Criminal Justice Policy Program at Harvard Law School
50-State Criminal Justice Debt Reform Builder Bringing transparency to areas of significant legal complexity.
50-State Criminal Justice Debt Reform Builder Bringing transparency to areas of significant legal complexity.
Case Law
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When does this apply
| State | Citation | Question | Brief answer | Language from the opinion | When does the case apply? | |
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Maryland |
Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 7-503; Rucker v. Harford Cty., 558 A.2d 399, 404 (Md. 1989) (citing Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. State, 15 Md. + See more376, 488 (1860) (Grand, C.J., concurring))
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Under state constitutional or statutory law, under what circumstances will the imposition or enforcement of fees or fines create conflicts of interest for courts, police departments, probation departments, or other + See morelaw enforcement agencies?
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Law enforcement officials can collect fees. However, law enforcement officials should not be given any duties which directly conflict with their law enforcement duties. |
“[T]he Constitution ... does not specify or describe the powers and duties of the sheriff. These are left to the common law and the Acts of Assembly.... There is nothing + See moreto prohibit the Legislature from adding to or diminishing his duties, provided those added be not in conflict with his office as sheriff.”
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Enforcement |
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Montana | State v. Farrell, 207 Mont. 483, 498-99 (1984) | Other applicable caselaw | An indigent defendant's sentence shall be evaluated under due process analysis; a prison sentence should not be imposed as a punishment for indigency |
Thus, we assess the legality of an indigent defendant's sentence in light of fundamental fairness, implicitly recognizing the presumption in favor of individual liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. + See moreWe think it arbitrary and unfair in this case to subject the appellant to the maximum sentence simply because of an apparently unsupported notion that he may not be able to **177 make good on the recoupment and restitution within ten years. Considering the lack of findings regarding appellant's financial resources and his ability to reimburse the proper authorities, we think the judgment of the trial court should be reconsidered. The record indicates that indigency may have been the criterion for imposing the sentence in this particular case, and we therefore view the sentence in this instance as a possible infringement upon fundamental fairness. Due process requires only that indigency or poverty not be used as the touchstone for imposing the maximum allowable punishment.
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Enforcement |