same prohibition. The purpose of assessing costs in criminal and in civil cases is the same and there is no justification for imprisonment for nonpayment of costs in criminal cases but not in civil cases [. . .] By being involved in court proceedings, any litigant, by implied contract, becomes liable for the payment of court costs if taxed as a part of the court's judgment. A judgment for costs in a criminal case is a civil, not a criminal, obligation, and may be collected only by the methods provided for the collection of civil judgments. To hold otherwise would permit that which is constitutionally prohibited.
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Enforcement | |
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Ohio | Strongsville v. Waiwood ,577 N.E.2d 63 (Ohio 1989) | A court may not order a person to appear orissue a warrant for unpaid court costs. |
An arrest warrant issued after defendant failed to attend a hearing for failure to pay court costs was defective because failure to pay court costs is a civil liability not + See morean obligation, such as a fine, that subjects a debtor to arrest.
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Enforcement |