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State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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Indiana IN Const. Art. 1, § 16
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
There is a constitutional limitation on excessive fines in the criminal context.
Section 16. Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature
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of the offense.
Ability to pay
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Indiana Ind. Code § 33-37-2-3; Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1.7
Coleman v. State, 61 N.E.3d 390, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)
Trial court must conduct an indigency hearing when it imposes fines or costs as part of a defendant's sentence; however, no specific requirement indicates when the hearing must be held
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as long as the hearing is held before the sentence is completed.
Further, the trial court must conduct an indigency hearing when it imposes fines or costs as part of a defendant's sentence. Johnson v. State, 27 N.E.3d 793, 794-95 (Ind.Ct.App.2015),
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see also Ind.Code § 33–37–2–3(a). However, no specific requirement indicates when the hearing must be held as long as the hearing is held before the sentence is completed. Johnson, 27 N.E.3d at 794–95.
Ability to pay
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Indiana Meunier-Short v. State, 52 N.E.3d 927, 931 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016)
An indigency determination merely prevents the defendant from being imprisoned for his inability to pay costs or fines. A trial court has the authority to assess fines, costs, and fees
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against an indigent defendant; a different result would amount to inverse discrimination since it would enable an indigent to avoid both the fine and imprisonment for nonpayment whereas other defendants must always suffer one or the other.
Meunier–Short contends a trial court may not impose costs or fines upon an indigent defendant. But we have previously held, “A defendant's indigency does not shield him from all costs
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or fees related to his conviction.” Banks v. State, 847 N.E.2d 1050, 1051 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), trans. denied. An indigency determination merely prevents the defendant from being imprisoned for his inability to pay. Henderson, 44 N.E.3d at 815. Notwithstanding the indigency hearing requirement contained in Indiana Code sections 33–37–2–3(a) and 35–38–1–18(a), a trial court has the authority to assess fines, costs, and fees against an indigent defendant; “indeed, a different result would amount to inverse discrimination since it would enable an indigent to avoid both the fine and imprisonment for nonpayment whereas other defendants must always suffer one or the other ...” Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970).
Ability to pay
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Indiana Collins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind. 1994) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? The power of the Legislature to impose and regulate fines, exercised within constitutional limits, is not subject to review by the courts
"To summarize, we hold that Article 1, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution imposes two requirements upon statutes that grant unequal privileges or immunities to differing classes of persons. First,
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the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes. Second, the preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons similarly situated. Finally, in determining whether a statute complies with or violates Section 23, courts must exercise substantial deference to legislative discretion."
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Indiana IN Const. Art. 5, § 17
State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 20, 24 (1857)

State v. Rowe, 103 Ind. 118, 2 N.E. 294, 295 (1885)
The provision of the Indiana Constitution that the governor shall have power to remit fines under such regulations as may be prescribed by law has been held only to authorize
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the remission of fines by the governor in pursuance of provisions of law. The power of the governor in this respect is not absolute, but can only be exercised pursuant to legislative direction.
...The Governor may remit fines and forfeitures, under such regulations as may be provided by law… It is plain, we think, that the power of remission is not granted absolutely to
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the governor, but only the power of exercising it pursuant to legislative direction. If the remission ought to be made in this case, the statutory requirement can yet be complied with, and the remission granted. The sense in which the governor may be authorized to “remit fines and forfeitures” is that he may release or absolve the person against whom a fine or forfeiture has been adjudged from its payment after judgment.
Enforcement
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Indiana IN Const. Art. 8, § 2 Under the Indiana Constitution all fines assessed for breaches of the penal laws of the state belong to the common school fund of the state.
...The fund to be derived from the sale of County Seminaries, and the moneys and property heretofore held for such Seminaries; from the fines assessed for breaches of the penal
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laws of the State; and from all forfeitures which may accrue;…
Revenue flow
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Indiana IN Const. Art. 1, § 16 Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? There is a constitutional limitation on excessive fines in the criminal context.
Section 16. Excessive bail shall not be required. Excessive fines shall not be imposed. Cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. All penalties shall be proportioned to the nature
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of the offense.
Ability to pay
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Indiana Ind. Code § 33-37-2-3
Eliseo v. State, 14 N.E.3d 778, 780 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)
(e) If, after a hearing under subsection (a) or (b), the court determines that a convicted person is able to pay part of the costs of representation, the court shall
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order the person to pay an amount of not more than the cost of the defense services rendered on behalf of the person. The clerk shall deposit the amount paid by a convicted person under this subsection in the county's supplemental public defender services fund established under Ind. Code § 33-40-3-1. Eliseo argues the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed a public defender fee of more than $100.00. He cites Ind.Code § 35–33–7–6, which sets a $100.00 cap for the public defender fee following a felony conviction. But the trial court “can order reimbursement [of fees] under any [of the statutes] or a combination thereof.” Jackson v. State, 968 N.E.2d 328, 333 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). Two other statutes, Ind.Code § 33–40–3–65 and Ind.Code § 33–37–2–36 give the trial court discretion in determining the public defender fee imposed. As stated above, because the trial court ordered payment after incarceration, it most likely relied on Ind.Code § 33–37–2–3 in determining the amount of the public defender fee, which does not have a cap on the amount. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering Eliseo pay a public defender fee of $300.00. See, e.g., Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 638 (Ind.Ct.App.2009) (holding the requirement to pay a $500.00 public defender fee was not an abuse of discretion).
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. Ability to pay
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Iowa Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) Ability to pay must be determined before imposition.
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2
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authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay.
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
Ability to pay
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Kansas State v. McGlothin, 747 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Kan. 1988).
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
The trial judge is statutorily required to make specific findings before imposing a fine and also must state on the record that she has taken into account the defendant's financial
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resources and the nature of the burden that payment of the fine would impose.
"The statute requires and we hold that where the defendant is convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor and is sentenced to imprisonment either in the county jail or in
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the custody of the secretary of corrections and a fine is to be imposed, the judge must make specific findings pursuant to 21–4607(2) before imposing a fine. The judge must also state on the record that he or she has taken into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment of the fine will impose, as required by 21–4607(3)."
Ability to pay
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Kansas State v. Robinson, 132 P.3d 934, 940 (Kan. 2006). Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The sentencing court must consider the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment will impose explicitly, stating on the record how those factors have
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been weighed in the court's decision.
"First, the sentencing court, at the time of initial assessment, must consider the financial resources of the defendant and the nature of the burden that payment will impose explicitly, stating
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on the record how those factors have been weighed in the court's decision. Without an adequate record on these points, meaningful appellate review of whether the court abused its discretion **941 in setting the amount and method of payment of the fees would be impossible. See State v. Moncla, 269 Kan. 61, 65, 4 P.3d 618 (2000) (noting difficulty of reviewing case in which district court failed to state findings, conclusions). Second, a sentencing court's failure to include such explicit consideration of the defendant's financial circumstances in the record does not render the sentence associated with the resulting assessment *547 “illegal,” as that term is used in Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22–3504. As we have already said, the assessment itself is not punitive; it is not a punishment or part of the sentence at all. Its connection to a sentence does not convert that sentence to one fitting the narrow definition of “illegal,” i.e., a sentence imposed by a court without jurisdiction; a sentence that does not conform to the statutory provision, either in the character or the term of the punishment authorized; or a sentence that is ambiguous with respect to the time and means in which it is to be served. See State v. Gayden, 281 Kan. 290, Syl. ¶ 1, 130 P.3d 108 (2006).
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Kansas State v. Goeller, 77 P.3d 1272, 1276 (Kan. 2003). The defendant had the burden to present evidence of his or her inability to pay restitution.
The plain language of Kan. Stat. Ann. §2002 Supp. 21-4603d(b)(1) requires restitution “unless” the court finds a plan of restitution unworkable. Moreover, “[i]f the court finds a plan of restitution unworkable, the
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court shall state on the record in detail the reasons therefor.” The design of this provision makes clear that restitution is the rule and a finding that restitution is unworkable the exception. It also leads us to conclude that it is a defendant's burden to come forward with evidence of his or her inability to pay.
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Kansas State v. Tafoya, 372 P.3d 1247, 1252 (Kan. 2016).
A sentence is not rendered illegal simply because the district court judge fails to consider the financial resources of the defendant when determining either the discretionary amount of a fine
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or the discretionary method of payment.
"[W]e conclude that a sentence is not rendered **1252 illegal simply because the district court judge fails to consider (or fails to state on the record that he or she
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has considered) the financial resources of the defendant when determining either the discretionary amount of a fine or the discretionary method of payment. Moreover, a remand from an appellate court to a district court pursuant to these authorities to correct this error is, in substance, not a remand for resentencing. As such, the Tafoya I panel was substantively correct when it limited its mandate to vacating the fine and instructing the district court to reconsider “the method of payment of the fine.”
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Minnesota Perkins v. State, 559 N.W. 2d 678, 692-93 (1997)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
In terms of timeline, at least, the sentencing judge need not specifically find that defendant has ability to pay fine before imposing it as part of sentence.
In State v. Martinson, the court of appeals analyzed its prior decisions requiring sentencing judges to consider a defendant's ability to pay before imposing costs of prosecution, and held that
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similar findings should be made before imposing a fine. 460 N.W.2d 342, 344 (Minn.App.1990), pet. for rev. denied (Minn., Oct. 25, 1990). The Martinson court noted that requiring such findings was consistent with the recommendations of the A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice. Id. at 343; see 3 A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice § 18-2.7 (1979). But in a subsequent case, the court of appeals held that a sentencing judge need not make findings as to a defendant's ability to pay a fine unless the judge decides to reduce the amount of the fine below the statutory minimum for the offense. State v. Patterson, 511 N.W.2d 476, 479 (Minn.App.1994), pet. for rev. denied (Minn., Mar. 31, 1994). Then, in State v. Lambert, 392 N.W.2d 242 (1986), the court of appeals affirmed the Patterson court's decision that a sentencing judge need not determine a defendant's ability to pay the statutory minimum fine. 547 N.W.2d 446, 447-48 (Minn.App.1996). Most recently, the court of appeals held that when a sentencing judge imposes a fine between the statutory maximum and the statutory minimum, the judge must find that the defendant is able to pay the fine. State v. Salinas, No. C6-96-180, slip. op. at 4 (Minn.App., filed Sept. 17, 1996). Perkins v. State, 559 N.W. 2d 678, 692-93 (1997).
Ability to pay
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Minnesota State v. Tennin, 674 N.W. 2d 403, 408 (2004) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? Any statute creating a co-payment obligation upon appointment of public defender violates indigent defendant's right to counsel under state and federal Constitutions.
Nonetheless, the requirement to repay costs of counsel is not without limit. In analyzing a recoupment statute from the State of Oregon, the United States Supreme Court held that Oregon's statute requiring an individual
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to reimburse the state for the services of a public defender was in line with the Sixth Amendment where “[t]hose who remain indigent or for whom repayment would work ‘manifest hardship’ are forever exempt from any obligation to repay.” Id. The question thus arises, does Minn.Stat. § 611.17, subd. 1 (c) (Supp.2003), which states that “[u]pon appointment of the public defender, an individual who receives public defender services shall be obligated to pay to the court a co-payment for representation provided by a public defender,” exempt persons who remain indigent or for whom repayment of the co-payment would work a manifest hardship? The answer to this question is critical to our analysis of the certified question. State v. Tennin, 674 N.W. 2d 403, 408 (2004) (quoting Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 53, 94 (1974)).
Ability to pay
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Minnesota State v. Palubicki, 727 N.W. 2d 662 (2007) Other applicable caselaw
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering defendant to pay restitution to murder victim's adult children for expenses arising from their voluntary attendance at murder trial, as their
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claimed expenses resulted from the crime; abrogating In re Welfare of D.D.G., 532 N.W.2d 279, State v. DeGrote, 2004 WL 556946. M.S.A. §§ 611A.04(1)(a), 611A.01(b).
Fines and fees
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Minnesota State v. Lopez-Solis, 589 N.W. 2d 290, 205 (1999) Costs incurred by a medical examiner in conducting an autopsy, preparing an autopsy report, and testifying at trial are not recoverable under the prosecution costs statute
Lopez–Solis argues that the costs of a medical examiner conducting an autopsy, preparing an autopsy report, and testifying at trial are costs that should not be imposed against a criminal defendant
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following conviction. Lopez–Solis contends that because the legislature requires county sheriffs to report all violent deaths to the medical examiner and because it is within the medical examiner's discretion whether to conduct an autopsy, the medical examiner should be viewed as an independent party. See Minn.Stat. § 390.32 (1996). We agree with Lopez–Solis that expenses incurred by medical examiners in conducting an autopsy, preparing an autopsy report, and testifying at trial may not be imposed against a criminal defendant following conviction. These services are provided independent of a criminal prosecution and therefore are not recoverable. Therefore, the $1,200 awarded by the trial court for Dr. Roe's trial testimony is reversed. State v. Lopez-Solis, 589 N.W. 2d 290, 205 (1999)
Fines and fees