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State Citation Question Brief answer Language from the opinion When does the case apply?
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Iowa State v. Van Hoff, 415 N.W.2d 647, 649 (Iowa 1987)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. A determination of reasonableness ... is more appropriately based on [a defendant's] ability to pay the current installments than his ability to ultimately pay the total amount due. Ability to pay
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 473 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. A defendant who seeks to upset a restitution order, however, has the burden to demonstrate either the failure of the court to exercise discretion or an abuse of that discretion. Ability to pay
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Iowa Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) Ability to pay must be determined before imposition.
Constitutionally, a court must determine a criminal defendant's ability to pay before entering an order requiring such defendant to pay criminal restitution pursuant to Iowa Code section 910.2. Section 910.2
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authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.
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Iowa State v. Kurtz, 878 N.W.2d 469, 472 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution?
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay.
The restitution ordered to the victim is made without regard to the defendant's ability to pay; however, other reimbursement and costs are ordered only to the extent that the defendant
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is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.
Ability to pay
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Maine State v. Davenport, 138 A.3d 1205, 1208 (Me. 2016)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
Defendant's ability to pay must be considered for restitution costs, but defendant has burden of proof on showing inability to pay
In addition to establishing the offender's burden at sentencing, the Legislature supplied the burden that applies on appeal: “On appeal of a restitution order, the offender has the burden of
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demonstrating that the incapacity was proven as a matter of law.” 17–A M.R.S. § 1325(4) (enacted by P.L. 1997, ch. 413, § 3).
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Maine State v. Lane, 649 A.2d 1112, 1115 (Me. 1994) Does the state’s separation of powers doctrine limit the ability of courts to impose or collect revenue? Yes. However, Legislative branch may give the judicial branch authority to impose additional fines, fees, and surcharges, which is the case with some Maine statutes.
All revenue received We have previously upheld mandatory minimum sentences and fines set by the Legislature to be imposed by the judiciary. See State v. Thibeault, 621 A.2d 418, 419
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(Me.1993) (mandatory minimum sentencing scheme set forth in 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1251 does not impermissibly limit judicial discretion in sentencing); State v. Briggs, 388 A.2d 507, 509 (Me.1978) (mandatory fine provided for night hunting did not violate separation of powers provision in Constitution); State v. Farmer, 324 A.2d 739, 746 (Me.1974) (minimum mandatory sentence does not violate separation of powers mandate). State v. Lane, 649 A.2d 1112, 1115 (Me. 1994) In the instant case, the Legislature directed that the judiciary add a mandatory 10% surcharge to any fine imposed. We find the judicial imposition of the surcharge was made pursuant to valid legislative authority and, therefore, is not an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers. Id.
Fines and fees
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Maine State v. Drewry, 946 A.2d 981, 991 (Me. 2008) Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? None besides indigency; court may take from offenders' funds earned while in prison
The court ordered Drewry to reimburse it in the amount of $2500 toward fees paid to Drewry's court-appointed counsel after finding that Drewry had $4265.42 in his jail account, which
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funds were obtained as a result of a settlement of Drewry's claim in the United States District Court against the Cumberland County Jail and Jail personnel for injuries he sustained from having been assaulted by another inmate while awaiting his trial. The trial court has the authority to reconsider a defendant's indigency status at any time during the course of criminal proceedings “whenever convincing evidence of non-indigence comes to [the court's] attention.” State v. Perry, 486 A.2d 154, 158–59 (Me.1985); see also M.R.Crim. P. 44. Drewry's alleged injuries, although sustained while in jail on the present indictment, were not the result of any misconduct on the part the State, the police, the court, or any witnesses. We decline to extend Drewry's invitation to expand our holding in Perry to these circumstances, and determine that the court committed no error in ordering Drewry to reimburse the State for a portion of his court-appointed legal fees.
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Pennsylvania Com. Ex Rel. Benedict Et Al. v. Cliff, 451 Pa. 427, 433-34 (Pa. 1973)
Under state constitutional or statutory law, what are the minimum requirements for a constitutionally adequate ability-to-pay determination? Include any guidance about the substantive standards to apply, the burden of proof,
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the sources of information that should be considered, and the timing of the determination (i.e. before imposition, before enforcement action, only if incarceration is threatened).
The state supreme court has held that it is a violation of the U.S. Constitution and the PA state constitution's equal protection provisions to subject a defendant to jail time
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simply because he is unable to pay a fine without first making a determination of the defendant's ability to pay. There appears to be no specific minimum requirements for ability-to-pay determinations. Apparently, however, the burden is on the defendant to inform and show the court that he is indigent.
It is nonetheless apparent that a state is prohibited from committing its citizens for fines without a reasonable opportunity being afforded to allow them to meet the court's directive consistent
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with their respective financial situation. In the cases before us there was no determination of immediate ability to meet the mandates that had been imposed, nor was there a showing that a reasonable opportunity had been given to allow the appellants to comply without immediate incarceration. We believe that the Supreme Court has made it plain that a defendant may not be incarcerated merely because he cannot make full payment of a fine. Therefore, we hold that the appellants must be given the opportunity to establish that they are unable to pay the fine. Upon a showing of indigence, the appellants should be allowed to make payments in reasonable installments.
Ability to pay
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Pennsylvania Com. v. Schwartz, 418 A.2d 637, 640 (1980) When is the determination of Defendant's ability-to-pay made? It is more rational to determine ability to pay before imposition of a fine.
If the judge does not at the outset determine the defendant's ability to pay a fine, he will often be forced to imprison him at some later point, when he
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fails to pay the fine. However, before a defendant may be imprisoned for not paying a fine, he must be given an opportunity to establish that he is unable to pay the fine. Commonwealth ex rel. Parrish v. Cliff, 451 Pa. 427, 304 A.2d 158 (1973); Commonwealth v. Shaeffer 228 Pa.Super. 734, 311 A.2d 361 (1973); Pa.R.Crim.P. 1407(a). If a defendant establishes that he is indigent, he will be allowed to make payments in reasonable installments. 451 Pa. at 434, 304 A.2d at 161. Thus, rather than waiting until the defendant is brought before the court for not paying a fine, it is far more rational to determine the defendant's ability to pay at the time the fine is imposed...Here, all the sentencing judge knew about appellant's financial background was that he had sold $980 worth of drugs to the undercover agents the previous year and was currently working with his father in the construction industry, “bringing home approximately $150 per week.” N.T. at 12, 13 (August 28, 1978, Guilty Plea hearing). This was hardly enough information to make an intelligent finding as to appellant's ability to pay the fine.
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Pennsylvania
Com. v. Verilla, 526 A.2d 398, 403 (1987). See also: Com. v. Opara, 362 A.2d 305, 312 (1976); Com. v. Pride, 380 A.2d 1267, 1270 (1977); Com. v. Johnson, 187
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A.2d 761 (1963); Com. v. Terry, 368 A.2d 279, 280 (1977)
Are there limits to the state’s ability to recoup fees for counsel under the state constitution? Legislature must act for fees for counsel to be recouped from defendant
Clearly, Damario (In re Estate of Damario, 488 Pa. 434, 412 A.2d 842(1980)) cannot be construed to permit assessment of counsel fees by a trial court simply because Appellant was
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assigned court-appointed counsel, even though he was not ruled indigent. Notwithstanding the fact that there exists no case law addressing the precise issue presently before this Court, we draw support from those cases which require a finding of statutory authority before the trial court's order of reimbursement to a public defender's office would be upheld. See Commonwealth v. Terry, 470 Pa. 234, 368 A.2d 279 (1977); Commonwealth v. Pride, 252 Pa.Super. 34, 380 A.2d 1267 (1977); Commonwealth v. Opara, 240 Pa.Super. 511, 362 A.2d 305 (1975). Absent an indication by our legislature sanctioning the assessment of counsel fees for court-appointed counsel, we decline to validate orders granting such relief to counties. Parenthetically we note that § 3 of the Act of January 19, 1968, P.L. 984, 19 P.S. § 793, at one time provided for the reimbursement by a criminal defendant or a relative of the defendant to the county “for compensation and expense incurred and paid to court-appointed counsel”. However, this statute has since been repealed, 1984, October 12, P.L. 959, No. 187, § 6.
Fines and fees