authorizes a court to order the offender to make restitution of court costs and court-appointed attorney's fees “to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.

is reasonably able to pay. . . . Thus, before ordering payment for court-appointed attorney fees and court costs, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay.

under both State law and the federal Constitution, the court must first assess the defendant's ability to pay the fine by inquiring into the defendant's family and financial situation. Any additional period of incarceration imposed for failure to pay the fine must be within statutory limits and may not, in any event, exceed 90 days. Finally, the total period of incarceration imposed on an indigent defendant may not exceed the statutory maximum for the underlying offense."

courts of this State, which shall have the force of law until rescinded, changed or modified by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law. The power of courts other than the Court of Appeals to make rules of practice and procedure, or administrative rules, shall be subject to the rules and regulations adopted by the Court of Appeals or otherwise by law." "Subject to the approval of the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals, the county administrative judge of each circuit court shall develop and adopt maximum hourly rate fee schedules for court-designated individuals conducting each type of fee-for-service ADR"

to prohibit the Legislature from adding to or diminishing his duties, provided those added be not in conflict with his office as sheriff.”

the financial status of each defendant at such time or times as the circumstances shall warrant....”Obviously cognizant that shifting sands of fortune might subsequently render inaccurate a previous eligibility determination, and also recognizing that time might not always permit a thorough investigation into the financial status of a defendant prior to the rendition of services, the General Assembly provided in art. 27A a comprehensive scheme whereby the Public Defender could obtain reimbursement from defendants later found able to pay for part or all of his services."

to incarceration unless he has been afforded the right to appointed counsel. This does not mean that a constitutional right to appointed counsel attaches in every civil contempt proceeding involving an indigent defendant. Rather, we hold only that, under the due process requirements of the federal and state constitutions, an indigent defendant in a civil contempt proceeding cannot be sentenced to actual incarceration unless counsel has been appointed to represent him or he has waived the right to counsel"

errs in determining his ability to pay, the defendant must make a timely objection to the order, else the issue is waived"

defendant must be given a hearing pursuant to Rule 32(f), N.D.R.Crim.P. At the hearing, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. In this case the prosecution would have to prove that Kottenbroch was capable of, but unwilling to, repay the costs of his court-appointed counsel. Such a construction will prevent invidious discrimination between a probationer capable of repaying the costs of his attorney and one incapable of such repayment. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 48, fn. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 2122, fn. 9.

defendant must be given a hearing pursuant to Rule 32(f), N.D.R.Crim.P. At the hearing, the prosecution must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a violation of a condition of probation has occurred. In this case the prosecution would have to prove that Kottenbroch was capable of, but unwilling to, repay the costs of his court-appointed counsel. Such a construction will prevent invidious discrimination between a probationer capable of repaying the costs of his attorney and one incapable of such repayment. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. at 48, fn. 9, 94 S.Ct. at 2122, fn. 9.

the amounts or the issues of restitution or reparation are uncertain or are in dispute. However, we do not believe it applies where restitution or reparation was resolved by agreement with the defendant through plea-bargaining procedures even though the specific amount is not known and is to be determined later. When a defendant agrees to pay for the damage he caused and has a general idea of the amount, but not the specific amount in dollars and cents, which is to be determined later, he cannot later claim in the absence of fraud, that he was not made aware of the amount or that he did not agree to the amount. After a voluntary agreement has been reached on the issues of restitution and reparation it would be a useless gesture to proceed under s 12.1-32-08, NDCC. We do not believe that justice requires the performance of an idle act (s 31-11-05(23), NDCC), which it would be to require a restitution or reparation hearing after the defendant has agreed to make restitution or reparation, as the case may be.

the court as a part of Bearden's sentence. Id. at 662, 103 S.Ct. 2064. . . . The crux of the decision in Bearden rested on good faith. Id. Unlike Bearden, but similar to the defendant in Mitchell, Nordahl knew his financial situation before he entered into the plea agreement with the State's Attorney. Nordahl was in a position to know the nature and extent of his finances and to evaluate his ability to pay the restitution obligation. Prior to entering the plea agreement, Nordahl knew of the encumbrances on his farm and other property. In his affidavit, Nordahl stated it was his intention to sell the bus to satisfy a portion of the restitution and to sell part of his farm property to satisfy the rest of the obligation. Presumably, Nordahl was aware that the outstanding obligations to the bank would go unfulfilled if he paid the restitution obligation in full or, in the alternative, the bank would lose its collateral.

defendant's ability to pay that fine, and other factors of judgment involved in setting the total sentence.” Trial and appellate courts must also consider other factors, including prior history, potential for rehabilitation, financial means, and mitigating and enhancing factors that are relevant to an appropriate, overall sentence. The seriousness of a conviction offense may also support a punitive fine.” “[T]he burden is on the contemner to prove inability to pay”

legislature, which discretion, exercised within constitutional limits, is not subject to review by the courts.”

each defendant's right to counsel.” "There is in the record an interesting letter from this assistant district attorney general to the defendants' attorney in which he asserts there is a conflict of interest because the state wished to talk with four of the accused, out of the presence of counsel, to explain the possibility of entering a “nolle” as to one or more of these persons and agreeing to a fine upon a guilty plea as to the others. If the state has no case against these people they could and should move to dismiss the charges without need to consult with them, either with or without counsel present."

financially able to defray a portion or all of the cost of the accused's representation, the court shall enter an order directing the party to pay into the registry of the clerk of such court such sum as the court determines the accused is able to pay. Such sum shall be subject to execution as any other judgment and may also be made a condition of a discharge from probation. The court may provide for payments to be made at intervals, which the court shall establish, and upon such terms and conditions as are fair and just. The court may also modify its order when there has been a change in circumstances of the accused."

retain counsel. Furthermore, the legislature has placed no limits on the word “whenever.” Thus, an indigency hearing is required at any point that the defendant claims indigency."